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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the issue of gender equality in the Canadian criminal justice system. 
It dissects two specific issues, the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic 
or counselling records and the prosecution of domestic assault charges. Withui these two 
issues it is argued that the criminal justice system has failed to treat female victims of 
violent crime fairly and equally. Moreover, it is suggested that this failure is anchored in a 
neglect of the appreciation of the unique gender issues connected to these matters within 
a contextual fiamework. 
With regards to the disclosure issue, a fundamental tenet, the presumption of innocence, 
and the accused's right to full answer and defence c o d i c t  with the complainant's rights 
to privacy and equaiity before the law. It is noted that where these rights conflict the 
courts have "balanced" the male accused's rights above those of the female complainant. 
The legislation enacted to address this issue and the courts' response to its 
constitutionality is examined to reveal the rationales relied upon by the courts to support 
their positions. As well, the evolution of female rights is presented through the treatment 
of sirnilar issues within the jurisdiction of Canadian civil law. 
Related to the matter of the prosecution of domestic assault charges, two recent initiatives 
in Ontario are presented. The conventional criminal justice system's response to the 
realities connected with these type of offences has failed to appreciate the context in 
which these transgressions take place. The numerous potential causes and consequences 
of domestic violence are reviewed to depict the complexities associated with the issue 
and to stress that there is no simple solution to the potentially fatal crimes. 
Lastly, any meanuigfil reform must begin with a contextual appreciation of the gender 
components of the issues. Regarding the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's 
cowiselling records it is wged that the courts must recognize the harrn that f'lows f?om the 
breach of privacy of these highly sensitive materiais. Judicial notice, based on the 
principle of distinction between legislative facts and adjudicative facts, is suggested as a 
key to fair and equal Uiterpretation of the legislation enacted to guide the courts on these 
applications. As for the reforms set out for equality improvements for the prosecution of 
domestic assault charges, it suggested that the answer to meaninfil rectification to 
improved access to justice for the victims of domestic violence is a better appreciation of 
the causes and consequences of the behaviour, including the nature of the cycle of 
violence. 
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I would like to take this opportunity to thank a number of individuals who helped make 
this project a reality. First of al1 to Bruce Archibald and Richard Devlin, my faculty 
supervisor and second reader respectively, for their scholarly input and editorial advice. 
They both were quite patient with a young middle-aged dog trying to leam a few new 
tncks. Next, 1 should mention my employer, the Ministry of the Attorney Generai of 
Ontario and more specifically my immediate supervisor Paul Taylor. It was as a result of 
his kind words of recommendation regarding my leave of absence that allowed me to take 
a hiatus £iom the Peel Crown's office to travel east to pursue an academic goal a decade 
old. 
1 would also be remised if l failed to mention my loving wife Margo. She has taught me 
more about gender equality issues than any other person on the planet, yet 1 do not recall 
ever speaking with her, at any length, about the subject. She is a dedicated mother to our 
two-year-old son D'Arcy, a wonderfully bright individual and an exceedingly diligent 
business leader of national repute. She is a highly motivated self actualized citizen truiy 
making a significant difference by leading through example. It is the way that she lives 
her life that motivated me to study and write about the issues examined in this thesis. 
Lastly, and perhaps more of a request than an acknowledgement, 1 ask that anyone 
reading this work to consider the Canadian women harmed a d o r  killed by intimate male 
violence. It need not affect you directly, as it did our famiiy through the tragic death of 
Ms. Susan McArthur (who was shot and kilied by ber husband in Hamilton, Ontario 
shortly afler she attempted to separate from him) to appreciate the temble suffering and 
waste of human life connected with this type of behaviour. We should al1 feel as if we c m  
make a difference by recognizing the inequalities that exist within the criminal justice 
system and then discussing them openly. Much work is needed in the field so that 
meaniagfûi refonns can be commenced and carried out- 
PREFACE 
(A) Perspective and Outline 
The goal of my thesis work is to apply my practical experiences and insights that 1 
experîenced as an Assistant Crown Attorney in a large urban centre in Brampton, Ontario 
to the recent scholarly revelations that 1 have made since my return to the campus. In this 
project 1 have included a signifiant level of perspective distilled fiom some of the 
frustrations that 1 re-darly worked through as an officer of the court and a quasi minister 
of justice in the judicial district of Peel. Looking back on my practical experiences as a 
criminal prosecutor, 1 recall the two areas of my work that 1 found to be the most 
frustrating were the prosecution of sexual assault cases and the general level of 
dissatisfaction 1 had with the way that the criminal justice system dealt with the victims of 
domestic vioknce. And to be specific, many of the fnistrations 1 felt were grounded in 
female witnesses' unwillingness to participate in the fact finding missions of a trial. 
(B) Nature of the Problem 
With regard to the issue of sexual violence, 1 had the unique opportunity to be delegated 
as Our office's sexual assault CO-ordinator. in addition to meeting with countless victims 
of such offences to prepare thern for trial, 1 was also able to regularly meet with other 
prosecuting crowns, victirn support persons, investigating officers and other involved 
professionals. 1 was also routinely required to enter the adversariai arena to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that these tembly destructive and criminal acts transpired in the ways 
that these vulnerable complainants described. Al1 too ofken, 1 became frustrated by the 
inadequate d e s  of evidence and criminai processes that seemed to prevent the 
cornrnunity fiom obtaining its fair access to justice. By fair access to justice 1 mean 
systemic factors that seemed to dissuade female witnesses fiom willingly wishing to have 
their cornplaints tested and prosecuted in the criminal courts. 1 also had the distinct 
pleasure of working with the members of the Peel Rape Crisis Centre to develop a Rape 
Cisis Protocol. The purpose of this Protocol was to allow al1 of those individuals corning 
into contact with sexual assault complainants a better appreciation of the implications 
associated with the overall system and some of the very unique rights and needs of these 
predorninately female complainants. As well, the Protocol highlighted the impact that 
those individuals interacting with the complainants could have on the eventual criminal 
court process. 1 found these involvements to be professionally rewarding. They now act 
as a starting point for what 1 hope will be M e r  advancements in the criminal justice 
response to the sexual assault complainant's needs. 
On the domestic assault front, again in addition to king directly involved in the routine 
j O b requirement of the prosecution of these cases, 1 was assigned the duty of k i n g  a 
dornestic assault CO-ordinator. Such a position required many of the same public liaison 
hc t ions  and resource contacts as outlined above for the sexual assault CO-ordinator. This 
assignment was enough to give any right thinking person a temble sense of 
dissatisfaction, particularly because not enough was k i n g  done to protect the women and 
children trapped in these dangerously violent and abusive relationships. Yet my 
experiences took me even M e r  in recognizing a problem. 1 was also regularly assigned 
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as our provincial court's "duty crown." One of the responsibilities of the "duty crown" 
was to meet with women wishing to have Wei? charges dropped. Every weekday 
aftemoon fiom 2:00 until4:30, in 30 minute intervals, 1 was required to meet with 
domestic assault complainants, al1 of whom had one unifjing request: that the charges 
against their husbands or boyfiends be dropped. Regardless of the distinctions in culture, 
religion, socioeconomic status, the number of children hiding behind their mother's legs 
or, fiom tirne- to-*he, the type of make-up used to mask the physical signs of abuse, they 
al1 came with a common hope that 1 could save their mariage and their lives by ignoring 
the situation that they found themselves in. It was the most remarkable and disturbing 
social phenomenon that 1 have ever witnessed. 
... 
X l l l  
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
(A) Introduction 
Currently, a debate is being waged about the need and the forrn of reforms required to 
improve the Canadian criminal justice system. Much of this debate is focused on the 
rights of female victims of crime and their access to a fair, impartial, effective and an 
equal social systern of justice. Some believe that there is very little if anything that can be 
salvaged fiom a system based on historical and antiquated traditions that no longer have a 
place in our modem society.' Others would suggest that although reforms are warranted. a 
wholesale change in the way we protect the public fiom the harm caused by criminal acts 
and the way that we deter those individuals inclined to cause such h m  would fail to 
accomplish those goals.' This project aligns itself with the latter camp. Much 
improvement is required to maintain a just, fair. efficient and impartial criminal justice 
system. The purpose of this thesis is to establish how the Canadian criminal justice 
system has failed to treat female v i c h s  of crime fairly and equally. The core premise of 
this work is that the cnminal justice systern has failed these women because it has failed 
IL. Berzins, '"Restorative' Justice on the Eve of a New Century: the need for social 
context and a new imagination" ( April 1997) [unpublished, text delivered at the 
Canadian lnstitute for the Administration Justice, Montreal]. 
'B. Archibald, "A Comprehensive Canadian Approach to Restorative Justice: The 
Prospects for Fair Alternative Measures in Response to Crime" in D. Stuart, R. Delisle, 
and A. Manson, eds., Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminul Reports 
Forum (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1999). 
to appreciate (within a contextual fiamework) the gender issues linked to two unique 
matters that bring women before the courts. In Chapter One this thesis is developed by 
examining some of the basic principles and goals of our criminal justice system. To 
present a perspective, the work aiso provides discussion on the nature of the adjudication 
process. its parties and their respective roles. The two central issues presented here that 
test o w  criminal justice system's ability to treat female victims of crime equally, fairly 
and irnpartially are (1) the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic or 
counselling records, and (2) some recent responses to the prosecution of domestic assault 
charges. With regard to the disclosure issue, we observe the fbndamental tenet of the 
presumption of innocence and the accused's right to Ml  answer and defence corne into 
direct conflict with the right's of sexual assault complainants to privacy and equality 
before the law. These matters are dissected in chapter two. The issues connected to the 
prosecution of domestic assault charges, particularly the shortcomings of the conventional 
criminal justice system's responses to the broader contextuai realities, such as the cycie of 
violence. are reviewed in chapter three. Solutions to these problems are canvassed in 
chapter four, where it is argued that any meaningfül reforms will require a deeper 
contextual appreciation of the issues. This premise holds true regardless of the direction 
in which these improvements move - either the modification of the existing conventional 
approaches within the realm of due process, or the community based restorative justice 
paradigrn. 
To effectively accomplish these tasks a definitions and terminology section has been 
3 
included in this introductory chapter. As well, a discussion regardhg the prevalence and 
scope of these two issues is set out. This is done for two reasons. First, to establish the 
societal significance of sexual and domestic assaults, and second to identifjr some of the 
cornpiexities comected with the issues so as to further the argument that any 
improvements proffered by the reformers must include a contextual understanding of the 
issues. It is the goal of this project to suggest that a contexnial understanding of the issues 
will promote a greater level of equaiity and justice for femaie victims of crime. The 
frarnework for the development of the importance of contextualism and the parameters 
for reforrn. are set out in the theory section of this chapter. 
(B) Definitions and Terminology 
Complainant, witness, victim or sexual assault survivor? The task here is to examine 
certain definitions and explain the choices for some of the terminology used throughout 
this thesis. This is an important component of the work for two reasons. The first reason 
is that the terms used to describe the witnesses to be scrutinized in this project wili carry 
with them certain connotations on at least two distinct levels. On one level, the choices 
that are made will eventually create a tone and an inferred perspective on the subject 
matter that is discussed. In short, the terms used to describe the female witnesses will 
have an impact on their treatrnent and, therefore, their social realities. As well, the terms 
used will condition the readers' contexhiai perceptions of the issues outlined in this work. 
On a different level, the terms used will also suggest inferences about the author. The 
second reason that language is a significant component of this work is that it will be 
argued that certain inferences should be drawn fiom the language used by the courts as 
revealing a reluctance within some ruihgs to treat femaie witnesses equally. This 
highlights a broader contextual reality of women's inequality, than that merely identified 
in the criminal justice system. This position is premised on the notion that the words used 
are deeply connected to rationales used by the judges interpreting legal principles. As a 
result, the selection of tenninology should not be under-taken without some reflection. 
Many legal scholars have recognized the importance that Ianguage used in legai studies 
has for both the subject matter being discussed as well for the author theorizing on the 
subject matter. For example, G. Matoesian, studying the interaction among law, language 
and power identified this perspective and wrote: 
In very tacit and taken-for granted fashion, language categorizes and 
legitimates our interpretations about social reality, sustaining some 
versions while disqualifiing others and conceals the hierarchical 
arrangements and sexual differences between men and women. Language 
is a system of power for those who control it, and, in the context of the 
rape trial, talking power transfomis the subjective violation of the victim - 
the victim's experience of sexual terror - into an objectivity : namely, 
consensual  se^.^ 
Also J. Thompson applied a similar importance and complexity to language, as he 
contemplated: 
The analysis of ideology is fùndamentally concerned with Ianguage, for 
language is the principle medium of meaning (signification) which serves 
to sustain relations of domination. Speaking a language is a way of acting. 
' G. Matoesian, Reproducing Rupe, Dominotion rhrough Talk in the Courtroom (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1993) at 2. 
emphasized Austin and others; what they forget to add is that ways of 
acting are infused with forms of power. The utterance of the simplest 
expression is an intervention in the world, more or less effective, more or 
less endowed with institutional authority. 'Language is not only an 
instrument of communication or even knowledge' writes Bourdieu, 'but an 
instrument of power. One seeks not only to be understood but also ta be 
bel ieved, O beyed, respected, di~t in~uished. '~ 
An analogy that helps to interpret these passages is the art of painting. Language is much 
like the paint selected to depict the image or convey the imagery of the painter's desire, 
more so than the brush that is used to apply the medium. It is the paint, particularly its 
colour and texture, that creates the thoughts and mernories c o ~ e c t e d  to the work for the 
person observing and absorbing the painting. The brush merely helps the artist complete 
the process. Similady, the language used by an author creates imagery and context for 
their subject matter. 
Applying these principles to this study, one must consider the potential impact that the 
tenns selected to describe those females who have complained to the authorities about 
being sexually assaulted and find themselves before the criminal courts as witnesses wili 
have on their contextual situations and reaiities. For exarnple. some of the literature 
4 Ibid. at 220. See also J. Thompson , Studies in the Theory of ldeology (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1984) at 13 1. Further reference to L.J. Austin's position is explained at page 
6. It is emphasized that speech is a way of acting and not simply reporting or describing. 
As such an adequate account of language must take into consideration the author's 
experiences to appreciate his or her "speech-acts."The reference to Bourdieu was noted to 
P. Bourdieu, "L'econornic des echanges linguistiques,"Langue Francaise (mai 1977) at 
30. For a review of Bourdieu's contribution to the sociology of culture see N.Garnham 
and R. Williams, "Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of culture: an introduction," (1 %O), 
2 Media Culture and Society at 209-223. 
reviewed to date suggests that the term "sexual assault survivor'" is appropriate, as a 
positive tenn recognizing the strength required to live with an experience of sexual 
assault. It is a term which suggests that although the individual victim had no control over 
the assault, they are empowered to have options in their responses and are actively 
involved in the process of reclairning their personal lives. This term would seem at first 
glace to be preferred to "sexual assault victim" that infers much less ernpowerment. 
However, the difficulty that arises with both ternis is that they presuppose that the 
transgression complained of occwred in fact, prior to there being a court disposition. This 
approach violates our criminal justice system's fundamental tenet: the presurnption of 
innocence. 
A related problem of language applies to the terms of "domestic assault," "family 
violence" and "wife assault." Each of these ternis bring with them certain connotations 
and IeveIs of societai acceptance. Similarly, when attempting to choose a term to descnbe 
instances of physical violence perpetrated by a male person on a female partner's person, 
one might argue that the tenn wife assault is inappropnate because the term "wife" 
connotes an antiquated notion of relationships grounded in a tradition of proprietary 
interests and inequality. Others might suggest the ternis "domestic assault" and "family 
violence " are inappropriate because they do not accurately describe the nature of the 
M. Whalen, Counseling fo End Violence Againsr Wornen: A Subversive Model 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996) at 5 1. See also the Region of Peel (Ontario) 
Sexual Assault Emergency Response Protocol (October 1996) [unpublished, available at 
the Rape Crisis Centre, Mississauga Ontario] at page 10. 
abuse that flows almost exclusively fiom the male party towards the female victim. 
Having contemplated the potential impact that the terms selected rnight have on the 
female witnesses, the second issue to be addressed is the recognition that the tenns 
selected also reflect back ont0 myself and my own life experiences. This notion was 
eloquently e'rpressed by L. Bersianik when she wrote: 
Language is not the product of spontaneous generation. We cannot 
separate what we are from how we speak, ourselves fiom language, tongue 
fiom speech. Language reftects the mentality of the individuals who speak 
it, and who are spoken by it! 
This sarne theme composed the centrai assumptions of C. Gilligan's research that 
examined human psychological developmental theories built exclusively on observations 
of men's lives by male scientists. In her work she recognized that "the way people talk 
about their lives is of significance, that the language that they use and the connotations 
that they make reveal the world that they see and in which they act."'~his notion is 
accepted as true and explains why, in some detail, my professional experiences that have 
impacted upon my scholarly orientations are set out in the preface to this work. 
6L.Bersianik, "Women's Work" in A. Dybikowski, V. Freeman, D. Marlatt, B. Pulling & 
B. Warland, eds., In the Feminine: Women and Words /Les  Femmes et les Mots 
(Edmonton: Longspoon Press, 1983) at 157. 
%. Gi I l  igan, In a Differenr Voice Psychological Theory and Women 's Developmenr 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1982). In her work she theorizes that psychology's 
developmental theories have been established on the observations of men's lives. Here 
she attempts to correct psychology's misperceptions and refocus its view of female 
personality. This work attempts to reshape our understanding of human experience. 
The third reason that these terms need to be addressed is that 1 am a male discussing and 
analysing issues that may affect al1 members in our society, but directly impact women. 1 
am cognizant that some feminist theorist~ have examined the significance that language 
selection has on the effect of assisting in the control and oppression of women by men.' 
This has been explained, in part, by Carol Gitligan by the fact that women have 
historically been lefi out of the debate and not been allowed to contribute to the evolution 
of the language that is used to explain the theories related to human development. She 
suggested reform that would allow for women's direct involvement in the debate. Her 
hope was that: 
The interpretation of women's experience in terms of their own imagery of 
relationships thus clarifies that expenence and also provides a 
nonhierarchial vision of human connection. Since relationships, when cast 
in the image of hierarchy, appear inherently unstable and morally 
probiematic, their transposition into the image of web changes an order of 
inequality into a structure of interco~ection.~ 
Having outlined these three components of the relationship between language and 
schoIarship. the choices made as to the terms used and the rationale behind those 
selections will now be reviewed. 
8 H. Eisentstein, Contemporary Feminist Thot@ (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984).In 
this work, on the issue of the symbolic language of pornography she suggested that one 
effect was the inference of the right of men to control women (at page 1 18). Also, she 
suggested another exarnple of the gender division of labour in Western culture, "that 
artificially assigned language, culture and authority to men, and nature, sexuality, and 
feeling to women."(at pages 1 19 to 120). See also A. Dworkin Pornography: Men 
Possessing Women (New York: Pengee / G.P. Putnam's, 198 1). 
9 C. Gilligan, supra note 7 at 62. 
The Canadian courts have traditionally described fernale witnesses who come before the 
criminal justice system to testifL about criminal acts of sexual violence or interference as 
'-sexual assault cornplainant~."'~ The cases that are reviewed in Chapter Two al1 use the 
term '-sexual assault complainant." Still, it is a tenn that has been established in the 
jurisprudence without great influence fiom the women who have come to the criminai 
justice system seeking nothing more than fairness and justice. As such, some femaie 
authors suggests that sexual assault survivor is a more contextually accurate descriptor. 
However, as indicated earlier, this title presupposes the finding of fact. Thus, given that 
the applications for disclosure discussed in this thesis occur ptior to determination of 
guilt, coupled with the fact that a fundamentai tenet of our criminal justice system is the 
presumption of innocence, the term "sexual assault complainant" has been retained. It is 
presented as a "credibility neutral" term that has been selected to describe the female 
parties who corne before the courts as Crown prosecution witnesses. This is done with the 
recognition that a legitimate criticism of this choice is that it falls into the same traditional 
obstacle of disallowing the women directly impacted by sexual violence a voice in the 
debate. Still, it is hoped that as these issues develop over time, the wornen who survive 
violent sexual violations are given the oppomuiity to have direct and meaningful input in 
the determination of a term that they find most acceptable. 
' O  The first reported case in the Canadian Criminal Cases journal that deals with sexual 
assault or "rape" charges is R. v. Graham (1899), 3 C.C.C. 22 (Ont. H.C.). In this case 
that Court used the term "complainant." A review of cases afier 1899, selected at random, 
up to the pre-Charter year of 198 1, found that al1 used the term complainant to describe 
the female witnesses that testified about sexually assaultive criminal acts. For example, 
see R. v. Landry(1935), 64 C.C.C. 104 (N.B.S.C.); R. v. Blondheim (1980), 54 C.C.C 
(26) 36. 
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With regards to the instances involving male partners physicaily assaulting" their female 
partners, the terni "domestic assault" has been used, pnmarily because it is the term used 
most frequently in the literature to describe the specialized courts established to deal with 
some of the criminal charges that are examined here. It is, as  M. Whalen observes, 
probably the most popular and widely used phrase to refer to the phenornena, even though 
it obscures the social and gender dimensions of the behaviour." This choice has been 
made, in part, to avoid confusion and in full recognition of the statistics fomd and 
reported by the Canadian Panel on Violence against Women, specifically that based on 
420 in depth interviews conducted with women between the ages of 18 and 64, al1 of the 
physical violence reported by the women were perpetrated by their "male intimates."" 
This choice has also been made in fiil1 appreciation of the fact that it is tenn that is far 
' ' Although other forms of abuse are recognized by the author as significant, they are 
outside the purview of this work. The discussions within this work are limited to acts of 
physical violence between domestic partners. The tenn "assault" is defrned by section 
365 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46 as "A person commits an assault when 
(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other 
person, directly or indirectly; 
(b) he attempts or threatens, by act or gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has . 
or causes that other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to 
effect his purpose; or 
(c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts or 
impedes another person or begs." 
"M. Whalen, supra note 5 at 18. 
" ~ h e  Canadian Panel on Violence Agains t Women, Changing the Landscape: Ending 
Violence Achieving Equafity (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993) 
mereinafier, The Panel]. 
from being universally accepted as appropriate or ideal? 
Also, the terms "stereotype" or "stereo~pical" and "myths"are used in references and in 
some of the analysis sections of this thesis. No attempt has k e n  made to interpret 
rneaning into the terms used by others. However, if used within the realm of analysis, 
these tems should be interpreted by their ordinarily defmed meanings. These include: 
"n~yth" as "an ill-founded belief held uncritically, especially by an interested group,"and 
"stereotype" as "something conforming to a fixed or general pattern, especially a 
standardized mental pictue that is held in comrnon by members of a group and that 
represents an oversimplified opinion. affective anitude, or uncriticai j~d~ement . " '~  The 
essence intended in the use of these words is to suggest that factuai inferences or 
conclusions have not been drawn fiom evidence tendered at a hearing but rather represent 
unreasonable conjecture and suspicion, rooted in uncritical judgement.I6 The distinction 
between these concepts and those comected to the determination of facts through the 
principle of judicial notice are important. This is discussed in chapter four, where it is 
14 Other alternatives have been selected by scholars writing in the area. For exarnple, M. 
Steinman prefers "woman battering" as defined as "violence by men against women 
intimates regardless of their marital status of living arrangements."M. Stienman, Wornen 
Batrering: Policy Responses ( Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co. and Academy of 
Criminal Justice Sciences, 1991). Compare this term with "wife assault" as discussed in 
Hilton N., Legal Responses ro Wijé AssauZt Currenf Trends and Evoltrtions (Newbury 
Park, California: Sage Publications Inc., 1993). See also M. Whalen, supra note 5 at f 8. 
l 5  Webster '.s New Collegiate Dicfionary, 8th ed., (Toronto: Thomas Allen and Son 
Limited, 1980) S. v. "myth" and "stereotype." 
16 See R. v. Morrissey (1 995),97 C.C.C. (36) 193 (Ont. C.A.) at 209 for a review of legal 
inferences. 
argued that the principles underlying the doctrine of judicial notice are grounded in 
broadly accepted truths as compared to uncriticai judgements. 
(C) Thesis Development 
As noted earlier, the goal of this project is to assess the effkctiveness of the criminal 
justice system's fair and equal treatment of femde witnesses in two very specific 
instances: first, the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic or counselling 
records; and second. the prosecution of domestic assault charges. The purpose of this 
thesis is to determine whether the criminal justice system is treating female witnesses. 
community and male accused fairly and equally. given the unique features of these two 
specific issues. The perspective of this work is that more needs to be done to balance the 
competing interests of the parties and witnesses to ensure faimess, equality and access to 
justice for al1 interested parties. Specifically, it is suggested here that a contextuai 
appreciation of the issues is the key to meaningfùl refonn. The meaning of "context" and 
the role it plays in interpreting Iegal poIicy is discussed below in the theory section of this 
chapter. Nonetheless, sorne basic explanation is warranted at this point. 
R. Devlin describes contextualism in law as "the process of locating phenornena in their 
relational afinity to other influentid f~rces."'~For the purpose of this work contextualism 
I7R. Devlin, "The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory" (1 997) 4 Review of 
Constitutional Studies 19 at 23 .This article demonstrates that "Charter-driven 
jurisprudence has had a significant impact. both quantitatively and qualitatively, on 
attempts to identifi the interrelationships between social variables and how one 
cornponent connects to another within the realm of the law. J. Stubbs recognized this 
position as she contemplated some of the modem legal responses to the issue of violence 
against women. She wrote: 
Wornen's lives are complex, multi-dimensional and inter-connected with others. 
Any singular measure of the outcome and the resort to the law to deal with 
violence risks misrepresenting this cornplexity, and misunderstanding the context 
in which the law is involved." 
This thesis contrasts the competing interests of a maie accused person with female 
victims of violent crime and then locates these issues within their relational 1in.k to other 
influences within our society. Likewise, with regards to the phenornena of domestic 
assault. both the conventional responses and the two recent criminal justice initiatives 
created to improve the problem are examined fiom their position within the criminal 
justice system as well as a nurnber of other relational forces. For example, the possible 
causes and consequences of this form of physical violence are discussed so that the 
effectiveness of the new initiatives can be appreciated within the broader comected 
societal influences. The desired outcome of this approach is meaninglùl and effective 
reforms. 
Anglophone Canadian legal scholarship." (at 78). See also S. Sugunasiri, 
"Contextualism: The Supreme Court's New Standard of Judicial Analysis and 
Accountability" (August 1998) [unpublished, available at Dalhousie University, Halifax 
Nova Scotia]. 
"J. Stubbs, "'Cornmunitarian' Conferencing and Violence Against Wornen: A Cautionary 
Note" in M. Vaiverde et al, eds., Wijie Assault and the Canadian Criminal Jusfice System: 
Issues and Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1 995) at 265. 
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To begin to fully appreciate the parties' interests in a broader context, one fmt  needs to 
examine the adversarial process and the general nature of the adjudication procedure of 
the criminal justice system. To start, the basic function of a contested law suit should be 
considered. Hart and McNaughton describe such a social formal dispute resolution 
mechanism as "society's last line of defense in the indispensable effort to secure the 
peacefùl settlement of social conflict~."'~ Clearly, it is generally accepted that a certain 
and organized manner of dispute settlement is required to allow for a functioning society. 
This is so not only for the specific parties involved in the conflict but also for al1 
members of a comrnunity so that they c m  work, live and function in an organized, 
predictable and safe manner on a daily basis. A critical component of this dispute 
settlement system is public confidence, without which people would attempt to resolve 
conflicts themselves, which would lead to unpredictability, injustices and perhaps social 
chaos. Two significant ingredients in public confidence are impartiality and fairness in 
the process of resolution. Regarding these ingredients Hart and McNaughton concluded: 
In judging the law's handling of its task of fact-finding in this setting, it is 
necessary always to bear in muid that this is a last-ditch process in which 
something more is at stake than the truth oniy of the specific matter in 
contest. There is at stake also that confidence of the public generally in the 
irnpartiality and faimess of public settlement of disputes which is essential 
if the ditch is to be held and the settlements accepted peaceably [emphasis 
theirs] .'O 
l9 Hart and McNaughton, Evidence and lnference in the Law, D. Lemer ed., S. Schiff, 
Evidence in the Litigution Process, 3 rd ed., (Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited, 
1988) vol. 1 at 9. 
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Obviously, this social system is not perfect. Nor does the public confidence demand it to 
be. Still, it is important that court is correct in its finding of facts. It is also important that 
the court makes its determinations of issues based on the evidence presented by the 
parties and through the application of legal principles. However, complete certainty in 
this process is both "impracticable and undesirable."" 
The unique feature of the conflicts that *se between individuals within the sphere o f  
criminal conduct is the role of the state. First principles describe a system that codifies 
certain harmfül conduct. If a member of our cornmunity conducts him or herself in a way 
that contravenes the Criminal Code" then the state first becomes involved in the 
investigative stage of the fact finding inquiry. The police, having received certain 
information fiom either a complainant or a third Party, attempt to gather evidence in an 
effort to deterrnine if the conduct brought to their attention, or obsewed directly, breached 
the codified law. If the police make a determination that they have reasonable grounds to 
believe a criminal act has occurred, they may lay an information on behalf of the state 
indicating that breach. Once this is done, any individual(s) specifically harmed by the 
conduct in question, now forfeit(s) control over the transgression to the "litigant party," 
narnely the state. However, the complainant still retains the right to pursue legal remedies 
as a direct litigant in the civil justice system. These avenues are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Within the criminal justice system the state's interests are, in theory, those of the 
"lbid. at 9. 
"Criminal Code, R.S., c. C-46. 
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comrnunity. The harmed individual or victim is considered a member of that cornmunity, 
but not a direct litigant. The harmed individual's interests are represented by the Crown 
Attorney and protected by the court. The discretion to proceed or not, and in what 
fashion, is lefi to the Crown Attorney, acting as an agent for the provincial Attorney 
General, whose authority in principle can be traced to the British Sovereign, her Majesty 
the Queen." In theory, the accused person is now prosecuted on behalf of the -te. 
because the conduct alleged to have taken place, at least potentially, effects the entire 
cornmunity. The individuals specifically harmed now become Crown witnesses and, as 
indicated above. are no longer direct parties to the proceeding. 
The other litigant in this criminal process is the person charged with the criminai offence. 
The fundamental tenet of our criminal justice system is that they are presumed innocent 
until the Crown has met its onus of proving each essential element of the offence(s) 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. He or she is also entitled to due process and a 
number of procedural satèguards that reduce the possibility of a wrongfül conviction. 
The conventional method of establishing this proof within these safeguards is called the 
criminal process and has been described by H. Packer as a: 
compendious term that stands for al1 the complexes of activity that operate to 
bring the substantive law of crime to bear (or keep it fiom coming to bear) on 
persons who are suspected of having comrnitted crimes. It can be described, but 
"For a M e r  review of Crown discretion see B. Archibald, "The Politics of 
Prosecutorial Discretion: Institutional Structures and the Tension between Punitive and 
Restorative Justice" (1998) 3 Can. Crim. L.R. 69. 
only partiaily and inadequately, by referring to the d e s  of law that govem the 
apprehension, screening and triai of persons suspected of crime." 
To examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal process H. Packer created two 
models; the "Due Process Model" and the "Crime Control Model." He explained the 
purpose of the two models: 
The nvo models merely afEord a convenient way to taik about the operation of a 
process whose day-to-day functioning involves a constant series of minute 
adjustrnents between the competing demands of two value systems and whose 
normative fûture likewise involves a series of resolutions of the tension between 
competing claim~. '~ 
The Canadian criminal justice system is premised on the phiIosophy of the due process 
model. To appreciate the purpose of o w  system both models need to be explored. 
At the core of the crime control model is the pnmary hnction to be performed by the 
criminal process. specifically the repression of criminal behaviour. The failure of a 
criminal justice system that is unable to enforce cnrninal Iaws and decrease, if not 
prevent. criminal conduct is that society will develop a general disregard for the 
restrictions on their conduct as established in Iaws. As a result, the crime control model 
has as it's primary focus the eficiency with which the criminal process works to 
investigate, determine guilt and properly sentence persons that have been convicted of 
criminal conduct. H. Packer suggests that an extension of this is a de facto "presurnption 
"H. Packer, The Limifs of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1968) at 149. This work explores the shortcomings and imperfections of the criminai 
process as a means of social control. As well, the relationship between the cnminai 
process and the substance of the criminal Law is explored. 
of guilt" that operates against accused persons who are not screened out of the 
investigative stage of the pro ces^.'^ 
On the other hand, the due process model rejects the phiiosophy that investigators and 
prosecutors are well suited to accurately establish the facts of the alleged criminal 
conduct. Rather, an adjudicative fact-fmding process is preferred that incorporates the 
possibiIity of error. Therefore, equally important goals of this process are the protection 
of the "factuaily innocent" and the conviction of only the "factually guilty."" These goals 
are balanced by factual determinations within a procedure that safeguards the integrity of 
the process, including the nght to Iegd counsel and the exclusion of reliable but illegally 
obtained evidence." At it's core is the presumption of innocence. 
Another important distinction between the two models are their respective vaiidating 
power sources. H. Packer surnmarized the differences: 
Because the Crime Control Model is basically an affirmative model, emphasizing 
at every turn the existence and exercise of official power, its validating authonty 
is ultimately legislative (aithough proximately administrative). Because the Due 
Process Model is basically a negative model, asserting limits on the nature of 
official power and on the modes of its exercise, its validating authority is judicial 
"See the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, sections 10(b) and 24(2). See also R. v. Oakes 
( 1  986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.); afirming (1983) 2 C.C.C. (3d) 339 (Ont. C.A.) 
regarding the limitations on the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Charter. The 
significance of due process and other procedural safeguards is also examined. 
19 
and requires an appeai to supra-legislative law, to the law of the Con~titution.'~ 
Therefore, when we examine the Canadian criminal justice system we find the person 
entrusted to assess the many trial issues, including the protections of due process, the 
determination of facts, guilt or innocence, in a fair equal and impartiai manner is a judge. 
In some cases these responsibilities are separated, with the fact finding responsibilities 
being delegated to a jury." The jury is created frorn members of the comrnunity in which 
the offences are dleged to have transpired in." Except for the application of certain legal 
doctrines, such as judicial notice, al1 of these detenninations are made on the formal 
presentation of evidence by the parties to the litigation to the judge, who is not an expert 
to the specific issues in dispute. Hart and McNaughton point out imperfections in such a 
sy stem, particutarly that: 
No doubt the rnethod of forma1 presentation of evidence before an 
impartial but uninformed tribunal, subject to the rules which such a 
presentation seems to require, will not always prove to be the best method 
of ascertaining the truth about past happenings. The law makes no 
assumption that it will. I t  deliberately sacrifices some aids to the 
ascertainment of the tmth which might be usefùl in particular cases in 
order, partly, to serve what are deemed to be more nearly ultimate social 
values. It is an important question whether these sacrifices are justified - 
whether, granting the possibilities of improvement in peripheral matters of 
detail, the main outlines in the law's approach to the task of determining 
2 9 ~ .  Pac ker, supra note 24 at 1 73. 
'OCriminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Part XIV s.471. 
"lbid. S. 626. Each provincial jurisdiction outlines the qualifications of potential jurors, 
see for example Jwies Acr, R.S.O. 1990, c. 5.3. 
questions of this kind are not entitied to general a~ceptance.~' 
Relating this somewhat simplified ovewiew of the basic goais and interests back to our 
specific issues, this thesis will review and analyze in chapter two how the courts and 
legislative branch of governinent have attempted to reconcile the opposing interests of the 
accused person right to fidl answer and defence and the rights of the cornplainant to 
privacy and equality before the law, related to the specific issue of the disclosure of the 
complainant's therapeutic or counselling records. In chapter three, this project will 
examine the conventional approach to the prosecution of domestic assault charges and in 
doing so point out the many unsatisfactory fiailties comected to this process. The 
conventional criminal justice response to these type of offences is then compared to the 
goals and processes of the restorative justice paradigm. The distinctions between the two 
processes are examined to ascertain if a community based restorative system is better 
equipped to resolve these conflicted domestic relationships. Following this, 
improvements are postulated that stress the need to contextualize these issues to advance 
increasingly fair and equal treatment and access to justice for both the community and the 
victims of both sexual and domestic assaults. 
(D) Scope of the Problem 
1. The Numbers 
To commence this section it must be noted that it is more than a mere CO-incidence the 
''HM and McNaughton. supra note 19 at 10. 
failings within the criminal justice system related to the disclosure of a sexual assault 
complainant's records and to domestic assaults, are anchored around a gender component. 
Sesual violence, other than those incidents involving children, almost always involves a 
femaIe cornplainant and a male accused. The Canadian Panel on Violence Against 
wornen3' reported the following statistics related to the sexual abuse of fernales under the 
age of 16: 
* More than one half (54 percent) of the women had experienced some 
form of unwanted or intrusive sexud experience before reaching the age of 
16. 
*24 percent of the cases of sexual abuse were at the level of forced sexual 
intercourse. 
* 17 percent of women reported at l e s t  one experience of incest before the 
age of 16. 
* 34 percent of women had been sexually abused by a non-relative before 
age 16. 
* 43 percent of women reported at least one experience of incest and/or 
extra familial sexual abuse before the age of 16. 
* 96 percent of perpetrators of child sexuai abuse were men." 
Regarding the sexual abuse of females over the age of 16, The Panel reported the 
fol lo~lng statistics: 
* 5 1 percent of women have been the victim of rape or attempted rape, 
* 40 percent of women reported at l e s t  one experience of attempted rape. 
* Using the Canadian Criminal Code definition of sexual assault (this 
includes sexual touching): two out of three women, have experienced what 
is legaily recognized to be sexual assault. 
+ 8 1 percent of sexual assault cases at the level of rape or attempted rape 
'j The Panel, supra note 13. In the absence of nationally maintained statistics on the 
scope of the violence suffered by femdes in Our society, The Panel partially b d e d  a 
community based study in Toronto, Ontario. In the study 420 women were selected at 
random. On a one-to-one basis, in-depth interviews were conducted by trained 
interviewers. The results of these interviews were tabulated as set out above. 
reported by women were perpetrated by men who were known to the 
w ~ r n e n . ~ ~  
Similady, incidents of domestic assaults brought to the attention of investigative agencies 
almost always involve allegations of a male partner physically abusing his female partner. 
The Panel found the following disturbing statistics related to îhe issue of incidents of 
physical assault in intimate relationships: 
* 27 percent of women have experienced a physical assault in an intimate 
relationship. 
* In 25 percent of the cases, women who were physically assaulted 
reported the their partners explicitly threatened to kill them. 
* In 36 percent of the cases, women reporting physical assault also 
reported that they feared they would be killed by their male intimate. 
* 50 percent of the women reporthg physical assault also experienced 
sexual assault in the context of the sarne relationship 
+ All of the physical assaults on women were perpetrated by male 
intima te^.^^ 
These numbers provide us with some insight as to the scope of the victimization of 
women in our society. Still, it is but one study that has limited application to an 
assessrnent of the national picture. One national survey that did definitively address the 
j51bid. at 9. Note "sexual assault" is not a defined term within the Criminal Code, 
although section 27 1 creates the offence and provides for punishments. "Sexual assault" 
is an assault as defined in section 265 of the Criminal Code committed in circumstances 
of a sexual nature. The test to be applied by a judge or jury to determine if the conduct in 
question is of a sexual nature is objective. The entire set of circurnstances must be 
considered to make a determination of conduct amounting to a sexuai assault. The intent 
or purpose and motive of the accused are factors that should be considered to deterrnine 
whether or not the conduct in question is of a sexual nature. R. v. Chase (1 987), 64 
C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Moreau (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 359 (Ont. CA.); R. 
v. Cook (1 98S), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (B.C.C.A). Section 15 1 of the Criminal Code does set 
out the conduct included in the offence of "sexual interference," specifically as "every 
person, who for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with apart of the body or 
with an object, any part of the body of a person under the age of fourteen years." 
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most estreme form of violence was the Homicide Survey." It revealed that in 1991. 270 
women in Canada were murdered. Investigative agencies reported that of this number, 
225 were classified as solved. From this categorized number, it was determined that 210 
of the women were killed by men and 121 were killed by their intimate partnen. 
The other significant Canadian study that attempted to determine the prevalence of 
violence suffered by women on a national basis was Statistics Canada's Violence Against 
Women Survey conducted in 1993." The purpose of this s w e y  was to elicit information 
on the full range violence, both sexual and physical assault abuses, that women 
cxperience in al1 types of relationships. R. Gartner and R. Macmillan explained the 
process used in the survey: 
Women reporting incidents of victimization were asked a series of detailed 
questions about the characteristics of the incident. the effects of the 
victimization on them. and the actions they took as a consequence of their 
\rictimi~ation.'~ 
"Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, The Homicide Survey. 1991 (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada. 1993). These numbers c m  be compared to the 1988 rates wherein 65% of the 
homicides victirns were men and 35% were women. A total nurnber of 70 women were 
killed by their husbands. See "Homicide" in Canadian Social Trends Vol. 2, (Toronto: 
Thompson Educational Publishing Inc., 1994) at 4 19-420. 
" ~ h e  survey took place between February and June 1993; see K. Rodgers, iWife Assault 
in Canada" Canadian Social Trends (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1994) at 3, and K. 
Rodgers, "Wife Assault: The Findings of a National Survey," Juristat. March 1994, Vol. 
1 4, No. 9 Cat. 85-002, as cited in the Final Report. From Rhetoric to Reality Ending 
Domestic Violence in Nova Scotia, Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia February 
1995. 
39R. Gartner and R. Macmillan, "The Effect of Victim - Offender Relationship on 
Reporting Crimes of Violence Against Women," (1 995) 37 Canadian Journal of 
Criminology Volume 393 at 40 1. 
The survey found that: 
Violence against women by their spouses is widespread in Canada 
According to the 1993 Violence Against Women Survey, 29% of the 
women or 2.7 million who had ever been married or lived in a cornmon 
law had been physically or sexually assaulted by their partner at some 
point in the relationship. Such assaults included only incidents where the 
violent partner could be charged under the Canada's Criminal code. Of 
women who had been abused by their spouse, 3 12,000 had experienced the 
violence in the year before the ~urvey.'~ 
The survey revealed that 25% of the women were victimized by strangers and the 
remaining 43% were victimized by boyfriends. dates, relatives or other men known to the 
victirns. The form of the violence was divided equally between sexual assaults, sexual 
touching and physical assaults." 
The most recent statistics on domestic violence in Canada reveal that little has changed 
since these studies were published. In a statistical profile released on June 1 1, 1999 by 
Stats Canada, it was reported that: 
According to police-reported data, women were more likely to be victimized by a 
spouse, either married or cornmon law, then were men. About 3 1 % of al1 females 
victims of violence in 1997 were attacked by a spouse, compared with only 4% of 
al1 male victims of violence. As a result, 88% of spousal assault victims were 
women."' 
' O  Final Report, supra at note 38 at 2. 
"' R. Gartner and R. Macmillan, supra note 39 at 405. 
'"1. Kulik, "Family Violence: A Statistical Profile 1997," Stats Canada Daily, June 1 1, 
1999, avaiIable at Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics. 
As explained in Chapter Three, we are also aware that violence which occurs within 
domestic relationship bas nwnerous possible causes and consequences, including an 
increasingiy violent cycle of abuse. This, coupled with the ciramatic under-reporting that 
is associated with this forrn of criminal behaviour, helps create an alarming pictwe. 
The Panel reported a concern for the nurnber of incidents of violence that are brought to 
the attention of the authorities. Without refemng to any specific studies the report 
concluded: 
Despite a wealth of research in the area, we have only educated estimates 
of the prevalence of violence against women in Canada today. No matter 
what methodology is used, the figures are consistently alarming and most 
researchen point out, underestimate the incidence of vi~lence.~' 
This is a complicated and multi-dimensional problem. To begin to understand these 
complexities. the reasons that attempt to explain the phenornena must explored. One 
study attempted to examine the factors that affect under-reporting. Rosemary Gartner and 
Ross Macmillan studied the significance of the parties relationship on the reporting of 
violent crimes against w ~ r n e n . ~  Based on the data from the 1993 Canadian Violence 
Against Women Survey they found that al1 forms of violence perpetrated against women 
"'The Panel, supra note 13 at 8. 
"4R. Gartner and R. Macmillan, "The Effect of Victim - Offender Relationship on 
Reporting Crimes of Violence Against Women" (1 995) 37 Canadian Journal of 
Crirninology 393. See also C. Bumis and P. Jaffe, "Wife Abuse as a Crime: The Impact of 
Police Laying Charges" (1983) 25 Canadian Journal of Criminology 309. 
were under-reported with only 15% of incidents brought to the attention of the 
authorities" and that "violence by known offenders is much less Iikely to come to the 
attention of the authorities than is violence by strangerdA6 This position was explained 
by the nature of the questions asked by the survey. Specifically, the researchers 
highlighted that respondents were asked about their victimization and not about a 
particular incident. They noted that, as revealed in the survey, 63% of the women reported 
that they had been victimized more than once and 30% reported that they had been 
victimized four or more times.'" These numbers lead to the conclusion that the estimates 
of under-reporting could be significantly more substantial. For example. the researchers 
esamined the survey's estimate of 23.7% of the women whose victimization ever 
becomes known to the authorities. Regarding this percentage. they noted: 
It  does not tell us the percentage of incidents of spousal violence that 
police learned about, because some woman are victimized many tirnes by 
their spouses. If we assume that on average each victim of spousal 
violence was victimized five times, the percentage of spousal incidents 
reported to the police could be as low as 5%, or less than the percentage 
for any other victim-offender relati~nship.'~ 
The explanations for this under-reporting are numerous. They include the victims fear of 
"Ibid. at 406. Note that estimate of 5 times was acknowledged by the researchers as a 
crude estimate based on data fiom the survey. They were also able to determine fiom the 
survey that only 7% of the women reported only one incident and contacted the police 
(see notes1 1 and 12 at 424 and tables 1 and 2 at 405 and 407 respectively). 
reprisal fiom the male batterer, feelings of shame and degradation, feelings of 
responsibility and low self esteem, a sincere hope that the male's behaviour can and will 
be changed' the economic factors that make the victims feel trapped in the relationship 
and they worry that they will not be believed."' 
A sociological explmation was proffered by D. Black. It was his view that because of the 
nature of ongoing relationships between people they are less likely to get the police 
involved. This was theorized because of the continued need for interaction and intimacy 
between the parties as well as the availability of less expensive and less formal options. 
These options included extended familiai groups. These same restrictive principles 
obviously do not apply to strangers and thus explains why stranger - victim offences are 
more likely to be reported to the a~thorities.'~ 
A ferninist Framework analysis of the under-reporting disagrees with the sociological 
presumption "bat the behaviour of law can be studied apart from the motivations or 
interests of individuals and without reference to the purpose, value, or impact of law. 
Feminist perspectives are aiso at odds with what are seen as de-gendered and de- 
" ~ h e  Panel. supra note 13 at 8. 
'OD. Black, The Behuviour of L m  (New York: Academic Press, 1976); and D.Black, 
"Social Control as a Dependent Variable" in D. Black ed., Toward a General Theory of 
Social Confrol (New York: Academic Press, 1984) as cited in R. Gartner and R. 
Macmillan, supra note 44. 
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contextualized rational choice models of victim decision making."" Thus, feminist theory 
would explain the likelihood of decreased reporting in intimate relationships for two 
reasons. The first is that victims of domestic violence are less likely to perceive the 
assaultive behaviour as criminal conduct. This recognition results from a specific male 
dominated construction of knowledge about intimate relations and a more general male 
dominated construction of reality." 
From these constmctions it is postulated: that both men and women perceive domestic 
violence as less serious than stranger violence; that domestic relationships are private and 
intimate by nature' so to brhg the violent abuse to the attention of the authorities would 
result in smbarrassment, sharne and a termination of the relationship." As well. if a 
woman was to consider contacting the police and thereby making the incident a public 
matter. a second process discourages this option for help. R. Gartner and R. Macmillan 
suggest other life expenences are considered and a conclusion is reached about the costs 
of such public action. Regarding this rationale these two researchers proposed: 
These costs and benefits reflect gender differences in power, not simply 
inevitable and gender-neutral costs of resorting to the law. Feminist 
analysts argue that women choose not to cal1 the police because they know 
(from their own life experiences) that they may not be taken seriously. may 
be blamed for their victimization, may incur the wath of their victimizer, 
farnily, or friends, may not be able to control the legal process once it 
5'R. Gartner and R. Macmillan, supra note 44 at 397. 
"Ibid. at 397. See also C. MacKimon, "Feminist, Marxism, Method and State: Toward a 
Feminist Jurisprudence, " 1983, 8 Journal of Women in Culture and Society at 635 - 658. 
decides to treat the incident as a "real crime," may lose their home and 
children, and, ultimately, may not be protected fiom fùrther violence." 
Therefore, aithough the two theories differ in their supporting rationalet they both predict 
the sarne outcorne, specificaily that female victims of violence incurred in an intimate 
relationship are less likely to become involved in the criminal justice system than other 
female victims of stranger violence. 
More importantly, through this review of potentiai explanations, a need for a contextual 
appreciation of the interrelationship of the variables that have been Iinked to the under- 
reporting of domestic assaults is highlighted. Efforts have been made in this work to 
depict components of the crirninal justice system that continue to create hurdles for 
Lvomen who wish to turn to the justice system for a fair and just dispute resolution but fail 
to do so for a nurnber of reasons. Regardless of these reasons, it is argued in this thesis 
that a refusal by physically abused women to access the criminal justice system is an 
indication cf its M u r e  to adequately respond to the unique problems of domestic assault 
victim. It is postulated that access not exercised for systemic reasons is access denied. 
Furthemore, denied access to justice is a primary example of a gender based inequality. 
These issues are exarnined in both chapters three and four of this thesis. 
"lbid. at 398. See also R.E. Dobash and R.P. Dobash, Wornan Violence and Social 
Change (London: Routledge, 1992); J. Hanmer, J. Radford, and E. Stanko, Women, 
Policing and Male Violence ( London: Routledge, 1992); P. Pincard, The Omitted 
Reality: Husband - Wife Violence in Ontario and Policy Implications for Education 
(Maple, Ontario: Learners Press, 1982); L. Rouse, R. Breen, and M. Howel, "Abuse in 
Intimate Relationships: A Cornparison of Married and Dating College Students," 1988. 3 
Journal of Interpersonal Violence at 414 - 429. Al1 as cited in R. Gartner and R. 
Macmillan, supra note 44. 
(E) Theory 
As outlined above, this thesis examines the criminal justice system's treatment of fernale 
witnesses as they corne before the courts as complainants of h m  caused to them by the 
alleged criminal conduct of another party. What is it about the gender of sexual assault 
and domestic assault complainants/witnesses that comects them to an unequd access to 
justice? Perhaps it has less to do with any particular thing about these individuals that 
warrants careful review, but rather it has more to do with how the criminal justice 
system's rules of law and court processes consider the situations that bnngs them to court 
in the first place. It is the hypothesis of this project that a component of the problem is 
that the courts have failed to adequately consider the legal issues set out above within 
their proper context. That equal treatment of these witnesses and their demands for 
criminal justice requires the courts to contextuaiize their issues, and not necessarily 
exclusively within an envelope of gender, but also within broader social, psychological 
and economic contexts. 
For exarnpte, with regards to the rights of privacy that al1 members of our community 
have to their counselling a d o r  therapeutic records, the courts have failed to give 
sufficient weight to the affect that an intrusion into a complainant's therapeutic records 
has on both the witness as well as society as a whole. More specificdly, the potential 
harm which flows fiom such an intrusion to the individuals directly involved and to the 
public generally must be considered. There is a chiIling effect connected with such 
invasions of privacy, in addition to a decreased effectiveness of o u .  criminal justice 
system's ability to determine facts and, if appropriate, deter those criminally responsible 
from harming again. To improve women's access to justice and equality these matters 
must be addressed. Moreover, the reforms required to improve this situation will warrant 
a contextual appreciation of al1 the issues, before the courts can effectively embark on a 
balancing process to give effect to the irreconcilable rights of the accused to full ansver 
and defence and the complainant's right to privacy. More importantly. once the potential 
harms are at least addressed, it will be postulated that there is no room for the 
considerations of stereotypical myths and beliefs as relevant factors when determining 
whether or not records should be opened, reviewed and then disclosed to the very 
individud(s) alleged to have caused the harm that created the need for counselling in the 
first place. 
Similarly. with regards to occurrences of domestic assault, the criminal justice systern 
needs to contextualize the complicated nature of the problem so that a witness's 
recantation of a complaint can be considered in the most complete light as is possible. 
This will allow for an extension of the t'undamentals created in the case law that have 
adopted a more principIed approach in the assessing of the relevance and admissibility of 
reliable and necessary evidence that was once described as inadmissible hearsay by our 
courts. Or, in the alternative, if one believes that the forcing of the trial process against 
the wishes of the complainant may be inappropriate in some instances, then o w  cnminal 
justice system needs to create other options. The alternatives provided for within a 
32 
community based restorative justice scheme are examined in chapter four. It is argued 
here that drarnatic improvements are warranted, such as the educating and counselling of 
the parties to ensure the abuse, oppression and violence against al1 women cornes to an 
end. 
I t  is stressed that the one underlying theme in the conventional response of the crimulai 
justice system to these two problems is a failure to contexnialize the unique issues that 
affect female victims of violent crime within their broader social realities. But what is 
meant by the term contextualize? As well, if it is argued that any meaningful reforms 
implemented must be cognizant of these matters and account for the interrelationships of 
the factors that create the problems identified, how then does one place the issues within 
their proper context? 
The Canadian courts have, in the past, relied on the notion of  context in their attempts to 
interpret legai policy, particularly in their efforts to set constitutional legal principles. For 
example. in R. v. Big M Drug Marr" the corporate respondent tested the constitutional 
validity of the Lord's Day Act? The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislation in 
question did infringe upon the respondent's section 2 (a) Charter right, the guarantee of 
the fieedom of conscience and religion. In its determination of the issue, the majority of 
the Court. considered the broad legislative history of the law, the language used to 
55(1985). 18 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.). 
56R.S.C. 1970, C. L-13. 
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articulate the right, other international jurisdictions treatrnent of the matter, and attempted 
to reveai the law's purpose and efTect." Dickson J., writing for the majority, declared that 
purpose of the legislation could only be ascertained by examining "the character and the 
larger objects of the Charter itself." Moreover, with regards to the Charter itself he 
emphasized that it was not enacted in a "vacuum" and as such it must be placed "in its 
proper linguistic, philosophical and histoncai con te~ t s . "~~  This analysis established a test 
that wouid require courts interpreting statutes to contemplate the particular law in 
question within a broad context, that would, over time, push judges beyond an abstract 
approach to determining legislative meaning. 
This principle was advanced fUrther in the case of Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney 
General). 59 In this case the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 3 O(1) of the 
hdicatrtre ~ c t . "  that limited the rnatters that could be published about court proceedings 
involving matrimonial disputes and civil proceeding pre-trials generally, contravened the 
publisher's freedom of the press. The Court went on to hold that such a lirnit was an 
unreasonable one under section 1 of the Charter- Wilson J., concumng with the majority, 
noted that there were two possible approaches that could be taken to ascertain the 
Charter's application to a challenged piece of legislation; the "abstract approach" or the 
57R. V. Big M Drlrg Mart Lfd, supra note 55 at 403 to 4 17. 
58?bid. at 424. 
"(1 989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577. 
60R.S .A. 1980, C. J- 1. 
-*contextual appr~ach. '~ '  For either test the anaiytical strategy was the same; a court 
would be required to identiQ the "underlying value which the right alleged to be violated 
was designed to be protected.'"' Also, both approaches mandated that an interpreting 
court had to establish the legislative purpose of the irnpugned law. Praising the values of 
the contextual approach Wilson J. wrote: 
One virtue of the contextual approach, it seems to me, is that it recognizes that a 
particular right or fieedom may have a different value depending on the context. It 
may be, for example, that the tieedom of expression has greater value in a 
political context than it does in the context of disclosure of the details of a 
matrimonial dispute. The contextual approach attempts to bnng into sharp relief 
the aspect of the right or fieedom which is truiy at stake in the case as well as the 
relevant aspects of any values in cornpetition with it. It seems to be more sensitive 
to the reality of the dilemma posed by the particular facts and therefore more 
conducive to finding a fair and just compromise between the two competing 
values under section one.63 
Since its advent into the Canadian courts judicial process," scholars have theorized about 
contextualism and its role in the promotion of women's equality. For example, C. Boyle 
lias urged judges and lawyers to adopt a more contextual approach to better familiarize 
themselves with the situations and experiences of women so that laws can be formulated 
6'lbid at 58 1 . Wilson J. identifiers the approach taken by Cory J., Dickson C. J-C. and 
Lamer J. concurring, as an abstract analysis of the issues. 
"lbid. at 584. The values in conflict in this case were the right of the public to an open 
court process and the freedom of the press to publish what transpires in those courts and 
the rights of the litigants to the protection of their privacy in matrimonial cases. 
64 For an excellent review of the Canadian's courts use of contextualism see S. Sugunasiri 
"Contextualism: The Supreme Court's New Standard of Judicial Anaiysis and 
Accountability" [unpublished] Dalhousie University, Halifax Nova Scotia, August, 1998. 
in a manner that more accurately reflects the conditions of women in a violent ~ociety.~'  
On the topic of a feminist approach to criminal defences, specifically regarding expert 
evidence, she speaks of the need for courts to "make themselves familiar with the 
individual situation, the societal context, and with perspectives that challenge their own 
intuitive view of the fa~ts. '*~ Similarly, on her analysis of the "imminent attack" doctrine 
connected with the principle of self defence within the reaim of domestic violence she 
urges a contexnial understanding of the broader issues, writing that: 
A feminist analysis in contrast would encourage the asking of the Whynok' 
non-questions in an attempt to understand the redistic choices faced by a 
women in such a situation, before a decision was made about criminal 
responsibility. This relates to the method by which that [sic] dificult 
questions should be approached. When a feminist analysis is used, it is 
possible to see as relevant things that we know about the experiences of 
battered women, the responses of the police, the comparative sizes and 
"Boyle. C.. "A Feminist Approach to Criminal Defences" as cited in R. Devlin, ed. 
Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications 
Ltd.. 1991). 
6iR. V .  Whynot (1 983) 9 C.C.C. (3d) 449. Jane (Whynot) Stafford killed her husband 
while he was asleep in his truck. She was charged with murder. Pnor to this act, the 
deceased had made a number of threats to Stafford. At the trial evidence was called to 
support the position that he had been a very violent man and was capable of canying out 
his threats to kill Stafford's fmily if she ever lefi him. The trial judge left with the jury 
the option of self defence. She was acquitted. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
overturned the acquittai, holding that at the time of the killing there was no imminent 
danger of attack and therefore self defence should not have been left with the jury. At the 
second trial Stafford pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 6 months in 
custody. In R. v. Lavallee 11 9901 1 S.C.R. 852, the Supreme Court of Canada specifically 
disapproved the imminent attack requirement. The Court allowed expert testimony to be 
considered to determine the reasonableness of a "battered wife's" belief that the only way 
to Save her own life was to kill her batterer. The expert evidence was determined to be 
relevant, although not determinative of the issue reasonableness relating to an accused's 
self defence perceptions and actions. 
strengths of men and women, and the redistic economic choices of women 
[ernphasis her~] .~ '  
It is submitted here that the same concepts that C. Boyle writes about in ternis of self 
defence can be applied to some of the issues associated with female prosecution 
witnesses who come before the courts alleging they have been violently victimized by 
their male partners. For example, it is argued that the entire abusive experience should be 
considered by the court in determining issues of reliability if, at the time of the trial, the 
witness recants her earlier recollections of the orïginally alleged domestic violence. An 
appreciation of the entire abusive experience will require the criminal justice system to 
Iocate the violence and its effects in its relational affinity to a number of different possible 
causes and consequences. 
In a similar vein, M. Eberts promotes the need to establish a female perspective within 
trial advocacy. She describes it as '?he work of putting before the courts the facts of 
women's [ives as women see them.'*9 This process of contextualization to support 
equality encourages exposing in the legal system "unseen maleness, and attempt to 
deconstmct it, in order to make room for the view points, the concerns and the 
experiences of ~ornen." '~ To m e r  her position she reviews a passage fiom R. v. 
"M. Eberts, "New Facts for Old: Observations on the Judicial Process" in R. Devlin, ed., 
Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications 
Ltd., 1991) at 469. 
Even women lawyers who believe in women's equality c m  be 
caught up in the affinnation of the male vision of the world. As 
Madame Justice Wilson points out in R v. Morgentaler. the more 
recent struggle for women's rights has k e n  a struggle to eliminate 
discrimination, to achieve a place in a man's world, to develop a 
set of legislative reforms in order to place wornen in the same 
position as men. It has not, she points out, been a struggle to define 
the rights of women in relation to their speciai place in the social 
structure and in relation to the biological distinction between the 
hvo sexes. The contemporary move, by contrast is to translate 
'women's needs and aspirations' into protected rights and assert 
'her dignity and worth as a hurnan beingTZ 
It is her position that a modem liberal notion of equality, particularly that al1 individuals 
should simply be treated the same, does not promote tme fairness and irnpartiality. As 
such. she proposes that as judges and lawyers attempt to create an "official version of 
reality" they should do so without submerging the redities of women's lives into 
stereotypes and uniquely male  perspective^.^ Building on this perspective. it is argued 
here that. in instances of applications for the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's 
therapeutic or counselling records the courts need to fully and contextually appreciate the 
broader societal and the gender specific issues interconnected with the legal issues placed 
before them. For example, the courts must not only consider the amount of individual 
h m  caused to the complainant whose private counselling record are opened. but they 
must also consider the chilling effect that such invasions will have on other victims of 
'IR. v. A4orgentaIer, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
"M. Ebens, szipra note 69 at 469. 
"lbid. at 473 and 490. 
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sexual violence willingness to corne forward to the criminal justice system with their 
complaints. 
Support for this theory can be found in Canadian jurisprudence assessing equality rights 
as established in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.'' In 
Andrews v. The Law Society of British Columbiaïs considered the constitutionality of 
section 42 of the Barrisrers and Solicitors ~ c t ' ~  that imposed a citizenship requirement 
for admission into the legal profession. Andrews was a permanent resident in Canada and 
met ail the other requirements needed to practice law. Being prevented fiom practicing 
law by the citizenship requirement, he challenged the law arguing it violated his 
guaranteed right to equality. The Court agreed and held the rule that barred an entire class 
t 
of persons, specifically non-citizens, fiom certain forms of employment violated section 
15 of the Charter. In their determination of the issue as to whether or not a member of the 
public fell within a group of persons enwnerated in section 15, the Court established a 
two-fold test. Courts would be required to consider both the law subject to the challenge. 
and the place of the group within the social, political and legal fabric of society 
challenging the law. In other words the Court was concerned with the application of the 
" Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982. being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c .  1 1 Fereinafter "Charter"]. 
75~ndrews  v. Law Socieîy ofBritish Columbia (1 989), 56 D.L.R. (4'h) 1 (S.C.C.). 
76 R.S.B.C. 1979, C. 26, s.42. 
 la^.^ Wilson I.. wrote for the majonty in it's final determination of the issues, but agreed 
with Mclntyre J.'s position as to the way that section 15 of the Charter should be 
interpreted and applied." On the issue of equality McIntyre J. wrote: 
It is a comparative concept, the condition of which may only be 
attained or discerned by comparison with the condition of others in 
the social and political setting in which the question arises. It must 
be recognized at once. however, that every difference in treatment 
between individuals under the law will not necessarily result in 
inequality and, as well, that identicai treatment rnay frequently 
produce serious inequalitym 
Furthemore. he rejected the classic modem liberal notion of equdity, that al1 people 
should be treated the sarne. stating that: 
It is. of course obvious that legislatures may - and to govern 
effectively - must treat individuals and groups in different ways. 
Indeed, such distinctions are one of the main preoccupations of 
legislatures. The classifiing of individuals and groups, the making 
of different mies regdations, requirements and qudifications to 
different persons is necessary for the govemance of modern 
society. As noted above, for the accommodation of differences, 
which is the essence of tme equality, it will fiequently be necessary 
to make  distinction^.^^ 
Approximately three months later, the Supreme Court of Canada was able to revisit the 
interpretation of section 15 of the Charter. In R. v. Turpin. '' Sharon Turpin and two other 
- - - -  
771bid. at 10. 
781bid. at 3 1. 
791bid. at 10. 
"Ibid. at 1 3 .  
'IR. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296. 
individuals were charged with first degree murder in the province of Ontario. The 
sections of the Criminai Code" that required the accused to be tried by a judge and jury, 
were challenged as unconstitutional, in part because the province of Aiberta allowed for a 
j udge alone trial in similar circumstances. The trial judge allowed the application, and the 
trial was conducted before a judge alone. Turpin was acquitted and the other two co- 
accused were convicted of second degree murder. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that 
the trial judge conducted the trial without jurisdiction and set aside ail three verdicts and 
ordered a new trial for al1 three parties. The Supreme Cowt dismissed the appeai, holding 
that the accused were denied equality before the law as they were treated more harshly 
than those individuals charged with the same offences in Alberta. However, the Court 
went on to proclaim, such a distinction was not discriminatory in its purpose o r  effect 
and. therefore. the legislation that rnandated a trial by judge and jury did not violate an 
accused's rights as guaranteed by section 15 of the Chi~ter.~' On the issue of context and 
the notion of equality. Wilson J., wrïting for the Court stated: 
If the larger context is not exarnined, the section 15 anaiysis may 
become a mechanical and sterile categorization process conducted 
entirely within the four corners of the impugned legislation. A 
determination as to whether or not discrimination is taking place, if 
based exclusively on an anaiysis of the law under challenge is 
Iikely, in my view, to result in the same kind of circularity which 
characterized the similarly situated similarly treated test clearly 
rejected by this Court in ~ n d r e w s .  
"Criminal Code, R.S., c. C-46, sections 427,428 and 429. 
"Ibid. at 133 1. 
BJlbid. at 1332. 
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More recently in the Eldridge Casess the Supreme Court of Canada assessed the Charter's 
section 15 equality guarantees within the context of equal access to medical services. in 
particular, three deaf individuais brought an action against the British Columbia 
provincial govemment for failing to provide funding for sign language interpreters for the 
deaf while receiving medical services. They argued that failing to provide such services 
impaired their ability to communicate with their doctors and this effectively equated to an 
unequal level of medical services. The Suprerne Court agreed and held that the legislation 
that did not accommodate equally for the deaf was unconstitutional and could not be 
j ustified as a reasonable limit within a !tee and democratic society. The Court referred to 
much of it's earlier reasoning articulated in Andrews, including the need "to look not only 
at the impugned legislation .. but also to the larger social, political and legal ~ o n t e x t . " ~ ~  In 
Chapter Two. this thesis will examine to what level and to what extent the courts have 
analysed the issues surrounding the disclosure of female cornplainants' therapeutic or 
counselling records within such a contextual framework. Sirnilarly, in chapter three 
prosecutorial responses to domestic assault charges will be scrutinized to review the level 
of contextualization that is employed by the criminal justice system, when deding with 
these types of charges. 
Also, the Court voiced a concem for the fonn of discrimination based in stereotypical 
thinking. Although the Court was specifically referencing societal biases against the 
85~Zdridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (l997), 15 1 D.L.R. 577 (S.C.C.). 
861hid. at 6 1 3. 
disabled, it is suggested that the principles articuiated are universally applicable to any 
form of discrimination anchored in inaccurate stereotypical thinking. Specifically. the 
Court considered the broader sociai context that the disabled m u t  face daily: 
It is an unfortunate tmth that the history of disabled persons in 
Canada is largely one of exclusion and marginalization. Persons 
with disabilities have too often been exciuded fkom the labour 
force. denied access to opportunities for sociai interaction and 
advancement. subjected to invidious stereoty-ping and relegated to 
 institution^."^' 
Most recently. the Supreme Court of Canada has had an opportunil to review these 
priiiciples. In Lrnv v. ilfirzisfer ofHirrnan Resotrrces Developrnent, a 30 year old woman. 
n.ithout dependent children or disability. was denied survivor's benefits under the 
Canadian Pension Plan. For persons such as Ms. Law, the Plan gradually reduces the 
survivor's pension by l/lSOth of the full rate of the return for each month that the 
claimant's age is less than 45. as deterrnined at the tirne of the contributor's death." The 
appellant argued that sections of the Plan that limited her arnounts payable based on her 
age violated her section 1 5 equality rights. as guaranteed by the Cheer. The Supreme 
Court of Canada disagreed with the appellant and, in the process, established a detailed 
guideline for iower courts to assess the validity of alleged section 15 Charter violations. 
88FiIe NO.: 25374, judgement March 25, 1999. The constitutional question in this case 
was whether sections 44(l)(d) and 58 of the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C., 1985. c. C-8. 
infnnged section 15(1) of the Charter on the g o n d  that they discriminate on the b a i s  of 
age against widowers and widows under the age of 45? The Court held that the sections 
did not create a Charter infnngement. 
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Iacobucci J., writing for the majority, set out 10 points to be followed in such inquiries. 
These guidelines included a discussion of the general approach to these types of inquiries, 
their purpose, and the requirement for the courts to embark on both a comparative and a 
contextual analysis of the issues. 
With regards to the general approach, Iacobucci J. determined that the nature of a section 
15 equality detemination could not be fixed in an exact formula. He codnned  the 
Court's earlier rulings and held: 
In accordance with McIntyre J.'s caution in Andrews, supra, 1 think that it is 
sensible to articulate the basic principles under S. 15(1) as guidelines for analysis, 
and not as a ngid test which might risk being mechanically applied. Equality 
analysis under the Charter must be purposive and c o n t e x t ~ d . ~ ~  
Next. he reiterated the purpose of the equality guarantee. On this issue he wrote: 
It may be said that the purpose of S. I5(1) is to prevent the violation of essential 
hurnan dignity and fieedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, 
or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which al1 persons enjoy 
equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society. 
equally capable and equally deserving of concem, respect and considerat i~n.~ 
Helpfullg. the notion of human dignity was expanded upon. Specifically, Iacobucci J. 
noted that: 
Human dignity within the meaning of the equality guarantee does not relate to the 
status or position of an individual in society per se, but rather concems the 
manner in which a person legitimately feels when confionted with a particular 
I ~ W . ~ '  
As well, the Court re-emphasized that the equality guarantee is a comparative concept, 
that requires a court to establish one or more relevant comparators. The recognition of a 
cornparison group requires the court to examine the subject matter of the law and its 
effects within a full appreciation of its "contextual  factor^."^' 
The Supreme Court articulated four such contextual factors, although they are presented 
as esarnples of an open category. Any one factor may suffice in the determination of an 
inequaiity. The first factor is a "pre-existing disadvantage." This ciassification of a 
contextual factor includes a vulnerability. stereotyping or prejudice experienced by the 
specific group or an individual.'' The Court stressed the importance of the need for the 
supreme Law of the land to protect vulnerable. disadvantaged, or members of minority 
groups. The second factor is the "relationship between the grounds and the claimant's 
characteristics or circumstances." The focus of this factor is the relationship between the 
ground on which the claim is made and the actual need. capacity or circumstance of the 
claimant. An example presented within this category is the gender of the ~lairnant.~" The 
"~bid.  at 15. A stereotype was defined as "a misconception whereby a person or, more 
ofien, a group is unfairly portrayed as possessing undesirable traits. or traits which the 
group, or at least some of its members, do not possess." 
'%id at 16. See also IVeatheraZZ v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872; and 
Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd, (1 9891 1 S.C.R. 1219. 
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third factor described was the "arneliorative purpose or effects" of the law in question 
upon a disadvantaged person or group withïn society. This improvement factor was 
described to be potentially more relevant in circumstances where a claim is brought by a 
'-more advantaged member of society? The last factor outlined was the "nature of the 
interest affected." To eiaborate on this classification Iacobucci J. relied on the rationale 
and words used by L'Heureu.u-Dube J. in Egon v. Canadu,% particularly : 
if al1 things are equal, the more severe and localized the ... consequences on the 
affected group, the more likely that the distinction responsible for these 
consequences is discriminatory within the meaning of S. 15 of the Cl~arrer.~' 
He went on to conclude: 
that the discriminatory calibre of differential treatment cannot be fully appreciated 
without evaluating not only the economic but also the constitutional and societal 
siçnificance attributed to the interest or interests adversely affected by the 
legislation in question.98 
Thus, from a theoretical perspective, the notion of assessing the issues comected to 
claims of inequality within a broad social context has significant scholarly and judicial 
support. It is suggested that the c o ~ e c t i n g  theme in these materials is that a fair, just and 
equal appreciation of these legal issues requires that the judges deciding the fate of the 
litigants must consider not only the impact that 
'llbid. at 1 6. See also Vriend v. Alberta, [ 1 9981 
96[1 9951 2 S.C.R. 513. 
their decisions will have on the claimants 
1 S.C.R. 493. 
97 Law v. Mirtister of Human Resources, supra note 88 at 1 7. 
98 Ibid 17. 
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that bring these matters fonvard. but also social realities of those claïmants. It is the goal 
of this thesis to test how, if at dl,  the criminal justice system has done at contextualizing 
women's lives as they corne before the courts as prosecution witnesses. This is 
accomplished by applying this theoretical framework to two critically relevant problems 
found within the criminal justice system; firstly. the disclosure of  femaie complainants' 
therapeutic records in cases involvins ailegations of sexual assadt and secondly, the 
prosecution of domestic assault cases. 
(F) Rcview of Methodology 
1.  Sesual Assault Complainant's Therapeutic or Counselling Records 
Understanding of the current state of the law as it relates to the topic of the disclosure of a 
sesual assault complainant's therapeutic and or counselling records is criticai to this 
work. The evolution of this Iegal process will be discussed in a chronologicai manner. 
starting with the O 'Connor The laws reactions to this case. including the 
legislative responseIw and the constitutional challenges that followed it's advent are 
reviewed. In a effort to further analyse the extent to which the Canadian courts have 
contextualized this issue, this thesis examines the compendium case to R. v. O 'Connor. 
9 9 ~ .  W. O 'Connor ( 1  994), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 1 09 (B.C.C.A.). 
'OoBill C-46, An Act fo amend the Criminal Code fproduction of recordr in sexual ofence 
proceedings), S .C. 1997, c.30. 
L.L.A. v. BeharrielZ.'O' As well. a brief review of the Supreme Court of Canada's 
response to a civil law challenge by a respondent for a plaintiff s counselling records is 
undertaken.'" Throughout this work efforts will be made to focus on the state of the iaw 
within the theoretical h e w o r k  of equality as described within a contextual back drop. 
Part of this discussion will include two components of societal hann. The first is the harm 
suffered by the individu& whose therapeutic records are opened and their counselling 
treatrnent is interfered with. The Court's treatment of the reports filed in the Mills 
Case. 'O3 that speak to the issue of complainant ham that flows fiom an invasion of their 
private counselling records are discussed. Through these reports it is argued that, in large 
measure. the courts have to date failed to properly contextualize the applications for this 
type of disclosure, prirnarily within a gender view point and secondarily within a victim 
of crime perspective. 
The second matter explored is the societal harm that flows fiom the chilling effect that 
the opening of such records might have on other women who have been sexually attacked 
but decide not to come forward to the authorities to have their cornplaints investigated. If 
women are deterred fiom accessing justice through the criminal justice system, it is 
pointed out that there are at least two ramifications that flow from this. The first is that it 
- - - - - 
"'L.L.A.  v. BeharrieZZ(1995), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.). 
' "Ah? v. Ryan Cl9971 1 R.C.S. 157 (S.C.C.). 
Io3R. v. Miiis (1997), 205 A.R. 321; 207 A.R. 161 (Alta. Q.B.). On appeal to the S.C.C. 
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effectively denies sexual assault victims and the community with access to justice. The 
second is that if the women that have k e n  injured in this way do not corne forward an 
opportunity is lost to deter this form of criminal behaviour that helps to oppress and 
violate al1 women's rights to equality. 
As well, it is important to note that this matter has a relevance beyond just the 
constitutionality issues of the legislation dealing with the issue of disclosure of these 
records. that may manifest itself in two ways. One is that if the Supreme Court declares 
Bill C-46 as unconstitutional then the drafters of the replacement legislation will need to 
continue to assess these issues as they grapple with the balancing of competing interests 
of the parties comected to these types of motion. In the alternative, if the legisiation is 
upheld, Canada's courts will continue to ïnterpret Bill C-46 to assist them in their just 
application of the law. This practical application of the law will require a contextual 
appreciation of al1 of the issues involved with these motions for disclosure. 
2. Domestic Assault 
To properly assess the methodologies used to examine the area of domestic assault, the 
proposals for refonn must first be reviewed. In short, it is postulated that the criminal 
justice system does not effectively deal with the problem of domestic violence. Provincial 
governments charged with responsibility of administering justice have two options to 
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improve the srarzcs quo. The first is to increase the effectiveness of the triai's process to 
search for the tmth by implernenting vigilant investigative techniques that preserve 
evidence as clearly as possible. One such technique could be the immediate videotaping 
of a complainant's statement. This could eventually assist prosecutors in the presentation 
of reliable evidence that could allow for the expansion of the prlliciples articulated in a 
series of cases deahg with the issue of the admissibility of hearsay ev iden~e . '~  
This option is examined through a doctrinal approach of the current state of the law and 
an analysis of it's principles which leads to an argument for the expansion of the 
principles outlined above. As well, this position is supported in both empincal and non- 
empirical interdisciplinary forms of research, that will help explain not only the scope of 
the problem from a sociological perspective, but also from some psychological theories 
that help explain the phenornena of the reluctant or recanting witness. This is examined 
so that the gender issues unique to domestic violence can be better understood within 
their complicated and layered context. For example, this work has reviewed a series of 
articles on the symptoms of the cycle of domestic violence to support the argument that 
there is a need to push for the contextualization of the hwnan behaviour patterns 
associated with domestic violence, so that the trial process of the search for the tmth can 
be balanced with the concepts of due process and an accused right to fundamentai justice. 
I0%ee R. v. Khan (1990), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.); R. v. Smith (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 
257 (S.C.C.) ; R. v. KGB, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740'79 C.C.C. (3d) 257 ; R. v. U(F.J), 
(1995) 101 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
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In this thesis an alternative to the conventional approach of the criminal justice system 
towards domestic violence is also examined. The philosophies of a community based 
restorative justice scheme, allowing for the principles of shaming, education and 
counselling to replace punishment as a deterrence to this reprehensible male behaviour, 
are also reviewed. Following a discussion of the possible causes and consequences of this 
form of violence, an effort has been made to suggest a comparative effectiveness between 
the ttvo options, given the power imbalances and safety risks unique to incidents of 
domestic assault. 
CHAPTER TWO: THE DISCLOSURE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 
COMPLAINANTS' RECORDS 
(A) Introduction 
This chapter examines the law in Canada as it relates to the disclosure of sexuai assault 
complainants' therapeutic and counselling records in the possession of third parties. Tt also 
reveais some of the complexities connected with one method of how a criminal law is 
created in Canada. This topic has been selected to advance the position that the criminal 
justice system has failed to treat female complainants equatly. It is argued in this chapter 
that this inequality is anchored in a failure to contextualize the consequences for women 
that flows fiom the disclosure of these types of materials. 
To begin, a straightforward prernise is suggested: our society must create laws to prwent 
the harm that flows fiom sexual violence and abuse. Once such laws are established, a 
procedural process must be implernented to ensure that those persons alleged to have 
breached such laws are dealt with arnd treated fairly by our criminal justice system. This is 
one of the protections ensured through the principle of due process. Yet, as we 
contemplate the niles associated with the disclosure of a sexuai assault complainant's 
therapeutic records to an accused person, we quickly see the dilemma that afises because 
of the competing interests and guaranteed Charter rights of those individuals involved. 
The classic liberal notion of minimal state intervention that is balancecl against the 
potential for societal harm is revealed, except in this case, the potential hann cuts in two 
different directions. The first inherent h m  is obvious; the wrongfbl conviction of an 
5 1 
innocent person. The second likely harrn is the subject matter of this chapter. It examines 
the harm that flows fiom the invasion of one's highly personal records, as well as the 
effect this law has as a disincentive for al1 victims of sexual assault to access justice 
through the criminal courts. This denied access represents a serious f o m  of inequality that 
directly acts to oppress female victims of violent sexual offences and indirectly d l  women. 
Related to this issue, we are able to observe the two different branches of govenunent 
authorized to create laws and apply laws in conflict over the appropriate balance to be 
stmck between these competing interests. In the O 'Connof Case we see the courts 
responding to a specific fact situation, in the absence of applicable legislation, and 
determining legal policy in the process. Next, the legislators, who in the meantime had 
been contemplating a legislative response to this disdosure issue, with extensive input and 
consultation with a number of non-legislative bodies, conclude there are certain 
shortcomings with the Supreme Court majority's viewpoint and therefore introduce a 
section in the Criminal Code to readjust the balance between the competing interests. This 
begins a continuing checks and balances process as the courts scnitinize the 
constitutionality of the new legislation. This engagement will corne to a head in the MiII' 
Case. In this case, the legislation enacted to deal with the issue of an accused person's 
right to obtain the therapeutic records of a cornplainant in a sexual assault case and the 
IR v. O'Connor (1996), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
IR v. Mill' ( 1  997), 205 A-R 32 1; 207 A-R 16 1 (Q.B.), on a p p d  to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. 
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corresponding rights and issues of privacy and equaiity before the law of the complainant, 
is tested predorninately because the legislators relied on portions of the Supreme Court's 
minority view in the O 'Conmr case that was directly rejected by the majority. 
To fùrther complicate matters, at the very heart of this whole process is a gender conflict. 
This gender component plays a large part in the formation of this law creatd to address 
the disclosure of a female complainant 's therapeutic records, as evidenced by the language 
used by the courts to assess the issue. Specifically, as one closely reviews the language 
used by the courts, a troubling pichire is revealed: that some of the same biases and 
stereotypes debunked in the rape shield legislation,J continue to be assessed and relied 
upon in tipping the balance in favour of the male accused person's right to tùll answer and 
defence over the female complainant's right to privacy, equality and security of person. 
Finally, to advance the argument that women's equaiity nghts have not aiways been 
thoroughly assessed within a contextuaiized framework LLA v. Behz~rieli,~ decideû at 
the same time as the O 'Connor Case, will also be examined. This case reviews the 
Supreme Court's policy consideration of one solution to the potential harm that flows 
from the disclosure of these materials, specifically a class privilege for counselling records. 
As well, both of these procedural and substantive criminal law cases will be wmpared to 
the Canadian civil jurisprudential treatment of the disclosure of therapeutic or counselling 
3Criminal Code, R. S., c. C-46, sections 276 and 277. 
' L LA.  v. Behamiell (1 995). 1 O3 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.). 
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records issue. This will be done to assess the Supreme Court's contemual considerations 
of the competing rights of the accused and the sexual ossault complainant. Additionally, 
these cases mark the wolution of the equality rights of the complainants co~ected to 
these disclosure applications. 
(B) R v O'Connor 
O'Connor, a Roman Catholic bishop, was charged with a number of sexual offences, 
alleged to have occurred when he was a priest at a First Nations residential school. The 
allegations dated back some 15 years prior to the charges king laid and involved a 
number of students at the school. Prior to the trial date, counsel for the accused applied to 
the court for an order demanding that the complainants authorize ail therapists, 
psychologists, and psychiatnsts who treated them to produce copies of their complete 
records. O'Connor also requested al1 school and medical records fiom the school where 
the sexual assaults were alleged to have taken place. Neither the complainants nor their 
care providers were given notice of this application. The application was granted and a 
disclosure order was made. The case was then adjourned several months. 
On the next triai date, counsel for the accused brought a second series of motions and 
applied for a stay of proceedings. The stay application was dismissed. However, during 
the course of the testimony it became clear that other material related to the original order 
existed and had not been disclosed. Counsel renewed their stay application and, on this 
occasion, it was granted.' 
1. British Columbia Court of A p p d  
The matter was appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeai. The Court ailowed the 
Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial. For perspective, this chapter will briefly review 
the Court's rulings related to the Crown's failure to disclose the complainant's therapeutic 
records. 
Counsel for the accused asserted a section 7 Canadian Chmer of itights and Freedorns6 
violation, and argued that the appropriate remedy flowing fiom such a violation would be 
stay of proceedings under section 24 of the Charter. On the issue of disclosure, the Court 
held that the Crown has an obIigation to disclose and that the accused has a right to all 
that which the Crown is obligated to disclose. Under the guarantees of section 7 of the 
Charter, the accused had a right to al1 information that could reasonably and possibly 
assist him in making full answer and defence. Still, a violation in this regard will only be 
made out where the accused establishes that the non-disclosure has probably prejudiced or 
had some adverse eRect on his ability to make tùll answer and defence. Here the accused 
failed to lay before the Court an evidentiary foundation to assess the relevance of the 
'R v. O 'Connor (1 994), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 109 (l3.C.C.A). 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s.7, Part 1 of the Constitution Act. 1982, 
being Schedule B to the C a d a  Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. l l [hereinafter "Chmrer '7. 
requested records. 
Within two months, the sarne panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal estabiished a 
procedure for the production and disdosure of therapeutic records in semal assuit  cases8 
A two step process was developed. The first stage required an accused person to show 
that the information contained in the medical records is && to be relevant either to an 
issue in the proceeding or to the competence of the witness to testie. They held that if the 
accused can satise this test, then the records are to be disclosed to the 
At this second stage, the court then reviews the records to determine which of thern are 
relevant to the defence. If the court were to determine that any ofthe records fa11 
into the category of "required by the accused to make fiill answer and defence," then the 
records are to be disclosed to the defence, subject to any conditions that the court deems 
appropriate.I0 To establish a finding of ükely relevance the accused would be required to 
lay an evidentiary foundation. With regards to the initial onus the Court held: 
The test to be met by an applicant on the initial application to have the 
medical records produced to the court is necessarily lower than the test to 
be applied by the court in deciding whether to release any of those 
documents to the parties. A less stringent test is appropriate at the first 
stage since, at the point in time when the application is first made, it is 
unlikely that anyone other than the witness and the physician, psychiatrist 
7 R. v. O 'Connor, mpra note 5 at 1 34- 1 49. 
'R v. O'Connor (No.2) (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (B.C.C.A). 
'lbid, at 26 1 and 267. 
l0lbid, at 267 - 268. 
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or therapist d l  know what is in the records." 
The Court premised its decision on the societal neeâ to deguard and protect the privacy 
interests of a witness, and then balanceci those needs against the rights of an accused to 
make full answer and defence. l2 
Of particular importance was the Court's rejection of the accuseci's argument for the 
disclosure on the basis that the documents may be relevant and went on to suggest 
factors that, on their own, would not be a sufficient foundation for the production of 
records. The Court held: 
The submission that medical records should be produced because they may 
be relevant to  the credibility of a cornplainant is patently inadequate to 
justie their production, in the absence of evidence indicating that there is 
likely to be something in those records relevant to the a particular issue in 
the case. Invoking credibility at large is not sufficient to justie such an 
interference with the privacy interests of a ~omplainant.'~ 
In coming to this conclusion the Court relied on the cornments of Madam Justice 
Heureux-Dubé, in the case of R v. O~ol in '~  and Madarn Justice McLachlin's reasoning set 
out in the case of R v. Seaboyer." The principles set out in these defisions will be 
discussed in the analysis portion of this chapter. 
"Ibid at 26 1. 
'*Ibid at 26 1 - 262. 
l3lbid, at 265. 
"R. v. Osuh  [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595; (1991)' 86 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.). 
15R v. Seaboyer [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; (1991)' 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.). 
2. Supremt Court o f  Canada 
In the Supreme Court, the same competing issues are assesseci, specifically the accused's 
rights to h l1  answer and defence and the complainant's rights to privacy and equaiity 
before the law. The majority considered the potential h m s  connected with the conflicting 
rights of a witness to privacy and an accused person's right to fûll answer and defcnct and 
aligned the latter with the findamental tenet of the criminal justice system - that an 
innocent person must not be wnvicted. The majority did not address the section 15 
equality right issue. Their conclusions have the effect of ranking the accused person's 
rights over those of the complainant's. It is proposed that, although they do not explicitly 
endorse such a position, when one carefblly reviews the language used to balance the 
competing interests, coupled with the end result, an argument can be made that a 
hierarchy of rights does exist. This theme is also elaborated upon in the Constitutionai 
Challenges section of this chapter. 
\ 
On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a number of issues, but for the purpose set out in 
this chapter, I will only discuss those that are co~ec ted  to the therapeutic records of a 
cornplainant. In a 5 : 4 Split, Lamer C. J.C. and Sopinka J., wrote for the majority.16 
They held that the intensely private nature of therapeutic records did not affect the 
Crown's obligation to disclose such materials to the defence, where those materials were 
16R Y. O 'Connor (1 W6), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). Regarding therapeutic records, 
Larner C. J. C., Sopinka, J., Cory, Iacobucci, and Major JJ., concurring; L'Heureux-Dubé, 
J., La Forest, Gonthier and McLachlin J I ,  concurring in dissent. 
already in the possession of the Crown. They reasoned that once the records had been 
revealed to the Crown, there was no pnvacy interest to be balanced against the nght of the 
accused to make fùll answer and defence. Further, if the Crown were to advance that such 
records contained nothing relevant, they would have the burden to prove the irrelevance 
of the records on an application for disclosure by the accused. In other words, once in the 
hands of the Crown, the records d l  be presumed relevant and mua be di~closed.'~ 
The minority view on this matter was that the case did not raise the issue of the general 
extent of the Crown's disclosure obligations regarding a complainant's private records in 
its possession and, as such, did not feel the need to comment on the issue." 
On the issue of the procedure for the production and disclosure of therapeutic records in 
the possession of the third parties, Lamer C.J.C. and Sopinka J. wrote for the majority. 
They determineci that the balance had to fa11 in the favour of the accused Party. 
Specifically, they held that the competing daims of a cornplainant to a constitutional right 
" lbid at 15 - 16,78 and 91. However, one issue not fully developed by the Court was 
the issue of consent, and its impact on how the Crown came to be in possession of the 
records. R. v. Stinchcombe (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), sets out disclosure 
principles related to crown obligations and exceptions. The Crown has a discretion to 
withhold information which may be subject to privilege and may delay disclosure so as not 
to impede an investigation. Also, the Crown is not required to disclose what is clearly 
irrelevant. The general principle is that idonnation should not be withheld if there is a 
reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose will negatively Sêct the accused's right 
to make h l l  answer and defence, unless the non-disclosure is required by the law of 
privilege. L. Stuesser, in "Reconciling Disdosure and Privilege" (1994) 30 C.R (4") 67 at 
79, discussed the expansion of Stinchcombe mandated Crown disclosure to the right of an 
accused person to pre-trial "discovery". 
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to pnvacy in the information held within the recurds maintained by a third party mua give 
way to the constitutional guarantees of an accused petson to make tùii answer and 
defence. The cornmon Iaw that supported this position w u  set out in R v. Stim:k~m&e,,'~ 
and R v. Seab~yer..'~ including " the ftndamentd tenet of our judiciai synem that an 
innocent person must not be wnvicted." 
The Court agreed with the Appellate Court that a two stage process was wamuited to 
process an accused' s request for a corn plainant 's t herapeutic records. However, the 
majority and the minority of the Court differed in their respective views as to the threshold 
of relevance, as well as the factors that a trial judge would need to assess such issues. 
At the first stage, Lamer C.J.C., and Sopinka J. proclairneci an accused need not establish 
an evidentiary foundation in every case. In some cases oral submissions by counsel may 
suffice. At the end of the day, an accused must persuade the judge that "likely relevant" 
information is contained in the records. They stated: 
the presiding judge must be satisfied that there is a reasonable possibiiity 
that the information is logically probative to an issue at triai or the 
cornpetence of a witness to testie. When we speak of relevance to an 
"issue at trial" we are refemng not only to evidence that may be probative 
to the material issues in the case (Le., the unfolding of events) but aiso to 
the evidence relating to the credibility of witnesses and to the reliability of 
other evidence in the case? 
The Court continued and held that the "likely relevance" initiai hurdle should not be 
19R v. Stinchcomb [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; (1991)' 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
'OR v. Seaboyer, supra note 15 at 32 1. 
R v. O'Connor. supra note 16 at 19. 
interpreted as an onerous burden on the accusexi but rather a "requirement to prevem the 
defence fiom engaging in speculitive, fuiafùl, disruptive, unmeritorious, obstructive and 
time consurning request for production."" 
Additionally, the Court provided furiher guidance suggesting a timing factor that should 
be considered when assessing likely relevance. They held: 
There is a possibiiity of materiality where there is  a reasonabiy close 
temporal co~ection between the creation of the records and the date of 
the alleged commission of the offence ... or in cases of historical eventq as 
in this case, a close temporal comection between the creation of the 
records and the decision to bring charges against the acaised." 
Beyond this, the Court went on to set out a number of examples, by way of illustration 
only, in which third party records may be relevant: 
1 . they may contain information concerning the unfolding of events 
underlying the criminal cornplaint. 
2. they may reveal the use of therapy which influenced the complainant's 
memory of the alleged events. 
3. they may contain information that bears on the complainant's 
"credibility, including testimonial factors such as the quality of their 
perception of events at the time of the offence, and their memory since."" 
Once the accused has satisfied the court on the threshold question of likely relevance, the 
records in question are then tumed ova  to the trial judge. The role of the triai judge at 
this stage is to assess whether, and to what extent, the records should be disclosed to the 
accused. The majority recognized the potential for harm to be suffered by a cornplainant 
but determined that this potential harm must be weighed against the abïdity of the accused 
to make tùll answer and defence. To assia the court in their balancing process, they set 
out a number of factors for consideration, including: 
1 .the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make fi111 
answer and defence; 
2.the probative value of the record in question; 
3 .the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy vested in 
the record; 
4.whether production of the record would be prernised upon any 
discriminatory belief or bias; and 
5-the potential prejudice to the complainant's dignity, privacy or security of 
the person that would be occasioned by production of the record in 
question." 
It is important to note that they specifically rejected L'Heureux-Dubé J. 's two additional 
factors, that a trial judge must also consider. These included: 
1. the extent to which production of records of this nature would frustrate 
society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences and the 
acquisition of treatment by victims; and 
2. the effect on the integrity of the trial process of producing, or failing to 
produce, the record, having in mind the need to maintain consideration in 
the ou t~o rne .~~  
Eventually, the majority established "the societal interest is not a paramount consideration 
in deciding whether the information should be provided." *' 
'%id. at 24. The majority of the  COU^ held that this second factor was more 
appropriately dealt with at the admissibilty stage of a hearing rather than at the disclosure 
stage. 
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The Court preferred other means to support society's interests in the reporting of sexual 
assault offences, such as publication bans, closing court rwms to the public and the 
application of a relevancy test regarding evidence generaily.28 However, as an aside, it is 
suggested that these types of arrangements merely protect against general public scrutiny. 
They do very little to prevent the invasion of privacy that goes dong with the opening of 
records, and they do nothing at al1 to reliwe the stress and anxiety that sexual assault 
complainants often feel once confionted by an accused's counsel in cross examination, 
particularly on information connected with their therapeutic records. 
In L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s rninority judgement, a number of basic principles are reviewed 
prior to her addressing the procedure for the production of a wmplainant's therapeutic 
records. She recognized additional considerations at the first stage of the process. These 
included a recognition of some of the broader Charrer values. More specifically, she 
noted, " the principles of fûndarnental justice, including the faimess of the trial, necessarily 
reflects a balancing of societal and individual right~."'~ These nghts are tied into section 7 
C h e r  guarantees t hat creat e presum ptions against the production of private records. 
The balancing of an accused's right to make fiil1 answer and defence cannot be interpreted 
so widely so as to allow a "fishing expeditior~"~~ into the private records of a complainant. 
"fiid at 24. Also note that the rejects L'Heureux-Dubé, J. 's inclusion of these additional 
factors, prefemng the avenues discussed by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R v. 
Ryan (1991), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 226 at 230. These approaches do not prevent disclosure, but 
focus on privacy fiom a public scrutiny perspective. 
In fact, she questioned the relevancy of the records generdly when isccuing the equahy 
rights of a complainant. She would place the burden on the accused to establish a basis 
t hat there is in existence material which may be usehl to an accused person in making ttll 
answer and defen~e .~ '  Regarding the nature of the records she added: 
Similady, the mere fact that a witness has a medical or psychiatrie record cannot 
be taken as indicative of the potential unreiiabiiity of his or her testimony. Any 
suggetstion that a particular treatment, therapy, illness, or disabiiity implies 
unreiiability must be informecl by cogent evidence, rather than stereotype, myth or 
prejudice." 
She concluded that there was a need for the courts to protect such rights that rnust co- 
exist along side of  those rights gua ran td  an accused person. 
The minority view proposed certain criteria to be applied to determine the production of a 
complainant ' s records, including : 
First, production should only be granted when it is shown that the accused 
cannot obtain the information sought by any other reasonably available and 
effective alternative means. Second, production which infnnges upon a 
right to pnvacy must be as limited as is reasonably possible to  fiilfill the 
right to make fùll answer and defence. Third, arguments urging production 
must rest upon permissible chains of reasoning, rather than discriminatory 
assumptions and stereotypes. Finally, there must be a proportionality 
between the salutary effects of production on the accused's right to make 
hl1 answer and defence as compared with the deleterious effêcts on the 
party whose pnvate records are being produced." 
It should be noted that this last component addresseci the needs of the individual 
complainant, as compared to the general needs of  society. Notably absent in this passage is 
any reference to the potential chilling effect that such invasions of privacy might have on 
sexual assault victims' willingness to corne forward and access justice through the criminal 
courts. Still, the rninority did factor into the consideration process the potential negative 
side effects that the opening of such records rnight have on the complainant's course of 
therapy, in addition to  the potential psychological h m  that such similar invasions into 
privacy might have? 
Tuming now to the issue of the minority's view of the two nage process, it s p e c i n d y  
disagreed wit h the rnajority ' s tinding, that the standard of "likely relevance" should not 
be interpreted as an onerous burden. They prefened to classifi the burden on the accused, 
at this stage, to be a "significant one" and went on to  highlight a number of factors that 
shou1d not be considered as sufficient, on their face, to cause the trial judge to review the 
records. The assertions that would fa11 below the mark at the first stage include: 
1 . An unsupported assertion that the records might impact on "recent 
cornplaint" or  the "kind of person" the witness is. 
2. The applicant cannot invoke credibility at large but must show that 
there is Iikely to be information in the impugned records which would 
relate to a complainant's credibility on a particular material issue at trial. 
3. That a prior inconsistent statement might be revealed, or that the 
defence wishes to explore the records for allegations of sexual abuse by 
other people. 
4. The mere fact that a witness has a medical or psychiatnc record cannot 
be taken as indicative of the potential unreliability of his or her testimony. 
5 .  Tt must not be presumed that the mere fact that a witness received 
treatment or counselling aEter a sexual assault indicates that the records will 
%id. at 67. The minority of the Court a h  held that given that these records are 
profoundly intimate, their opening alone can have senous consequences for the dignity and 
treatment course o f  a complainant. 
contain information that is relevant to the defencdS 
If the evidentiary foundation presented by the defence falls below the threshold of 
relevance, then that is the end of the application. However, if the application succeeds p s t  
the first stage, then the mai judge must embark on a balancing process. Again the two 
competing interests, the accusecl's right to make tùll answer and defence and the 
complainant's privacy and equality rights, are assesseci. At this pint,  the court should 
review the records and order the disdosure of those records, or parts thereof, that have a 
signifiant probative value that is not substantially outweigheci by the danger of prejudice 
to the proper administration of justice. As weU, the wurt mua consider the potentid of 
ham to the privacy rights of the witness or to the privileged relation that witness has with 
a co~nse l lo r .~~  In the end, the minority sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that should 
be considered in the detennination of this process, as discussed earlier in this paper. 
On the specific issue of the complainant's right to equality without discrimination as 
guaranteed by section 15 of the Charter, L'Heureux-Dubé J. pointed out three relevant 
factors. First that W! of al1 sexual assault victims are ~ o r n e n . ~ '  Second, she referenced a 
study that suggested between 50% and 8û% of women institutionalited for psychiatric 
disorders have pnor histories of sexual abuse." Third, it is a comrnon event in today's 
"Ibid at 57; Osolin. supra note 14 at 521 per Cory S. 
381bid at 57; T. Firsten, "An Exploration of the Role of Physical and Sexuai Abuse for 
Psychiatrically Institutionalized Women" (1990), [unpublished research paper] available 
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Canadian society that those who have been sexually assaulted obtah treatment because of 
their victimizati~n.'~ 
This assessrnent represents the minonty's enort to contextualize the harm component of 
sexual assault offences into its larger social contact. Indirectly, it also positions the victims 
of such crimes within an enumerated group as envisioned by section 1 5 of the ClrrvfererQ 
This analysis consistent with the jurisprudence enunciated in the Law case (decided post 
O 'Connor). In Law the purpose of section 15 was set out by Iacobucci J.: 
It may be said that the purpose of S. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of 
essential human dignity and fieedom through the imposition of 
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote 
a society in which al1 persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human 
beings or as members of Canadian society, equaily capable and equaliy 
deserving of wncem, respect and consideration. Legislation which effects 
differential treatment between individuals or groups will violate this 
fundamentai purpose where those who are subject to differential treatment 
faIl within one or more enumerated or analogous grounds, and where the 
differential treatment reflects the stereotypical application of presumed 
group or personal characteristics, or othenivise has the effect of 
perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable, or 
less worthy of recognition or value as a human king or as a member of 
Canadian ~ociety.~' 
fiom the Ontario Women's Directorate. 
''Supra note 6, section 1 S(1) "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has 
the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability". 
"Law v. Cana& (Uinister of Entpoymen f mtd Immigration) (1 999), File no.: 253 74 
(S.C.C.) at 13. 
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Thus, it is suggesed here that the perspective of the minority, regarding the complainant's 
equality rights as balanced against the accused's rights to fil1 answer and defence, should 
be given additionai weight in the interpretation of the current or any fbture legislation in 
the area. 
L'Heureux-Duôé J. also reflects on past evidentiary mles such as those addresseâ in 
section 276 of the Criminal Code. It is her position that to allow an unwarranted fishing 
expedition into a complainant's past sexual histories as recorded in her therapeutic records 
may ailow an accused person to circumvent the protections created in the rape shield 
legislation." 
Moreover, she highlights another antiquated legal notion to support her position, 
specifically the requùement for corroboration before a woman's or a child's allegations of 
sexual assault could be brought before the courts. She challenges that such a provision 
could no longer withstand Charrer scnitiny. This notion is comected to a sexual assauit 
complainant's therapeutic record, as she wrote: 
In my view, a legal system which devalues the evidence of complainants to 
sexual assault by de facto premming their uncreditworthiness would raise 
sirnilar concerns. It would not reflect, far les promote "a society in which 
al1 are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human 
beings a equaily deserving of concern, respect and consideration."" 
42R V. O 'Connor, supra note 1 at 66. 
" Ibid at 58; Andrews v. Lmu Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R (4"') 1 at 15 
per Mclntyre 1. 
From this point she extends her rationale to examine stereotypical reasoning or  
conclusions based on speculations that would affect equality principles in the threshold 
requirement of providing a 'court with a relevance evidentiary foundation. To  
automaticaliy expose a complainant's personal backgrounds, such as those contained 
within therapeutic records, has the potentiai to reflect a systernic bias in the criminal 
justice system against victimited women. On the routine request for disdosure without 
establishing a threshold of  relevance L'Heureux-Dubé 1. wrote: 
Such requests, in essence, rest on the assumption that the personal and 
psychological backgrounds and profiles o f  complainants of  sexual assault 
are relevant as to whether or  not the complainant consented t o  the sexual 
contact, or whet her the accused honestly believed that she consented. 
Although the defence must be fiee to demomtrute, without resorting to 
stereotypical reasoning, that such is relevant to a live issue at trial, it would 
mark the tnumph of stereotype over logic if courts and lawyers were 
simply to asnrme such relevance to exist, without requiring any evidence to 
this effect whatsoever." [emphasis hers] 
Finally, L'Heureux-Dubé J. discussed the potentid application of  the law as it related to 
the victim of a sexual assault and the community rights to have these matters detennined 
by a court. The impact on the woman who must choose between "accusing their attacker 
and maintaining the confidentiality of their records" was acknowledged. To make this 
point she relied on the words of Hill J. in R v. Burbosa: 
In addressing the disdosure of records, relating to  past treatment, analysis, 
assessrnent or care of  a complainant, it is necessary t o  remember that the 
pursuit of fùll answer and defence on behalf of  an accused person should be 
achieved without indiscriminately or arbitrarily eradicating the privacy of 
the complainant. Systemic revictimization of  a complainant fosters 
disrepute for the criMnid justice system4' [emphasis hers]. 
(C)  Bill C- 46 
The cornrnon law position developed by the majority in O 'Connor was superceded by 
legislation. One critical feature of this legislation is the way in which it was drafted. The 
Iegisiators, drafting Bill C-46, adopted the reasoning fiom both the majo~ty and the 
minonty from the O 'Connoor decision, including the views of L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s, that 
considered the rights of a sexual assault complainant, despite the fact that some of those 
views were specifically rejected by the majority. 
The relevant sections of this legislation need to be reviewed at this stage. This examination 
is important to the advancement of my analysis of this subject in four ways. Fust, it 
provides the reader with some insight into one method of Canadian law making. It 
examines the consultation process and a number of the considerations reviewed by the 
legislators in the process. Secondly, it provides a comparison to the goals and objectives 
of a similar piece of legislation, comrnoniy referred to as the rape shield laws. Through this 
comparison some of the principles behind the new disclosure provisions are legitimized 
and bolstered. Thirdly, it provides a template for the analysis of the process whereby the 
courts test the constitutionaiity of Bill C46. Fourthly, as the courts scrutinize its 
constitutionality, the language used to interpret meaning, reveals a great deal about the 
- - -- 
451b~d at 59; R V. Barbosa (1994), 92 C.C.C. (3d) 13 1 at 141 (Ont. Gen Div.). 
7 1 
rationale used by the courts to they balance the competing Chraier guaranteed, but 
irreconcilable, rights. 
On May 12, 1997, Bill C-46 was proclaimeci. This was a legislative response to the issues 
surrounding defence applications for the disclosure and production of a semal assault 
complainant's private records held by a third party. This legislation was enacted as 
sections 278.1 to 278.9 of the Crinriml This legislation govems disdosure 
applications in cases relating to charges of semai assault. Approximately one year prior to 
the proclamation, the Minister of Justice indicated the intended purpose of the new 
legislation was to "strengthen protection for complainants of sexual offences and to 
enhance privacy and equality nghts for dl complainants." " 
A review of each section of the legislative response is beyond the parameters of this 
thesis. Rather, this project will focus on the portions of the statute that endorse and 
expand upon those factors considered in the O 'Connor decision. 
As established in O 'Connor, a two stage process is mandated. At the first stage, the trial 
judge must assess whether or not the records in issue should be reviewed by the court. 
The test at this threshold is "likely relevant."" 
'6Criminal Code. R.S., c. C46. [hereinafter CriMnal Code]. 
"Depanment of Justice, News Release, June 12, 1996. 
'8Criminal Code. S. 278.3(3). 
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To assist in the determination of likely relevance, section 278.3(4) codifies a number of 
assertions that are insufficient on their own to estabtish the requisite threshold: 
that the record exists; 
that the record relates to medical or psychiatric treatment or counselling 
that the complainant or witness has received or is receiving; 
that the record relates to the incident that is the subject-matter of 
the proceeding; 
that the record may disclose a pnor inconsistent statement of the 
complainant or witness; 
that the record may relate to the credibility of the complainant or 
witness; 
that the record may relate to the reliability of the testimony of the 
complainant or witness merely because the complainant or witness 
has received or is receiving psychiatric treatment, thetsrpy or 
counselling; 
that the record may reveal allegations of semai abuse of the 
complainant by a person other than the accused; 
that the record relates to the sexual activity of the complainant with 
any person, including the accused; 
that the record relates to the presence or absence of a recent 
complainant; 
that the record relates to the complainant's sexual reputation; or 
that the record was made close in time to the cornplaint or to the 
activity that h s  the subject-matter of the charge against the 
accused .'9 
The first three subsections are consistent with the majority's view in O 'Connor, with one 
exception. The Court maintained as a relevant consideration the issue of a temporal 
connection between the creation of the records and the date of the alleged commission of 
the offence. Also, in cases of ''historical" accusations, a temporal connedon between the 
creation of the records and the decision to bring charges against the accused was set out 
as a pertinent factor. It is important to note that this temporal comection is specitically 
- - -  - - - - 
49Criminu/ Code. S. 278.3 (4). 
m e d  out as an insufficient ground in subsection (k) of the legislation. 
In conjunction with issue of timing, subsection (i) deals with the issue of recent complaint. 
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, courts have traditionally maintained that the 
timing of the complaint is still a factor to consider in assessing the validity of the 
allegation.'* Therefore, this new component of the legislation seems to ovemim a 
historically relevant consideration. Ta my knowledge, this specific factor has not yet b a n  
challenged. 
Section 278.3(4)(e), deals with the credibility of the complainant in general. It might be 
argued that this may be in conflict with the majority's assertion that the information 
contained in the complainant's records may be relevant if it "bears on the complainant's 
credibility, including testimonial factors such as the quality of their perception of events at 
the time of the offence, and their memory since."" 
In subsection (f) reliability, as distinguished fiom credibility, is addressed. n i e  potential 
for unreliability merely because the complainant is seeking treatment is specifically deemed 
inappropriate. 
Subsection (g) incorporates the anti-myth reasoning set out in R v. SeaboyeP and 
eventually codified in section 276 of the Criminal Code. This issue will be elaborated on in 
-- 
'OR V. Henrich (1996), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A). 
"R v. O 'Connor. supra note 16 at 23. 
V. Seaboyer. supra note 1 S. 
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the analysis section of this chapter. Still, it should be noted that this section marks that a 
corn plainant ' s sexual history is an irrelevant consideration. Similady, in subsection (h) and 
a), which do not include the word "may" could be interpreted to absolutely prohibit the 
pret rial discovery of informat ion conceming sexual activity or reputation. These sections 
appear to support section 277 of the Crimiml Code. Section 277 deals with the issue of 
reputation evidence, specifically making such evidence inadmissible for the purpose of 
challenging or supporting the credibility of a sexual assault complainant. 
Furthemore, a trial judge must also consider the provisions of section 278.5(1) and (2) 
prior to ordering the person in possession or control of the record to produce it to the 
court for review. Section 278.5(1) requires a trial judge to reconsider subsections 
278.3(2) to (6), that set out the accused's onus to establish the threshold requirement of 
IikeIy relevant and finally to establish that "the production of the record is necessary in the 
interests ofjustice." Arguably, this last provision adds an additional flexibility for a trial 
judge attempting to balance the competing interests of the parties. 
Section 278.5(2) also sets out specific factors that the trial judge must take into account in 
determining whether or not the records should be produced for the purposes of judicial 
review. These factors to be considered are in addition to "the salutary and deleterious 
effects of the determination on the accused's right to make firll answer in defence and on 
the right to privacy and equality of the complainant." It is important to compare the 
words used in this section with those used by Lamer C. J.C., and Sopinka J. in O 'Conmr, 
specifically : 
We also agree that in making that determination, the judge must examine 
and weigh the salutary and deleterious eff'écts of a production order and 
detennine whether a non-production order would constitute a reasonable 
limit on the ability of the acaised to make hiIl answer in defence." 
They do not endorse a right to privacy and equality on behalf of the complainant. 
Aiso of significance are the factors set out in section 278.5(2Xa) through (h)." It is 
important to note that added to the majority's list of relevant factors, the section also 
incorporates L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s two additional factors that appear in subsections (f), 
(g) and (h)." It is this specific inclusion of the dissent's additional factors that have causeci 
sorne members of the defence bar to challenge the constitutionality of Bi11 C-46, rnost 
notably in R v. Mills? 
13R v. O 'Connor, supra note 1 6. 
" In determining whether to order the production of the record or part of the record for 
review pursuant to subsection (l), . . . the judge shall take the following factors into 
account: 
the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make a fiIl answer 
and defence; 
the prohibitive value of the record; 
the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the 
record; 
whether production of the record is based on a discriminatory belief or bias; 
the potential prejudice to the personal dignity and right to privacy of any person to 
whom the record relates; 
society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences; 
society's interest in encouraging the obtaining of treatment by complainants of 
sexual offences; and 
the effect of the determination on the integrity of the trial process. 
'IR v. O 'Connor, supra note 16 at 23 and 69. 
%R. V. MilZs(1997) 205 A.R. 321; 207 A.R. 161 (Q.B.), on appeal to S.C.C. 
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Once al1 of these factors have been considered at the first nage and the trial judge is 
persuaded, he or she should review the records in issue, then sections 278.6 (1) ta (3) 
apply. Effectively the review is done in the absence of the parties. During this review, the 
trial judge is guided by section 278.7. The wording in this section parallels that of section 
278.5 already reviewed. Section 278.7 specifically demands the same factors considered 
at stage one be re~nsidered agaîn at this stage of the process. At this stage. the judge 
must be satisfied that the record, or patt thereof, is likely relevant to an issue at trial or to 
the competence of a witness to testie and its production is necessary in the interest of 
justice. The factors that are to be considered in such a balancing process are set out 
specifically in section 278.7(2), as the trial judge ernbarks upon the mission of balancing 
the competing interest of the accused's right to make fidl answer in defence and the nght 
of privacy and equality of the complainant. As stated earlier, those considerations are set 
out in section 278.5(2)(a) to (h).'7 
Once satisfied that the record, or any part thereof, is likely relevant to either an issue at 
trial or the competence of a witness to test@, and its production is necessary in the 
interest of justice, the trial judge may impose certain conditions on its production. Again, 
this statute requires that the interests ofjustice be protected as well as "to the greatest 
extent possible, the privacy and equality interests of the ~ m p l a i n a n t . " ~ ~  As such, the 
records may be edited, restricted fkom either duplication or publication, or fiom k i n g  
" Criminol Code, sections 278.7(1) and (2). 
"'lbid. at section 278.7(3). 
disclosed to any other third ~ a r t y . ' ~  
@) Analysis 
1. Origins and Policy 
Prior to the drafking of Bill C-46, Parliament was aware of  a growing dissatisfaction with 
the criminal justice systern's treatment and response to women and children. The 1992 
legisl ators drafied amendments to the Criminal Code to redress credibility issues, 
stereotypes and myths often connecteci to fernale and children witnesses testiFng U? 
matters charging sexual offences. Bill C49, wdified as sections 276 and 277, withstood 
constitutional challenge in R v. Seaboyer? McLachlin, J., speaking for the majority, 
addressed the probtems which courts have traditionally been confionted with relating to 
issues of relevance in charges of senial assaults. Specifically, the Court stated: 
The main purpose of the legislation is to abolish the old common-law rules 
which permitted evidence of the compIainant7s sexual conduct which was 
of little probative value and calculated to mislead the jury. The cornmon- 
law pennitted questioning on the prior sexual conduct of a cornplainant 
without proof of relevance to a specific issue in the trial- Evidence that the 
complainant had relations with the accused and other was routinely 
presented (and accepted by judges and juries) as tending to make it more 
likely that the wmplainant had consented to the alleged assault and as 
undermining her credibility generally. These inferences were based not on 
facts, but on the myths that unchaste women were more likely to consent 
to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of belief. These twin 
19See S. Chapman, "Third Party Records7' [unreported] a paper presented at the National 
Criminal Law Program, University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C., July 1998, for an excellent 
review of Bill C-46. 
60 R W. Seaboyer, sttpra note 1 S. 
myths are now di~credited.~' 
Also in the Seaboyer decision, L'Heureux-Dubé, dissenting in part, discussed the concept 
of relevance in the context of senial assault charges and traditional misconceptions 
surrounding relevance. Specifically, on the test of relevance, she stated: 
Whatever the test, be it one of experimce, common rnse or logic, i? is a 
decision particularly vulnerable to the application of private beliefs. 
Regardless of the definition used, the content of any relevancy decision will 
be filled by the particular judge's experience, cornmon senw andlor logic. 
For the most psrt, there will be generd agreement as to that which is 
relevant and the determination will not be problematic. However, there are 
certain areas of inquiry where experience, common sense and logic are 
informed by stereotype and myth. As 1 have made clear, this area of the 
law has been puiicularly prone to the utilkation of stereotype and 
determinations of relevance and again, as was demonstrated earlier, this 
appears to be the unfortunate concomitant of a wciety which, to a large 
measure, holds these beliefs. It would also appear that the recognition of 
the large role that stereotype may play in such detenninations has had 
surprisingly little impact in this area of the iaw." 
Further, L'Heureux-Dubé, J., again questioning the bais of the doctrine of recent 
complaint and the historical rules relating to the corroboration in sexual assault trials, 
commented that: 
Application of the relevance concept was not the only way in which the 
common-law integrated stereotype and myth into trials of sexual offences. 
Also part of the unique body of evidentîary law surrounding m a l  
offences were, among other things, the doctrine of r e n t  complaint and 
corroboration niles. These evidentiary concepts were also based upon 
stereotypes of the female cornplainant requiring independent evidence to 
support her evidence and, in addition, evidence that she raised a "hue and 
cry" f ier  her assault. It is noteworthy that both recent cornplaint and 
conoboration rules fonned exceptions to general rules of evidencd3 
Thus, in these three passages, the judicial branch of the state (in a dissenting judgement) 
recognizes an inequality issue, encapsulatecl in many stereotypes. The Court upheld the 
legislative branch of the state's legai rheme to address a component of the problem." 
The Court recognized inappropriate, sexist and discriminatory beliefs that had no place in 
the assessment of a female witness's credibility and upheld the legislative scheme that 
addresseci the issue. However, the case law interpreting sections 276 and 277 of the 
Criminal Code failed to address the issue of access by accused parties to the therapeutic 
records of complainants in sexual offence prosecutions. That specific issue was brought 
to the attention of the Minister of Justice in June of 1994, dunng the annual consultation 
of violence against women syrnp~siurn.~~ 
In November of 1995, an Issues and Options Paper was distributed by the Executive 
Branch, highlighting addressing this void in the legislation. Between January 1995 and 
Febmary 1996, an extensive series of consultations were conducted across Canada. 
"See S. Bond, "Psychiatnc Evidence of Semal Assault Victims: The Need for 
Fundamental Change in the Determination of Relevance" (1983) 16 Dalhousie L. J. 4 16, 
for a review of sexist myths and their impact within the criminal justice system. 
6sL. C. and Brian Mills and The A t fomey Generd of Alberta and The Attorney General of 
Canaab, AEdavit of Catherine Kane, Supreme Court of Canada, File Number 26358, at 
page 2, paragraph 4. 
Representatives fiom the Federal Department of Justice met with ''Provinciil Attorneys 
General, representatives fiom the Defence Bar, representatives of the Canadian Bu 
Association, acadernics, sexual assault victim service providers, women's groups and 
others to solicit their views on criminal law reforrn initiatives in this area." '' 
After the O 'Connor decision was rendered, the Department of Justice conducted fùrther 
consultations with members of the Defence Bar, feminist academics, Crowns and service 
providers for sexual assault complainants. This consultation process helped to establish a 
range of viewpoints sunounding the disclosure of a complainant's therapeutic records. At 
one end of the continuum were those that advocated an absolute privilege for al1 
counseling and related records. This position was rejected, but a goal was established. 
Specifically, Catherine Kane, an employee of the Federal Department of Justice, Criminal 
Law Policy Section, States in her affidavit filed in the Supreme Court that: 
There was a consensus that the right of an accused person to make fil1 
answer in defence required the production of relevant information. 
Participants in the consultation process emphasized that legislation should 
include the following essentiai elements: dari@ that a wide range of 
personal records commonly sought by defence counsel would be subject to  
the codified procedure; dari@ that applications for production of records 
should be brought at trial, not at the preliminary inquiry; clari@ that the 
accused must establish, with reference to specific grounds, that the records 
sought would be likely relevant to an issue at trial or to the cornpetence of 
a witness to test@; to require the judge to consider the Charter rights of 
both the accused and complainant or witness before or in production to the 
judge and/or to the accused; to dari@ that a subpoena issued to require a 
record holder to bring records to the court would not circumvent the 
production regime and result in the recipient of the subpoena providing the 
records directly to the counsel for the accused and to clarifL that record 
hotders (particularly senice providers), should not be punished in costs for 
b6Zbid at page 2, paragraph 5. 
asserting their rights and their cüents rights to privacy in the records sought 
and for insisting that the acaised establish the relevance of the particular 
records. [emphasis h e r ~ ] ~ ~  
Due to this consultation process, legislative options were revised to create Bill C46.  This 
Bill was introduced by the Minister of Justice and received first reading in the House of 
Commons on June 12, 1996. Next, this Bill was exaMned by the Standing Cornmittee on 
Justice and Legal Affairs. This process included hearings wherein over 20 witnesses 
appeared and represented a broad range of interests, including women's groups, 
academics, the Canadian Mental Health Association, and representatives fkom both the 
defence bar and the Crown. Bill C-46 received royal assent on Apd  25, 1997 and was 
proclaimed in force and effect on M a y  12, 1997. 68 
Further insight into the intent of the legislation can be gamered fiom news releases 
associated with the new legislation. On June 12, 1996, the Department of Justice issued a 
news release, indicating the aim of the new legislation was to "strengthen protection for 
complainants of senial offences" and to "enhance privacy and equality nghts for al1 
complainants." The amendments were "intended to correct a problem that has arisen 
almost exclusively in sexud assault cases, which is the unwarranted invasion of a 
"lbid. at page 3, paragraph 8. Note that written briefs were also submitted to the Standing 
Cornmittee on Justice and Legal AfEairs by the National Association of Women and the 
Law, the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Canadian Mental Health 
Association (Legal Issues Task Force), the National Council of Women of Canada, 
Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres, Action ontarieme centre la violence faite aux 
femmes, CALACS, METRAC and Canadian Council of Criminal Defence Lawyers. 
68 Ibid at page 4, paragraph 9. 
complainant ' s private and confident i d  records for improper purp~ses."~~ 
As well, the intent of the legislation is clearly set out in its pre-amble. It addresses 
concerns about sexual violence and abuse in our comrnunity. It also outlines the 
detrimental affects of compelling production of intensely personal information, particularly 
information associated with counseling and therapeutic records. The wording of the 
legislation is strikingly similar to the pre-amble ponion of Bill C-49," now commonly 
referred to as the rape shield provisions as set out in section 276 of the Crimiml Cd.'' 
As reviewed earlier, the rape shield provisions prohibit the couris nom relying on myths 
and stereotypes that have historically pervaded the trial processes determination of sanial 
assault complainant's credibility. They have attempted to restore some level ofdignity to 
a fair trial process. 
Beyond the pre-amble, it is argued that the new legislation continues to advance some of 
the same themes as established by the rape shield provisions. In Seaboyer, the Court 
debunked certain myths and stzreotypes improperly, and al1 too ofien, associated with a 
sexual assault complainant. For example, section 276 prohibits the use of 
Evidence that the complainant has engaged in semal activity, whether with 
the accused or with any other person, ... to suppon an inference that, by 
reason of this sexual nature of that activity, the complainant (a) is more 
likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject matter 
@'De partment of Justice News Release, June 12, 1996. 
''An Act to A m e d  the CrirninaI Cde (sema/ arunrli). S .C. 1982, c. 3 8. 
"H. Holmes, "An Analysis of Bill C-46, Production of Records in Sexual Offence 
Proceedings" (1997) 2 Can. Cnm. L.R. 71 at 75. 
of the charge; or (b) is less worthy of belief 
In addition to these general statements of law, the legistators also codified a number of 
considerations that are to be applied by a triai judge to assess the admissibility of a 
complainant 's sexual history. These factors are comparable to those set out in section 
278.2. Section 276.(3) established the following factors: 
the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make 
hl1 answer and defence; 
Society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault 
offences; 
whether there is a teasonabte prospect that the evidence will assist 
in arriving at a just determination in the case; 
the need to remove fiom the fact-finding process any discriminatory 
belief or bias; 
the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of 
prejudice, syrnpathy or hostility in the jury; 
the pot ential prejudice to the complainant' s persona1 dignity and 
right or privacy; 
the right of the complainant and of every individual to personai 
security and to the fil1 protection and benefit of the law; and 
any other factor that the judge, Provincial Court judge or justice 
considers relevant .'-' 
Thus, when one reviews the minonty's judgment fiom O 'Connor, and the legislators' 
intent in the codification of sections 278.1 to 278.91, we observe a common goal that 
encourages women who have been victimized by sexual assault to report those onences to 
the police and have them dealt with in the criminal justice systern. Similady, in section 
276.(3), we observe a specific recognition of the possibility for discriminatory beliefs or 
biases and an acceptance that those issues should be excluded fiom the fact finding 
nCrirnid Code. supra note 3. See also J. McImes and C. Boyle "Judging S e 4  
Assault Law Against a Standard of Equality" (1 995) 29 U.B .C.L. J. Vol. 2 34 1, for an 
excellent analysis of Bill C-49. 
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process. Lastly, subxctions (0 and (g) underscore the importance of supporting the 
dignity and nght to privacy as well as the p e ~ n d  security of the complainant in cases 
involving sexual offences. 
Returning our attention to Bill C46, when one looks closely at the prohibited inferences 
set out in section 278.3(4), a similar principle is recognized, that the existence of certain 
facts do not, in logic or in law, allow for cenain inferences to be drawn. E.G. Ewaschuk 
described inferences as "factuai conclusions drawn as a result of a process of logical 
reasoning"." He went on to explain, in Mme detail, the method by which inferences may 
be drawn: 
Thus, a trier of fact is entitled to draw inferences fiom evidence tendered at 
trial. The factud inferences are, generaiiy, drawn fiom 'primary findings of 
fact' made by the trier of fact in respect of individuai items of evidence. 
However, the inferences drawn must be safr: inferences in the sense that 
they reasonably and logically follow fiom an item or items of evidence 
accepted as validly proven onty after the trier of fact has weighed al1 of the 
evidence as a whole. [emphasis bis]" 
Relating this analysis to this disclosure issue for example, the fact that a therapeutic record 
relates to treatment received by a complainant - even if the treatment is directly connected 
to the specific allegations of the proceeding - by itself does not allow inferences to be 
made about issues of likely relevance. The fact that the complainant sought treatment 
after being sexually assaulted by an accused person, and that a record of that treatment 
7 3 ~ .  Ewaschuck, Criminal P W n g s  & Practice in CarmctQ, 2nd ed. ( Aurora, Ont.: 
Canada Law Book Inc., 1994) at 16-57. 
74ibid. at 16-57. See also Doherty, J.A.3 comments in R. v. Morrissey (1995), 97 C.C.C. 
(3d) 193 at 209 (Ont. C.A.). 
exists, is a neutral fact fiom which no inferences can be d r a ~ n . ' ~  
However, this position was not adopted by the majority in O 'Comr .  It is suggested here 
that the Court could have determined that without a strong evidentiary foundation to 
establish relevance, no inference could be drawn fiom the temporal comection between 
the creation of the records and the date of the alleged commission offence. It is argued 
that no connection can flow Iogically and reasonably fiom this fact and as such it should 
be condemed as conjecture and speculation." 
The Supreme Court declined to protect the rights of the complainants and to create an 
environment that does not deter women fiom invoking the criminal justice system. They 
failed to recognize not only the general significance of the nature of therapeutic records, 
but also the specific fiinction that a therapist or counsellor has when treating someone that 
has been sexually assaulted. For exarnple, in addition to being extremely personal, the 
materials are focused on explorhg the complainant's emotionai and psychological 
responses to a traumatic event, particularly being sexually violated. This lies in significant 
contrast to investigators' evidence and witness testimony that is relied on to ascertain 
"See Chipman I.A. in R v. White (1994). 89 C.C.C. (3d) 336 (N.S.C.A) at 35 1. 
' 6 ~ .  Holmes, supra note 7 1 at 89. Arguably the prohibition would not apply to a Iisted 
factor coupled with some other fact, which together give rise to a legitimate inference 
bearing on an issue at trial. While the simple existence of a sexual assault counseling 
record is completely uninformative in and of itself, it might legitimately bear on the issues 
in the trial if, for example, the complainant denied ever having used sexud assault 
counselling services. 
historical facts." Perhaps an analogy will help make this point. 
Unfortunately, most of us know someone whose home or apartment has been broken into. 
If we do not, we can al1 certainly empathize with the victim of such a crime. They fetl 
violated. The sanctity of their home has been breached and they fa1 angry, M d  and 
most of ail, very uneasy about staying in a place where they no longer feel safe. This is al1 
aggravated by the fact that one's home is oflen considered a place to escape fiom the rest 
of the world. For most, regardless of how bad things might get in the outside world, a 
home is a place to retreat to that will a o r d  one the opportunity to relax and fuid some 
peace of mind. Once your home has been broken into you no longer have a sanctuq to 
retreat to, rather you now need a place that you can go to because you feel vulnerable. 
People understand this because it is a common human need to feel safe in one's home. 
Through no fault of our own, anyone of us could be next. It is because of this that we ail 
seem to have compassion for the needs of these types of victims. The desire to move or 
guard against future invasions is recognized, as is the need for therapeutic counselling, in 
some cases. In this exarnple, it is hard to imagine what court would ailow an accused 
person charged with such an offence to obtain the therapeutic records of the home owner, 
without a sound evidentiary basis, to determine whether the alleged victim, during their 
discussions with their counsellor, possibly made any inconsistent statements about the day 
their home was broken into, or their recollections as to how they found the contents of 
their bedroom. Such a notion would be seen as positively outrageous. Of course counsel 
"R v. O 'Connor. supra note I at 65. 
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for an accused could always make an application for additional disdosure if the 
appropriate circumstances were in place to suppon a daim of relevance. For example, if 
counsel had obtained some information based on evidence that a complainant had in the 
past "staged" or fdsified claims of king victirnized in such a fashion, then the counseu'mg 
records of such a complainant may certainly be a live issue. Still the point is made that 
such a daim of relevance would require an evidentiary foundation, and the courts, it is 
suggested, would not be inclined to d o w  counçel to embark on a "fishing expedition" to 
discover potentially relevant details. 
Our society has evolved to the point that we accept the place of counsellors in assisting 
those that have been exposed to tembly traumatic events. For example, the state made 
available to jurors who sat on the Paul Bemardo Case crisis therapists. As tners of fact to 
these tragic and inhuman violent violations that they were required to observe, the criminal 
justice system not only recognized the need for such a re ,  but also paid for it. Most 
Canadians would agree that this is a small price to pay for what society got in retum fiom 
these citizens. In this light, could anyone imagine defence cwnsel arguing for the nght to 
open such therapeutic records to ensure a juror's cornpetence? The notion evokes 
indignation. 
Outside of the criminal justice system another example is the counselling care that was 
offered to those Nova Scotians, who risked their own lives to attempt to rescue any 
potential suwivors of the downed Swiss Air flight, off shore fiom Peggy's Cove in the fdl 
of 1998. And beyond just the civilian needs, the government dso recogntzed that the 
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military personal, deployed to assist in the recovery process and having witnessed the 
grisly remains of the doomed passengers, simila. needs for professional counselling. What 
court would allow the opening of such records to assess the credibility of such witnesses, 
if called to test@ about their observations during the course of a civil trial? Certainly such 
a motion fiom the discovenng party would have an onerous burden to establish relevance. 
Why then is that we have a difficult time understanding the need for a sexual assault 
survivor to seek treatment for king attacked? The violation that they have suffered is far 
worse than that of the homeowner. Where does the victim of a sexual assault go to feel 
safe again? Tt is not their home that has been violated but their body, the very self that no 
longer protects them from the world at large. It is not a property violation, rather it is a 
violent interpersonal infnngernent. It is argued that the majority view in O *Conmr Case 
failed to understand this reality in their interpretation of the nghts of the accused to make 
full answer and defence and the nghts of the cornplainant to equality before the court and 
to their privacy. The majority failed to apply a more contextual approach," as did 
L'Heureux-Dubé J. in her questioning of the relevance of the records, to the issue of the 
accused' s nght to full answer and defence. Reviewing her own rationale in R v. Osoh," 
she articulated the special characteristics of therapeutic records and highlighted the 
potential they have to "derail" the fact finding mission of the trial process. Specifically, she 
7 g ~ .  Boyle, "A Feminist Approach to Criminal Defences" in R Devlin, ed., C W a n  
Perspectives on Legal77wory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1991), 
advances the t heory of contextualizing uniquely female experiences. 
v. Osolh. supra note 14. 
attempted to contextualize the nature of the records, stating that: 
. ..medical records conceming staternents made in the course of therapy are 
both hearsay and inherently problematic as regards reliability. A witness's 
concwns expresseci in the course of thcmpy atter the fact, even assurning 
they are correctly understood and reliably noted, cannot be equated with 
evidence given in the course of a trial. Both the context in which the 
statements are made and the cxpectations of the parties are entirely 
different . In a trial a witness is  swom to testifL as to the particular events in 
issue. By contrast, in therapy an entire spectrum of factors such as personal 
history, thought. motions ru well as pahcular acts may inform the 
dialogue between the therapist and patient. Thus, there is a serious nsk that 
such statements could be taken piecemeal out of context in which they 
were made to provide a foundation for entirely unwarranted inferences by 
the trier of fact? 
Yet, why do we as a society not feel the same level of empathy towards someone whose 
body - and self - has been invaded and whose need for healing is premised on such an 
intimate a level? It is my opinion that it is stereotypical misconceptions and unidonneci 
positions that causes our criminal justice system to tum a blind eye to the ham being 
suffered by such groundless pnvacy invasions comected to demands for the production of 
their therapeutic records. Support for this position can found in the contrasting opinions of 
the Supreme Couds  findings in R v. O *Conno#' on the issue of the threshold of likely 
relevance at the first stage of the inquiry. For example, the majority of the Court sets the 
threshold as "not an onerous one" and continues to link a close temporal comection 
''lbid. at 499. H. Holmes, in "Access to Third Piriy Records" (1996) 44 C.R (4"') 144 at 
148 examines the nature of counselling records. It is her concem that there exists an 
immense potential for abuse of the material containecl therein and therefore argues for an 
application of "scnipulous care to ensure actual relevance to real issues." 
8'R V. O *Conmr. supra note 1. See also A Young in "When Titans Clash: the Limits of 
Constitutional Adjudication" (1 9%), C.R (43  152, that examines the historiai re- 
victimiuition by an insensitive and patriarchd crimiml justice system. 
between the creation of the records and the date of the allegations as a relevant 
consideration. This represents a jump in logic prernised on a stereotypical myth about 
women who delay reporting an incident and should therefore be more carefiiliy 
scmtinized. Rather, it is suggested here that the length of time that it takes for a person to 
come foward with a complaint, without anything more, is indistinguishable fkom the 
characteristic of the wursc of t r e a t m t  selected to commence the huling processa 
A secondary effect that may flow fiom such considerations is society's lost opportunity to 
deter males tiom continuing such behaviour. If one assumes that women will be less 
willing to corne before the courts to have these rnatters judicially deterrnined if they 
believe their personal records will be opened and reviewed by the court (or worse the 
accused) wit hout some evidentiary foundation to assess the t hreshold of relevance, then 
society will have lost an oppomnity to address and denounce the behaviour as criminal. 
One might also argue that those that would attack a female do so because they believe 
they can over power the victim and because they can get away with it. Assuming, for a 
moment, that individuals modi@ their behaviour to avoid negative consequences (such as 
imprisonment or other court sanctions), certainly similarly minded individuals would 
recognize the faiiure of  the same court process to protect the rights of the complainant. As 
a result of this lack of disincentive, they may be more willing to manipulate the position of 
power imbalance that women occupy in our society's criminal justice system and continue 
to conduct themselves in a manner that continues to objectie women and put their lives 
82 See R. v. O 'Connor, supra note 1 at 65 for a discussion regarding the irrelevancy of 
treatment type. 
and safety in peril. 
Actions taken by the courts that foctor in these myths and sterwtypes when determining 
issues of access to third party records creates not only a grave injustice for the suMvor of 
a sexual attack, but also for society as a whole. When the comrnunity loses faith in the 
system' s ability to sene both the victim as well as those accused of crimes, respect for the 
system is lost and people either stop looking for justice al1 together or, at a minimum, look 
elsewhere for it. One clear example of this is the case of R. v. Lee," where the triai judge 
considered the issue of the validity of sections 278.1 to 278.9, and declared the provisions 
unconstitutional. The Court then decided that the records of the complainant should be 
disclosed to the defence. As a result, the Crown, in consultation with the complainant, 
stayed the criminal charges. It is suggested that this is a concrete example of how a niling 
of a court on the issue of opening up a survivor's therapeutic records can impact the 
process, including the community's right to access justice. As well, the impact can have a 
ripple effect on other charges. As additional victims are advised of such rulings, they will 
be forced to make difficult decisians about immersing themselves in a trial system that fails 
to recognize a balancing of their equal rights and privacy concerns. Their individual health 
concems and treatment progress will be factored into one's decision making process as to 
whether or not they will come forward with their complaint. One c m  only speculate, at 
this stage as to the chilling effect that such rulings will have on our community's efforts to 
reduce the fûrther violent victimization of women in Our society. 
83R v. Lee (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 598 (Ont. GD.) and the Afiidavit of Catherine KUK, 
supra note 65. 
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Also, when compared to the Supreme Court's fomments in Smith v. Jonep a fiirther 
inequality is revealed. In this case the main issue deliberated and commented on was 
solicitor-client privilege. The facts in this case involved a male accused charged with 
aggravated sexual assault on a prostitute. His lawyer refend him to a psychiatrist 
believing that it would be o f  assistance in the preparation of a defence or in supporthg a 
sentencing position. The lawyer advised the accused that the consultation was privilegeâ. 
During the consultation the accused told the psychiatrist, in great detail, his plan to 
kidnap, rape and kill prostitutes. The psychiatrist infomed the lawyer that he was of the 
opinion that the accused was dangerous and that he would, more tikely than not, carry out 
this plan without treatment. The accused pled guilty and when the psychiatrist discovered 
that his opinion wodd not be addressed in the sentencing hearing he commenced an action 
for a declaration that he was entitled to disclose this information in the interests of public 
safety. The British Columbia Court of Appeal ailowed the psychiatrist to disclose the 
information to the Crown and the police. The Supreme Court of Canada a5med  the 
decision of the lower wurt and caretiiliy assesseci the three factors that shouid be taken 
into account in determining whether public safety outweighs solicitor-client privilege: a 
clear risk to an identifiable person or group of persons; a risk of serious bodily h m  or 
death; and imminence of danger." 
84[1999] S.C.J. No. 15 Fik No.:26500. 
"With the following directive; that the file was to be u n s d d  and the publication ban was 
liAed, except for those parts of the psychiatrist's report which did not fd1 within the public 
safety exception. 
What is relevant here, was the dissmting judgement of Major Jea6 A component ofhis 
rationale was based on fostering a "climate in which dangerous individuais are more Wcely 
to disclose their disoders, seek treatment and pose l e s  âanger to the p ~ b l i c . " ~  It was his 
view that that to create such a climate it was necessary to confirm the communications as 
privileged, but permit the psychiatrist to give his opinion and diagnosis regarding the 
threat posed by the acaised. Particularly interesting was his perspective on the c h i h g  
effect that opening the privileged relationship between patient and the founsdor  would 
have on the public. He stated: 
If defence counsel cannot fieely refer clients, particulafly dangerous ones, to 
medical or  other experts without r u ~ i n g  the serious risk of the privilege k i n g  set 
aside, their response will be not to refer clients until &er the trial, if at d. This 
could result in dangerous people remaining fke on bail for long penods of time , 
undiagnosed and untreated, presenting a danger to society. 
The chilling effect of completely breaching the privilege would have the undesired 
effect of discouraging those individuals in need of treatment for serious and 
dangerous conditions fiom consulting professional help. In this case the interests of 
the appellant and more importantly the interests of society would be better m e d  
by obtaining treatment. This  COU^ has rccognized that mental health including 
those suffenng fiom potentially dangerous illnesses, is an important public good? 
This issue of promoting treatment and counselling is not addressed by the majonty. 
Therefore, while it would appear that the C o u d s  majority position in O 'Connor,." 
specifically that the societal interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences 
g6~issenting judgement included Lamer C.J., Major and Bimie JJ. 
"Smith v. Jones. =supra note 84 at 4. 
"~bid. at 7. Reference at the end of this passage is made to M.@.) v. Rym, that is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
g9S~~pra note 1 at 24. 
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and the obtaining of treatment by victims was declared not to be a "paramount 
consideration" in the detennination of the disclosure of complainants' counselling records, 
the potential h m  that flows tiom discouraging treatment for dangerous offenders is a 
priority for the minority of the Court when it cornes to the issue of solicitor-client 
privilege. Perhaps the distinction between the two is that, as highlighted in Chapter One, 
the vast majority of s e 4  offenden are male and srnial usault complainats are f d c .  If 
this is in fact the premise behind the distinction, then the geder-bad inequality underlying 
the positions is startling. 
2. Constitutional Challenges and the Mills Case. 
To review thus far, this chapter has examined a fact dnven issue being resolved through 
the courts. In the absence of statutory principles, the courts created a rem* a a o  stage 
process to determine the production of therapeutic records in a third party's possession. 
The legisiative branch of government responded to the need for ftrther assistance by 
passing Bill (2-46. This codification was created through a public consultation proccss, 
and input fiom Canadian legal scholars, including those Justice's sitting on the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Yet this is not the end of our review. The next stage in the formation of 
a law in Canadian çociety is how the courts have interpreted Bill C-46. As one would 
have expected, there have been constitutional challenges to sections 278.1 to 278.91. 
While these constitutional challenges are interesting enough on their own, they dso 
advance the examination of gender inequality within the criminal justice system. To focus 
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on this issue other matters such as procedural requirements, distinctions ôetween the 
credibility and the reliability of complainants in sexual assault prosecutions and rulings on 
the review and production of therapeutic records are not discussed here? 
Further support for the argument that gender plays a large part in the creation of a law can 
be inferred fiorn the language used by the courts as they assess the wnstitutionaiity of Bi11 
C46.  In particular, it is noted that although one Court cites principles that prohibit the 
ranking of Charter rights, the end result of the balancing process implemented favours the 
accused's right to full answer and defence over the female wmplainant's right to privacy. 
It is dso important to note in these cases the degree to which the trial judges attempt to 
determine the constitutionality of Bill C-46 within a fiamework of contextualization. This 
is particularly significant in the consideration of the section 1 Chorter limitations. 
For example in R v. MNS,~* Belzil J. found Bill C-46 as unconstitutionai. In this case, the 
accused was charged with a sexual assault offence and sought disclesure of the 
cornplainant ' s therapeutic records, not in possession of the Crown. During the course of 
the trial, the defence commenced a series of motions for the disdosure of the 
complainant's therapeutic records. Belzil J. onginally applied the principles as set out by 
the majority in O 'Connor, as the motions pre-dated the legislation. Having been 
persuaded on their likely relevance, Beizil J. reviewed the records and ordered two fiil1 
q o r  interpretations on procedurai issues see: R v. C. KG.. [1997] S.J. No. 856 (Sask. 
Q.B.); R. v. J.F.G..[1997] N.W.T.J. No. 47 (SC.). 
''R V. MiIIs. sl(pr4 note 2. 
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and two part pages discloseci to the rccused. A second motion, requesting additional 
records was heard but prior to a ruling Bill C-46 was mled in force and effect. Counsel 
for the accused advocated that Bill C-46 violated the accused's section 7 and 11 (d) 
Charter rights. The violation was articulated through an impairment of his ability to make 
full answer in defence and an undennining of his constitutionai right to a f ~ r  triai. Equaiity 
rights as guaranteed by section 15 of the C h f e r  were not considered by the Coun. 
Belzil J. accepted the majonty's view in the Supreme Court of Canada in O 'Conmr as the 
state of the law. At page 336, he stated: 
It is important to note that the majority judgment pointed out that in 
criminal proceedings, the ultimate goal is the search for tnith rather than 
the suppression of potentially relevant eviden~e.~~ 
The Alberta Court also highlighted the majority's rejection of the concept of a societd 
interest in the prosecution of sexual assault offen~es .~~ It was determined that those factors 
considered as relevant by L'Heureux-Dube J. and specifically rejected by the majority, yet 
included in the new legislation, were relevant issues to be assessed in detemiinhg the 
constitutional validity of the legislation. In addition, Belzil J. also noted that because Bill 
C 4 6  altered the balance between privacy rights and the rights of the accused to a fair trial, 
in pan because the majority's ruling on the likely relevance test at the first stage, 
specifically endorsing a low threshold, was cont rq  to the higher threshold provided for in 
the new legislation. The Court held that this also created an unf'air burden o n  the 
Following this Belzil J. analyzed the inherent confiict between the two parties7 rights by 
adopting Lamer C.J.C. findings in the Dagemïs Case. Specifically Behl J. noted: 
It would be inappropriate for the courts to continue to apply a cornmon 
law mle that automatidly favoured the rights protected by S. I l(d) over 
those protected by s.2@). A hierarchal approach to rights, which places 
some over others, mua be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and 
when developing the common iaw. When the protected rights of two 
individuals corne into conflict, as can occur in the case of publication bans, 
Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that hlly respects the 
importance of both sets of rights." 
Belzil J. then goes on to conclude that "privacy rights do not tmmp the right to a fair trial 
and the right to fair trial does not trump privacy rights."= Finally, Behl J. brings his 
judgement to an end by holding Bill C46  unconstitutional because within the legislation 
"privacy rights are ranked paramount to the rights of an accused to a fair trial."97 
On a procedural ground, Belzil J. highlighted section 278.4(2) that specifies that neither 
the cornplainant nor the record holders are compellable as witnesses at a hearing for 
disclosure. This provision was held to constitute a substantial departure fkom the 
reasoning of the majority in O 'Cont10r.~ 
95Canodan Brdcasting Corp. v. Dogenais. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 83 5;  94 C.C.C. (3d) 289; as 
cited in R v. MiIIs* mpra note 2. 
06R. v. Mi//s* mpra note 2 at 344. 
Moreover, on the ground of departing fiom the majority's position on the appropriate 
considerations the trial judge concluded: 
In the net result, Bill C-46 forces a trial judge, without having seen the 
documents, to engage in such a balancing of interests at an early stage and 
compeis the trial judge, in part, to use factors specifically rejected by a 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada even at the second stage of the 
analysis. 
It is clear, accordingly, that Bill C-46 does, indeed, incorporate a number of legd 
propositions advanced by the minority of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
O ' C o ~ o r  and specifically rejected by the rnaj~rity.'~ 
Tt is suggested that an overwhelrning concern of Belril, J. was the potentiai for a 
miscamage of justice for an accused if wrongly convicted. Part of his concern was 
connected with the nature of a sexual assault offence and the stigmatitation that follows a 
conviction for sarne. He determined that the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada in 
O 'Cornor properly balanced al1 interests connected to the production of third party 
records and concluded that: 
Bill C-46 tilts the balance and creates a legislative regime which is presumptive 
against disdosure even though the Supreme Court of Canada majority in 
O 'Cortrior stated that such records are oAen relevant in criminal proceedings. In 
my view, the tilting which 1 have identified is cunfirmed by the legislative adoption 
of a number of legal propositions specifically rejected by a majority of the court."' 
As such, the Court determined that the accused's Charter rights as guaranteed in sections 
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7 and 1 1 (d) had been breached by Bill C46. 
In a later decision, the sarne Court prepared its judgment on the issue of whether or not 
the new legislation could be saved by section 1 of the Chrater-'02 At the hearing of the 
determination of the issue, evîdence was called by the Crown to elaborate on the specific 
and unique nature of a sexual assault complainant's relationship with a therapist. Refemng 
to this evidence Belzil J. summarized the vulnerabiiity and potential harm suffered by a 
sexual assault survivor. He held: 
It is clear that the vast majority of complainants of sexual abuse are fernale. 
Therapists, for the most part, accept complainants of sexual abuse at face 
value, and absent information to the contrary, accept the complainant's 
version of alleged abuse as being accurate. The foais of individuals 
engaged in treating victims of sexual abuse is on rehabilitation and therapy, 
not on verifying the tmth of allegati~ns.'~~ 
The Court attempted to corne to grips with the potential chilling effea that the production 
of third party therapeutic records might have on other complahants of sexual assault, 
particularly related to their desire to seek wunselling and treatment, to begin or advance 
the healing process. As such, the two competing interests needed to be bdanced against 
the other. One had to give way to the other and, in the end, it was held that the 
impairment of a fùndarnentai right, such as hl1 answer in defence, could not be saved by 
section 1 of the Charredol The ultimate effect of this determination is the creation of a 
hierarchy of Chmer rights, with the accused's right to full ariswer and defence ranked 
-- 
'o'R v. Mills(1997), 207 A.R. 161 (Q.B.). 
'O3ibid. at 166. 
''%id at 173. 
above the confîicting rights of a complainant. 
Also related to the issue of contextualking the impact of the application of the legislation, 
Belzil J. continued to assess the impact on complainants' willingness to access justice 
through the criminal court. He recognized that the disclosure of therapeutic records "will 
act as a deterrent for a few cornplainants not to seek therapy" but he was satisfied that no 
more than a "small handtiil of patients have refiised therapy due to a risk of disclosure in 
the course of legal proceeding~."'~~ This position was based on his examination of the 
evidence presented looking at the impact of the O 'Connor Caw over the two years 
following its determination. Rather, Belzil J. stressed the potential positive cathartic affect 
that a trial has for a "small numbei' of complainants that may also lead to either the 
commencement of therapy or the pursuit of fûrther therapy? However, the Coun did not 
incorporate into its decision the effect that a not guilty verdict, based solely on credibility, 
might have on a complainant. As well, no assessment was made by the Court as to what 
impact the arbitrasr determinations of likely relevant information, containeci within a 
complainant's counselling records, may have on women deciding whether or not they will 
access justice through the criminai courts. 
Rather, the Coufi, in conclusion, stated: 
As important as privacy nghts are, the fact is that the criminai justice 
system must remain vigilant to the danger of wrongfiil conviction. 
Parliament is not fke to impair Charter protected rights. A balance must 
be stnrck between competing rights of privacy, on one hand, and the right 
to a fair trial, on the other. 
In my view, Bi11 C-46 is not a proportional response and does not constitute a 
minimal impairment of rights, but rather constitutes a substantial impairment of the 
fundamental right to a f i r  trial."' 
In a similar application, Chapnik J. also held that sections 278.1 to 278.9 1 were 
unconstitutional.'" In R v. Lee, the acaised was charged with two counts of xmd 
assault. During the course of his trial, Mr. Lee presented the Court with an argument that 
the new legislation violated his sections 7 and 1 l(d) Ci#nler rights. The Court agreed and 
fully and unreservedly adopted the reasoning of Mr. Justice Belzil in R v. M i i i ~ . ' ~  Later 
the Court assessed whether or not the legislation, now deemed unconstitutional, could be 
saved by section 1 of the Charrer. Chapnik J. held that the new legislation could not be 
saved by section 1, and the Court ordered the production of third party records according 
to the procedure laid out by the Supreme Court of Canada in O 'Connor. In detennining 
the issue, the Court balanced the conflicting rights of the individuals involved in the 
process, and stated: 
As 1 held yesterday, Parliament's attempt at balancing has resulted in a 
violation of the accused's right to a fair trial. There is not public interest in 
' O U R .  v. Lee (1 997), 35 O.R. 594 (Ont. G.D.). 
'(%. v- Milis, supra note 2. See dso R v. E.H., [1998] O.J. No. 4515 (Ont. G.D.), and R 
v.Hmper, 119971 O.J. No. 5584 (Ont. G.D.), that adopt the rasons as set out in R v. 
Mills. 
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impairing the rights of the accused person to have a fiiir trial."' 
Furthemore, the Court relied on an article written by David Paciocco'" that enumerated 
reasons why, in his view, Bill C-46 was unconstitutional. In his assessrnent of 
proportionality, he concluded: 
In the end, though, this legislation is not even close to rninimally impairing 
the relevant constitutional rights, the tests that this Bi1 adopts are so 
weighed down with extraneous factors and with redundant obstacles to 
access that it simply c m o t  be found to be rninimally impairing. In fact, so 
prevalent are those obstacles, that this Bill will corne perilously close to 
qualiSing as one of those rare enactrnents whose very purpose, and not 
just its effect, contravenes the Charter."' 
Thus, in these two cases we see the courts grappling with the competing interests of the 
accused's right to a full answer a defence and the wmplainants right to equality and 
privacy. Also, it is significant to note that the complainant's rights, while considered are 
not scrutinized within the parameters of the Charter. In the end, the female complainant's 
consti tut ional guarantees rernained unrecognized and were forfeited to those claimed by 
the male accused. 
On the other hand, a series of cases have upheld the constitutionality of the new 
legislation. In R v. Stronrner, Patterson A.C.J. upheld the new legislation as constitutional 
"OR. v. Lee (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 598 at 602 (Ont. G.D.). 
"l~aciocco, D. "Bill C-46 should not suMve constitutional challenge", 3 Semal Offences 
Law Reporter 185 at 192. See also M. Peters "Third Party Disclosure Under O'Connor: 
Defence Concems (1 996) 44 C.R. (4'") 179. 
"'lbid. as cited in R v. Lee, supra note 1 10 at 602. 
1 O3 
except for section 278.5(2),"' in an application by Mr. Stromner for access to the 
complainant's records in the possession of a third Party. A component of the accused's 
application was that Bill C-46, was of no force and effect becsuse it violateci his rights as 
guaranteed under section 7 of the Chorter. Once again, an argument promoting the 
declaration of the legislation as unconstitutional focused on the legislation's requirement 
that a trial judge was tu consider factors that the majority in the Supreme COUR of Canada 
rejected as appropriate considerations. These considerations related to Society's interest 
in encouraging the reporting of sema1 offences, society's interest in encouraging the 
obtaining of treatment by complainants of sexual offences and the effect of the 
determination on the integrity of the trial pro ces^."^ When he considered these values, 
they were contrasted with the accused's guaranteed rights to fùll answer in defence and 
the foundational premise of the criminal justice system - that no innocent person is 
wrongly convicted of an offence. 
In balancing these competing interests, the trial judge detennined that the means set out in 
the new legislation, to balance the competing interests, were rationally connecteci. He 
specificall y held: 
Society and the Mctims of sexual crimes equally have an interest in 
ensuring, to the extent possible, that the victims are not fùrther humiliated 
and degraded by disclosure of essentiatly private material. 
The impugned legislation is Parliament's direction for balancing these 
competing interests. In my view, with the exception of S. 278.5(2), the 
l l 3 R .  v. Stromner, ,119971 A.J. No. 872 (Aita. P.C.). 
"'R v. Stromner, [1997] A.J. No. 872 (Aita. P.C.). 
measures contained in the Act are not orbitrary, unfir or based on 
irrational considerations. In balancing the interests of both parties, each of 
whom enjoys Constitutional protections, the means are rationaily 
comected to the objective. Finaily, there is a proportionality between the 
Charter limitations on the nght of disclosure in the accuseci and the privacy 
rights of the indi~idual.~" 
These words aiign themselves with the evolution of principles set out in the Law Case, lr6 
that contemplated the scope and purpose of section 15 Chmer guaranteed rights to 
equality. 
As well, within a contextual fiamework the trial judge recognized the degrading aspects of 
a sexual assault cornplainant role in the criminal justice system. He noted that in addition 
to being compelled to test@ to the degrading aspects of the crime, an additionai fbrther 
humiliation was being suffered as a result of the disclosure of her most intimate records to 
the  very person who perpetrated this terrible indignity upon ber."' 
Nonetheless, with regards to section 278.5(2), the triai judge determined that the 
requirement of a judge to take into consideration factors, without having had an 
opportunity to review the records, created an "insurmountable banier in the detennination 
of the process." It was his view that the inclusion of these factors dunng this stage of the 
disclosure detennination process, had the potential of impacting on an accused's nght to 
ll'lbid at 49 and 50. 
l16Lmu v. Minister of Utman Resarrfes Development, File No.: 25374, judgernent March 
25, 1999. 
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make full answer and defence. "'As a result, this section was deerned uncons t i t~ t iona l .~~~ 
As well, there are a series of cases that have upheld the constitutionality of the new 
legislation in its entirety. In R v. Hurrie, a defence motion was heard to strike down Bill- 
46."' During an application in a dangerous offender proceeding, one of the Crown 
witnesses revealed, for the first time, that she had spoken about the sexual offence to a 
counsellor in 1977. The Crown was not aware of this information until testified to  by the 
witness. As a result of this testimonial disclosure, defence cornmenced a motion for the 
disclosure of the therapeutic records and challenged the constitutionality of provisions in 
sections 278.1 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code. The defence postulated that the legislation 
created a presumption against disclosure and that the procedurai requirements set out in 
Bill C-46 infringed the accused's right to make hll answer in defence. The defence 
argument proposed that the new legislation irnpaired the ability o f  defence counsel to 
properly prepare a defence because witnesses would be "chilled in their discussions with 
defence counsel.""' Additionally, the defence proposed that the procedural requirements 
were too onerous and that they included factors not present in the majority judgment in 
O 'Conrror. 
The trial judge determined that the provisions in section 278.5(2) simply provided for the 
1181bid at 46. 
llglbid. at 46. 
''OR v. Hurrie, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2634 (B.C.S.C.). 
"'lbid. at 10. 
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need to establish an evidentiary basis of relevancy before a-ing the initial production of 
the documents in questions, first to a judge and then potentiaily to an acaised. 
Taylor J. r a i d  an interesting issue related to the accused's right to fbll answer in defence. 
Specifically, a concern was raised for potential complainants who wished to assen their 
rights to privacy and were aware that no such privacy right existed. The Court was 
concened that such a complainant might refiise to provide even the Crown with this 
information. This would then circumvent the procedural process of the legislation that 
attempts to promote, at least in put, the accused's right to full answer in defencd2' 
Having reviewed the positions of both parties, Taylor J. formulated the specific issue, 
"whether in the recognition of the right to privacy in tenns of records as defined in section 
278.1, in the context of offences involving a cornpiainant or witnesses' sexual integrity, as 
Parfiament, in establishing procedures under section 278.1 to 278.9 by requiring the 
establishment of evidentiary basis, created an unacceptable risk of a possibility of 
miscarriage of justice occumng?"" 
The Court concluded that in an effort to balance the competing constitutional interests of  
the defence and the complainant, the intent of the legislation required an evidentimy basis 
of likely relevance, as opposed to an accused assertion of reievance as the threshold for 
invoking the two stages contemplated in the legislation. It was detennined that the burden 
of establishing this evidentiary basis for production at either stage was not an onerous one. 
The court concluded: 
In my view, the procedures set up under Bill C-46 do not prevent an 
accused fiom the exercise of his right to hiIl answer in defence in a way 
that could be said to infnnge upon those rights. Rather, it establishes in an 
area of societal concern about the privacy rights of complainants and 
witnesses in the context of sexual condua and the effea~ upon such 
persons of disclosure a low level evidentiary threshold of likely relevance 
across which an accused mua pass to invade the privacy of wch persons in 
pursuit of their constitutional rights. Recognizing that mere assertions are 
not adequate, Bi11 C-46 adopts this evidentiary threshold in the context of 
the criminai process and thus establishes, as 1 have remarked, a low 
threshold. '" 
In R. v. Cirrti, the British Columbia Supreme Court addressed the issue of a section 1 
Charter consideration.'" Hutchison, J. dealt with an accused's motion regarding 
restrictions on his right to make full answer in defence as a result of Bill C-46's procedurd 
requirements. The  COU^ dismissed the application and went on to hold that any 
restrictions on the accused's right to make fùll answer in defence were justified in a fiee 
and democratic society because they merely required an accused to demonstrate Wrely 
relevance. This requirement balanced the accused's rights with the complainant's nght to 
privacy. Hutchison, J., in coming to his conclusions, had the opportunity to review the 
case law set out ab~ve. ' '~  In addition to these trial level cases, the Court also reviewed 
Chief Justice Dickson's findings in R v. Oakes, including: 
Canadian society is to be fiee and democratic. The court must be guided 
by the values and principles essential to a fiee and democratic society 
which 1 believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity 
l2'1bid at 22. 
"1 v. Curti, [1997] B.C.I. No.  2367 (B.C.S.C.). 
126 R v. Milis, mpra note 2; R v. Strorntier, m~pru note 1 1 3; R v. Lee, supra note 1 08. 
of the human person, wmmitment to society justice and equality, 
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group 
identity, and faith in society and politicai institutions which enhance the 
participation of individuals and groups in Society. The underlying values 
and pnnciples of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights 
and fieedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against 
which a lirnit on a right for fieedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be 
reasonable and demonstrably ju~tified.~~' 
An effort was made by the trial judge to consider these guiding principles in its assessrnent 
of social history and values, in addition to the broad design and workings of society when 
it determined certain section 1 lirnitati~ns.'~~ Finally, the Court detemiined that with the 
establishment of a likely relevance threshold Parliament pteserved fiili answer and defence 
while at the same time preventing accused individuals fkom engaging in fishing 
expeditions. In stnking the appropriate balance, the Court concludeâ: 
The cases hold that if Parliament has clearly show its intention to take a 
certain course, and this course does not go beyond rninimally infnnging a 
Charter right, the courts should be loathe to overn.de Pafliament, which is, 
&er all, surely supreme in a free and democratic ~oc ie ty . '~~  
In  a recent decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, both the constitutionality of Biil 
C-46 as well as the role of the legislative branch of the govemment, was considered. In 
the case R. v. Regan , the accused applied to the Court for dedaration that sections 278.1 
I2'R v. Oakes (1 986), 24 C.C.C. (36) 32 1 (S C.C. )  at 346; as cited in R v. Curt& supra 
note 128 at 8. 
12?lones v. 7he Queen (1986), 3 1 D.L.R. (4&) 569 at 594 (S.C.C.); as cited in R v. Curti, 
supra note 125 at 10. 
129R. v  Curti. supra at note 125, at 20. See also R v. Fm>jy, [1997] O.J. No. 4828 (Ont. 
G.D.), endorsing R. v. Curri 
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to 278 -9 1 of the Crimiml Code, were unconstituti~nd."'~ In this case, the accuseci, 
charged with a number of m related offences, argud that the new legislation created a 
more onerous regime than was considerd appropriate by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
O 'Connor and as a result, this legislation infnnged his sections 7 and 1 l(d) rights as 
guaranteed under the Charter. The application was dismissecl by MacDonald, AC-J., who 
held that the legislation was not so significantly different fiom the process considered by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in O 'Connor, so as to render it unconstitutional. Once 
again. the Court grappled with the competing interests of the accused and complainant. In 
doing so, the Coun also considered the two branches of govenments law making roles. 
Sirnply put, the Court acknowledged "Parliament is supreme, provided its laws are 
constitutionally valid. The Court's role is to ensure constitutional c~rnpliance.'~' 
Both the Crown and interveners for the complainants argued that the process as 
formulated in O 'Cottnor was not the only possible constitutionally valid approach to the 
production of private records. It was their view that as long as Bill C-46 addressed and 
balanced competing rights in a constitutionally acceptable way, then the legislation should 
be deemed constitutionally valid, even where the processes diverge fkom those proposed 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Interestingly, they advocated that "to force Parliament 
to follow O 'Connor on al1 fours, would be tantamount to the courts (as opposed to 
130R. v. Regan, [1998] N.S.J. No. 356 (N.S.S.C.), r e l d  September 15, 1998. 
'"'lbid. at 13; The court acknowledged that this relationship was originally confirrned by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Vriend W. Alberta (1998), 156 D.L.R. (4") 385 at 437. 
Parliament) writing legislati~n."'~~ 
Prior to reviewing the pre-amble of the legislation, the Court recognized the range of 
alternatives the legislators had when wntemplating a response to the vacuum in the 
codified provisions of the CrimimI Code. The legislators did not adhere to requests for 
total disdosure that would have completely ignored the complainant's privacy and equality 
rights. Similady, they rehted the position of absolute privilege which would have, of 
course, ignored the accused's rights. The Court, deterrnined that "like the majority in 
O 'Connor, it attempted to strike a balance that would recognize both sets of wmpeting 
rights."'"As a result, the Court presumed that Parliament attempted to reconcile both 
competing rights in a constitutionally valid manner.'Y 
In R. v. N.J.M., an accused was charged with semial assault and buggery offences. 
Counsel for the accused brought an application seeking production of the complainant's 
medical and psychiatrie records. The Court held that the application failed to provide any 
evidence to ground the belief that the complainant's therapeutic records had any likely 
relevancy as connected to the issues of the complainant's state of memory or to her 
'14Note: there are additional cases that have considered the constitutionality and upholding 
Bill C-46 as valid, that have not been reviewed in this essay. These cases include R v. 
Hnyda, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2600 (B.C.S.C.); R v. Weeseekase, [1997] S.J. No. 790 (Sask. 
Q.B.); R V. G.C.B., 119971 0.1. No. 5019 (Ont. G.D.); R v. REC., [1998] O.J. No. 977 
(Ont. G.D.); R v. R. [unreportedl Mr. Justice Belleghen, Brampton, Ontario, June 2, 1998 
(Ont. G.D.) 
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competency and credibilityJJS M e r  review the  pre-amble of the legislation and Sections 
278.3(4), 278.5(1) and (Z), Easton J. determined that he was bound by the legislative 
enactments. It is important to note, however, he also indicated that this case did not 
involve a constitutional challenge of the legislation and the Court did not nile on that 
issue. 
The Court went on to comment on the privacy of the complainant and the privacy and 
sanctity of these records have and that they have now assumed a pararnountcy which they 
rnay not have enjoyed prior to the recent enactments. The Court held: 
Obvious care was taken by Parliament to address a myriad of grounds 
which it has now stated to be, in and of themselves, insufficient to establish 
likely relevancy to an issue at trial or to the competency of a witness to 
testiîjr. 13' 
Thus, the Canadian trial courts are far fiom unanimous on the constitutionality of Bill C- 
46. Perhaps more importantly for our purposes here, the courts have a l s ~  given diserent 
values to the conflicting interests of the rights of the male accused and those of the female 
complainants. For exarnple, in the Mills case BelWl J. held the law to be unconstitutional 
and that it could not be saved by section 1 ofthe Charter primarily because of it's impact 
on an accused person's right to tùll answer and defence. Contrary to this, the cases that 
were reviewed here that upheld the Bill as constitutional did so after considering the 
135R v. MJM. (1 997). 155 Nfi d. And P.E.I.R. 228 at 236. 
'3616id at 23 5. See also A. Young "When Titans Clash: the Lirnits of Constitutiond 
Adjudication" srrpra note 8 1 for a discussion regarding the nature of constitutional 
adjudications that balance these competing interests. 
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contextual effects of opening and disclosing these counselling records. These effms 
included society's interest in having srnial offences reported, the integrity of the triai 
process and the potential for the further humiliation and degradation of the female 
complainants. Although not specifically articulated it these cases, it is submitted that these 
positions are the same issues and balances that a section 15 Charter andysis of equaiity 
would mandate. Therefore, to be given even greater weight it is urged that these positions 
of equality should be evaluated by the courts within a section 15 Charter right. 
3. L.L.A. v Beharriell 
In L.L.A. v. Beharrieli, 13' the compendium criminal case to O 'Connor, Beharriell was 
charged with indecent assault. The allegations dated back some 13 years prior to the 
charge being laid. In 1992, the cornplainant went to a public hospital care centre and a 
second adult women's counselling centre to obtain counselling for the difficulties that she 
was suffering as a result of the alleged sexual abuse. Prior to the trial, Beharriell brought a 
motion for the production of the complainant's counselling records. The motion was 
adjourned to be determined by the trial judge. The Crown served and filed notices to 
quash the subpuenas served on the two counselling organizations. The trial judge 
dismissed the Crown application to quash the subpoenas. The trial judge alx, held that the 
records were not privileged and ordered the production of the counselling records. 
13'(1995), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.). 
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Eventually, the cornplainant and the two counselling organizations appealed the issue to 
the Supreme Coun of Canada. In the meantime the triai judge stayed the order for 
production pending the outcome of the appul. 
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal because the procedures for the 
production of the wunselling records a s  set out in the O 'Conmr case were not followed. 
In part, because neither the trial judge nor the parties had the benefit of the Court's 
decision in O 'Corrnor at the time of the original motion, Beharriell was allowed to renew 
his request at his trial under the two stage process enunciated in O 'Connor. *" 
Larner C. J-C. and Sopinka J., with Cory and Major J.J. concurring, wrote for the majority. 
Related to the procedure and the substantive issues connected with the production of the 
sexual assault counselling records in the hands of third parties, they simply endorsed the 
law as it was established in O'Connor. 
L'Heureux-Dubé J., with LaForest and Gonthier J.J. concurring, agreed with the 
majority's result but expanded her reasons as she addressed the issue of privilege. She 
concluded that the private records of a senial assauh criMnal proceeàing should not, as i 
class, be considered as privileged communications. 
Still, she did provide reasons that may prove to be helpfùl for the courts as guidelines for 
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assessing applications for the production of these types of materials. In particular she 
began her ruwns by articulating some basic evidentiary first principles. She noted that "aii 
relevant information is presumptively admissible at triai" aithough "srne probative and 
trustworthy evidence will be excluded to serve ovemding social inter est^.""^ This 
exception creates privilege within the scheme of public policy. L'Heureux-Dubé J. 
descnbed the traditional justification for legal pnvilege as utilitarian or  "instrumentai" 
considerations that focus on the societal importance of certain relati~nships.'~ She 
explained: 
Essent iall y, t his rationale asserts that cornmunications made within a given 
relationship should be privileged only if the benefit derived fkom protecting 
the relationship outweighs the detrimentai effects of priviiege o n  the search 
for the truth."' 
This passage would seem to support the notion that courts should be considering the 
effect that the opening of such records might have on the willingness of sexual assault 
victims to either seek counselling or coming foward to the police with their cornplaints of 
sexual abuse. 
L'Heureux-Dubé J. also highlighted a second non-utilitarian viewpoint to justify privileged 
communications founded on a more abstract proposition. This perspective was anchoreci 
"'lbid at 107; see also M. Neuhauser in "The Privilege of Confidentiality and Rape Crisis 
Counselors" (1985) 8 Women's Rts L. Rep. 185; R. Weisberg "Defendant v Witness: 
Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory 
Communications Privilege" (1977-78) 30 Stan L. R. 935 at 940 to 942. 
in fiindamental individual values that align themselves more with the principles protected 
in the Charter. Specifically, regarding the communications within the context of the 
counsellor and sexual assault complainant relationship she quotes Anna Joo: 
Whereas the utilitarian rationaie views the goal of counselor- patient 
privilege as promoting beneficial fùture relations, the privacy justification 
perceives the main purpose of the privilege as shielding the patient fiom the 
h m  that the disclosure may cause. According to the privacy justification, 
some human relationships are tùndamentai to human dignity and should be 
fiee fiom state interference.'" 
Within the xope  of L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s anaiysis of privilege she c o n d e s  that there is a 
strong contention for protecting the confidentiality of the records of wmmu~cations 
between a counsellor and a sexual assault complainant. These arguments for privilege 
were broken d o m  into five categories. First, that sexuai assault counselling relationships 
are based and depend on confidentiality. This confidentiality was recognized as essential in 
"creating the sense of security necessary to encourage the free flow of discussion which is 
crucial to the victim's recovery."'" 
Second, without confidentiality sexual assault victims wiil be deterred fiom seeking 
la21bid at 108; see also A. Joo, "Broadening the Scope of Counselor - Patient Privilege to 
Protect the Privacy of the Sexual Assault SuMvor" ( 1  999, 32 Harv. J. on Legis. 255 at 
260; "Developments in the Law - Privilege Communications" (1 985), 98 Harv. L. Rev. 
1450; R. v. Gmenke (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at 315 (S.C.C.). 
'431bid at 1 15; see also K. Williamson "Confidentiality of Sexual Assault Victim - 
Counselor Communication: A Proposed Mode1 Statute" (1984) 26 A&. L. R 461 at 466 
to 467; C. Scarmeas, "Rape Victim-Rape Crisis Counselor Communications: A New 
Testimonial Privilege" (1 98 1- 1982) 86 Dick. L. Rev. 539 at 543 to 544; M. Lawrence 
"Rape Victim-Crisis Counselor Communications: An Argument for an Absolute Privilege" 
(1984) 17 U.S. Davis L. Rev. 1213 at 1223 to 1224. 
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treatment or fiom discussing with their counsellors al1 of the information ~ 0 ~ e C t e d  to the 
h m  suffered. This effect would be harrrûul to both the victims and to society as a 
whole.'" 
Third, the possible repercussions of the chilling effect of anything that deters victims fiom 
seeking counselling which may lead victims to report these crimes to the authorities will 
accentuate the under-reporting of these type of offences. This is particularly significant 
because according to Statistic Canada only 6% of the sexual assaults surveyed in 1993 
were reported to the police.'45 Concems of female complainants over the police and the 
courts treatment of their allegations deters a significant portion of women fiom reporting 
these criminal transgressions to the authorities. In contemplation of the contextual 
application of the law L'Heureux-Dubé J. wrote: 
The legal system has a direct and vital interest in promoting the reporting 
of sexual assaults. It is important to recognize the impact that procedurai 
and substantive rules have upon the resolve of sexuai assault victims to 
obtain treatment and upon the reporting of crimes of this nature. Therefore, 
the societal importance of the relationships between counseIlors and sexuai 
assault complainants necessarily goes beyond the benefit to the victims: it 
also vitally linked to the effectiveness of the criminal justice to deal with 
sexual assault ~rirnes."~ 
Fourth, the records of statements made in the course of medical or therapeutic treatments 
"'J. Robert "Criminal Justice Processing of Sexual Assault Cases" (1994), 14 : 7 Juristat 
3; and Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, Changrhg the Lm&cqe: ErtcIi'ng the 
Violence - Achieving L@a&y (1 993) at 28 to 29. 
'"%. L.A. v. Beharriell, supra note 137 at 1 16. 
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are hearsay and intrinsicaily unreliaMe. fhis unreliability, in part, stems fiom the fact that 
the records are gathered in a medical or therapeutic context. Treatment in these situations 
requires that counsdlors inquire into personai history, thoughts, emotionai and other triai 
irrelevant information. The purpose of maintaining these records is to assin in counselling 
not to create an accurate historical verbutimt record. Also, these records are not 
necessady produced contemporaneously with the counselling sessions. Al1 of these fictors 
combined accentuate the therapeutic or founseling notes ~nre l iab i l i t~ . '~~ 
Fifth, the comrnon law principles goveming privilege need to be compatible with Chrrrier 
values including female victims' privacy and equaiity interests. This position is bolstered 
by a review by the Court of other Chrter values, such as the right to freeâom of religion 
and expression. In these instances we are able to observe how the Canadian courts have 
consistently considered the application of such principles in relation to the constitutional 
rights affected.'" The links that exist between laws and their societal consequences have 
been highlighted and considered. 
Still, regardless of these arguments, L'Heureux-Dubé J. rejected a class privilege for these 
14'16id at 1 17; see a h  M. MacCrimmon and C. Boyle, "Equdity Faimess and Relevance: 
Disclosure of Therapists Records in Sexual Assault Records in Sexual Assault Trials, in 
Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, Filtering and Analysing Evidence in 
an Age of Diversity (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1993) 8 1 at 1 O3 to 105. 
'%id. at 1 17 to 1 18; see also M. MacCrimmon, "Developments in the Law of Evidence: 
The 199 1-92 Term Truth, Faimess and Equality" (1993), 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 225 at 
258 to 259. 
pnvate records. Given the principle aim of our criminai justice system's adversarial 
process is the search for truth, she concluded: 
A class privilege is a complete bar to the information contained in such 
records, whether or not relevant, and the onus to ovemde it is a heavy one 
indeed. The particular concems r a i d  by the recognition of a class 
privilege in favour of private records in criminal law relate to: (1) the tmth- 
finding process of our adversarial procedure; (2) the possible relevance of 
some private records; (3) the accuseci's right to make fiil1 answer and 
defence; (4) the categories of actors inciuded in a class privilege; and (5) 
the experience of other countries. '" 
On this last point, the experience of other countries, L'Heureux-Dubé J. examines both the 
American and some of the Commonwealth countries' positions. She concludes the 
Amencan position regarding privileged communications is "somewhat simild to that of 
Canada, although the communications "between counsellors and sexual assault 
complainants, are considered privileged as a result of the enactment of statutory privilege, 
both by the federal govemment and by the ~tates".'~* In the Commonwealth, public 
interest immunity or Crown privilege allows for the non-disclosure of relevant evidence 
when considerations of public policy outweigh the importance of full disclosure. This is a 
14glbid at 1 19. A comparative Mew of privileged communications 
108 to 114. 
can be found at pages 
'50ïbid. at 1 Il. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Flonda, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Utah and Wyoming provide for an absolute 
protection of privacy records relating to semal assault complainants in criminal trials. A 
search was not conducteci to determine whether any of these statutes have been tested to 
date regarding their constitutionality vis-a-vis the Six and Founeenth Amendments. Some 
state courts have mled the absolute privileges as unconstitutional due to the infrngements 
of the defendant's rights: see In re Robert H., 509 A.2d 475 (1986); Commonwealth v. 
Smrcels, 5 1 1 A.2d 22 1 (1 986). Yet two States, Pemsylvania and Xllinois have found the 
privilege to be constitutional: see Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992) and 
People v. Foggy, 52 1 N. E. 2d 86 (1 988) respectively. 
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cornmon law privilege. In criminal law this inununity cannot prevent the disclosure of 
documents that "can enable the accusecl to resist an degation of crime or to estabüsh 
innocence." '" 
Thus, the Court rejected the notion of a clasr, privilege for these type of counselling 
records. Instead of a clas privüege, a b h c i n g  of Chrater vdws praxss was preferred 
by the Court. This is the same method applied in the O 'Connor Case L'Heureux-Dubé J. 
supports the ideal that the constitutional values required to be b a l d  in these types of 
disclosures instances are: (1) the right to full answer and defence; (2) the right to privacy; 
and (3) the right to equality before the law without discrimination.'" The rationale used to 
support this conclusion is referred back to the passages aiready discussed f?om the 
O 'Connor Case and fkom Larner C. J.C. ' s conclusions in the Dogemis CaseJJ3 that refbte 
a hierarchal approach to interpreting Charter rights and promotes a balancing of 
competing interest process.'" 
"'lbid. at 1 1 4. See also Duncan v. Cammell, Loird & Co. [1992] A.C. 624 (H.L.). Still no 
commonwealth countries have addressed the private records of a semai assault 
corn plainant . L' Heureux-Du bé J. reviewed other cases related to govemmental 
documents, police informants and social worker logs, and concluded that it would be 
"doubtftl that public interest imrnunity would bar disclosure of such records when the 
accused's guilt or innocence is at stake." (at page 1 14). 
rS3Dagenais v. C a d i a n  Brdcast i t~g Corp. (1 994),94 C.C.C. (3d) 245 at 3 16 to 3 1 7 
(S.C.C.). 
lML.L. A. v. Beharriell, supra note 4 at 126. 
4. Civil Law Cornparison 
After the Supreme Court of Canada considered the procedure for disclosing a sexual 
assault complainant's therapeutic records during the course of a criminal trial, they 
reviewed the same issue within the context of a civil Iaw suit. In M.@.) v. Ryrmxs5 a fernale 
plaintiff commenced a civil action for damages allegedly caused by the defendant's sexual 
conduct. Specifically, it was alleged that when she was 17 years old she received 
psychiatrie treatment fiom Ryan During the course of the treatment Ryan had sexuai 
relations with the plaintiff, and committed acts of gross indecency while in her presence. 
The plaintiff asserted that this conduct injured her and therefore she sued for damages. 
To resolve the dificulties allegedly caused by the conduct of the defendant AM. sought 
psyc hiatric treatment fiom another counsellor. Concemed about her privacy, the new 
counsellor assured A.M. that their private communications would remain confidentid. 
This led the new counsellor to refrain from taking the usual kind and amount of 
counselling notes. 
Ryan requested production of A.M.'s reports and counselling reports and notes. At a 
hearing before a Master for disclosure, A.M. agreed to release her repons but refùsed to 
disclose the notes taken during the counselling sessions and claimed privilege over the 
notes in question. 
The Master held that there was no privilege and ordered the notes to be disclosed. The 
British Columbia Supreme Court afirmed that decision. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal allowed A.M.'s appeal in part, but ordered the disclosure of her reporting letters 
and her notes relating to the discussions between A-M. and her new counsellor. The 
rv156 production of these materiais were held to be "protected by four conditions: 
that inspection be confined to Dr. Ryan's solicitors and expert witnesses, 
and that Dr. Ryan himself wuld not see them; that any person that saw the 
documents should not disclose their contents to anyone not entitled to 
inspect them; that the documents could be used only for the purposes of 
the litigation; and that one copy of the notes was to be made by Dr. Ryan's 
solicitors, to be passed on as necessary to Dr. Ryan's expert ~itnesses.'~' 
The r n a j ~ r i t ~ ' ~ ~  of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. McLachlin J. 
writing for the majority reviewed the four requirements for a privilege to exist for the 
communications between a psychiatrist and a patient. First, the communications at issue 
must have originated in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. Second, that the 
element of confidentiality be essential to the fiil1 and satisfactory maintenance of the 
relation between the parties to the communication. Third, the relation must be one, which 
in the opinion of the community, ought to be sedulously fostered. And fourth, the interests 
served by protecting the communications fiom the disclosure outweigh the interests of 
"%Forest, Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JI.; L'Heureux-Duôé J. 
dissenting. 
pursuing the truth and disposing wrrectly of  the l i t igat i~n. '~~ It is important to note that 
this founh requirement assumes that the opening and disclosing o f  such records will in 
some m m e r  foster the pursuit of tmth and the correct disposd of  the Iaw suit. It is 
proposed here that this represents stereotypical rationale and a bias of  the Couxt as to  the 
nature of the communications between the plaintiff and her counsellor. Without an 
evidentiary foundation o f  relevance, the court is Ieft with an i l log id  presumption o f  
relevance - there may be  something in the notes that will help determine an issue of  
credibility. 
The  COU^ went on to  hold that in this case the first three conditions for the prinlege for 
the communications existed here. McLachlin J. held: 
It may thus be concluded that the first three conditions for privilege for 
communications between a psychiatrist and the victim o f  a sexual assault 
are met in the case at bar. The communications were wnfidential. Their 
confidence is essential to  the psychiatrist - patient relationship. The 
relationship itself and the treatment it makes possible are of transcendent 
public importance. 
The founh requirement is that the interests served by protecting the 
communications from disclosure outweigh the interests of pursuing truth 
and disposing correctly of  the litigation.IM 
The  COU^ went on to  establish that "once the first three requirements and a compelling 
primajacie case for protection is established"16' the focus shifts t o  the balancing of 
competing interests considered by the fourth requirement. 
- 
"'M(A.) v. Ryan, supra note 155 at 173 to  175. 
'601bid at 1 74. 
'6'lbtd at 179. 
McLachlin I. acknowledged the importance of the Chrrrter values protected by sections 8 
(search and seizure) and 1 5 (equd treatment and benefit of the law) and wrote: 
A nile of privilege which fails to protect confidentid doctor/patient 
communications in the context of an action Prising out of  semai assault 
perpetuates the disadvantage felt by victims of sexual assault, often 
women. The intimate nature of sexud assault heightens the privacy 
concems of the victim and may increase, if automatic disclosure is the d e ,  
the difficulty of obtaining redress for the wrong. The victim of  a sexual 
assault is thus placed in a disadvantaged position as comparwf with the 
victim of a different wrong. The result rnay be that the victim of a semial 
assault does not obtain the equal benefit of the law to which S. 15 of the 
Charter entitles her. She is doubly victirnized, initially by the sexual assault 
and later by the price that die m u t  pay to claim redress - redress which in 
some cases may be part of her program of therapy. These are factors which 
may properly be considered in determining the interest served by an order 
for protection fiom disclosure of confidentid patient-psychiatrist 
communications in sexual assault cases!62 
Nonetheless these interests must still be balanceci against the Society's interest in the 
"pursuing the trut h and disposing wrrectly of t he litigation."'" Furthemore, disdosure 
must be produced to "get at the tmth and prevmt an unjust verdict."'" 
The Court specifically rejected the al1 or nothing approach adopted by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Jaflee v. Redmo~id.'" which endorsed an absolute privilege for al1 
psychotherapeutic records. Altematively, the Coun adopted the position established in 
'62ibid at 175 to 176. 
'63ibid at 1 7 5 .  
'@'Ibid at 177. 
'651 16 S .  Ct. 1923 (1996). 
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O 'Connof wherein the test was developed for the production of third party therapeutic 
records. This test balances the cornpeting interests by reference to a number of factors 
including the right of the accused to fiil1 answer and defence and the right of the 
com plainant to privacy. 
Finally, on the issue of the production of the counselling notes the Cowt held that despitc 
the "compelling" interest in p r e s e ~ n g  the confidentiality of the communications in issue 
the notes should be discloseci. The Court went on to protect the rights of the patient by 
accepting the conditions attached to the disclosure as set out by the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal. 
Still, it is the view of this writer that these conditions only limit the invasion of privacy to a 
restricted number of people al1 woriung for the defendant. This presents the patient with 
the same limitations as were presented to sexual aswl t  complainants in the criminai 
context developed in the O 'Comor Case Therefore, if this is the reality that wornen face 
in the civil justice system, the sarne results may dissuade women fiom using this court 
process as well. The end result is Iimited access for women who have been sexually 
assaulted to any forrn of conventional justice. 
L'Heureux-Dubé J. in dissent, reviewed that sirnilar applications within a criminal context, 
requires that the courts assess a proportional balance between Charter rights. On this issue 
166S~~pra note 1. 
of balancing Charter vaiues she mntempiated her position uticulated in O 'Conm~ and 
wrote: 
. . . the nghts to  individual liberty and security of the person as enshrined in 
s.7 of the Charier enwmpasses a nght to pnvacy. This finding was based 
on a number of developrnents in the jurisprudence of this Court. In its s.7 
jurisprudence, it has expressed great sympathy with the notion that liberty 
and security of the person involve privacy interests. That privacy is 
essentiai to human dignity, a basic value underlying the C h t e r ,  has also 
been recognized. Our right to  sccurity of the person under 9.7 has been 
found to include protection fiom psychotogical trauma which can be 
occasioned by an invasion of our pnvacy. Certainly, the breach of the 
privacy of a sexual assault plaintiff constitutes a severe assault on her 
psychological well-being. Section 8 also reveals that the Charter is clearly 
premised on a respect for the interests of individuals in thtir privacy. 
Finally, the common law of torts of defamation and trespass fûrther 
recognize the validity of  an individual's claim to funher privacy interests.'" 
L'Heureux-Dubé J. went on to distinguish between the strong public interest in the 
relationships between a patient and a counsellor and the nature of the records themselves 
and the effects of the disdosure would have asserting her expectation to privacy right. 
This is what distinguishes the basic premise or value of the right to  privacy fiom the 
doctrine of privilege.'" More specifically, that once the privacy is violated it cannot be 
regained. Again comparing the wntext of a criminal application for disclosure and the civil 
application for production, L'Heureux-Dubé J. held: 
. . .the discovery process has the potential to allow a far more serious 
incursion upon a plaintiffs' reasonable expectation of privacy than on 
plaintiffs in other types of tort cases. These case are somewhat unique. As 
was observecl in O'Connor, supra, at pp. 487-88, the wrong involved here, 
sexual assault, may create a need for a therapeutic response if the victim is 
to restore herself to a state of  healthy fiinctioning. As Dr. Paritt's affidavits 
167 A.M v. Ryan, supra note 155 at 199. 
'681bid at 200. 
attest, effective counxlling requires that the most intimate daails of a 
patient's life and her i ~ e r m o s t  thoughts, fears, and feelings be fieely 
shared with the therapists. At the same t h e ,  it oAen requires that the 
wunsellor keep records of what has transpired during the sessions with the 
plaints. A plaintiff may also maintain a private diary of these experiences, 
thoughts, and feelings.'" 
She concludes that the discovery of such materials will act as strong disincentive to 
plaintiffs to recover damages for the injuries suffered by either preventing the 
commencement of the litigation or may encourage unjust settlements to avoid the 
disclosure of private records and notes. Such results are inconsistent with section 15 
equality rights as guaranteed by the C h f e r .  "O 
In her dissenting judgement she agrees with the majority that a successfùl claim of 
privilege had been made out that established that records were exempt fiom disclosure. 
She also agreed with the Court of Appeal' s general conclusion that it had a broad 
discretion to control the process of discovery to ensure that the remaining documents and 
their disclosure did not affect any of the parties unjustly. However, it was her view that the 
discretion exercised in these circumstances did not result in an "appropriate balance of the 
Chorier values of pnvacy, equality, and fair trial.""' Given the nature of the documents 
and notes, and the potential h m  that would flow fiom an invasion of pnvacy relating to 
such sensitive and questionably relevant matters, she preferred a process that would allow 
a judicial officer to first review the materials. Specifically, she heid: 
By failing to screen the private records in such cases, the courts create a 
hierarchy of Charter values, where interests in privacy and equality may be 
seriously affecteci for records or parts thereof which may provide very 
little if any benefit to the defence or be unnecessary to ensure the fainiess 
of the proceedings. Procedures adapted to the context of discovery in civil 
p r o d i n g s  fiom the principles developed by this Court in O ' C o l l l ~ ~  are 
in order.'" 
How then does one reconcile these two different approaches? Is there a firndarnental 
distinction between the criminal trial process and the civil triai process when it relates to 
this disclosure issue? It is contemplateci here that the majority in the Ryan Case hinge their 
position on the common law principle behind the recognition of an exception or 
"privilege" regarding the disclosure bas& on the ''ibndamental proposition that everyone 
owes a general duty to give evidence relevant to the matter before the court so that the 
truth may be a~cenained."'~~ An exception or privilege to this component of the fact 
finding mission may exist where it can be established that a public good transcends this 
goal. Once again competing interests need to be balanced. However, the Charter's 
application to this balancing process is distinguishable in the two justice systems. 
More specifically, the Charter's application to wmmon law principles within the d m  of 
private li tigation is unlike criminal cases, wherein govemment action is chaltenged. 
McLachlin J. described the difference as follows: 
The most that the private iitigant can do is argue that the common law is consistent 
with C ' e r  W. It is very important to draw this distinction between Charter 
rights and C h t e r  values. Care must be taken not to expand the application of the 
Charter beyond that established by S. 32(1), either by creating new causes of 
action, or by subjecting aU court orders to Charter scrutiny. Therefore, in the 
context of civil litigation involving only private parties, the Charter will "apply" to 
the common law only to the extent that the cornmon law is found to be 
inconsistent with Chmter principles.'7' [emphasis hers] 
L'Heureux-Dube similarly resolves the conflict. In O 'Connor the female cornplainant's 
privacy interests were balanced against the acaised's section 7 Charter right to make hl1 
answer and defence. Contrary to this, the defendant in a civil proceeding does not have a 
direct Charter right to be guaranteed. Even though similar values are in issue the 
defendant's liberty is not in jeopardy. She, quite properly, is concemed about a 
miscarriage in justice that would result in an incorrect finding of fact. Again the balancing 
process is implemented between the plaintiff and the defendant but here the interests are 
fiamed within Charter &, because these interests (as is the case with an accused 
person within the criminal sphere) are not absolutes. She described the dichotomy as 
In many cases, the exercise of discretion, through the making of an order, for 
example, will not constitute direct state action and therefore cannot be subject to 
the same constitutional scnrtiny as legislation or the acts of state officials. Where 
this occurs, this Court has nonetheless found that the exercise of discretion must 
adequately reflect the values underlying the Charter. In the criminal context, a 
proportional balance of the effects on Charter rights is required ... In cases ofnon- 
criminai law powers exercised in the context of legislation with a public purpose or 
ot her state action, the court must also reflect a balance of Charter vaiues when 
exercising a statutory or cornmon law discretion...'" 
1751bid at 191. In this passage she citesR v. O'Connor, supra at note 1; LL.A., supra 
note 129; R v. SaIituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R 654; and R v. Park, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 836 as 
examples criminal cases. For civil references she cites Degemis v. Carnadiun 
(E) Conclusioa 
A review of the creation of Bill C46 provides an interesting perspective on how a 
statutory law is created in Canadian society, and some of the wmplexities of the 
competing interests, including the gender issues connected to the production of a f d e  
corn plainant ' s therapeutic records. Further, it provides an illustration to assess the criminal 
justice system's treatment of female sexual assault wmplainants. Chronologically, it was 
pointed out that while the Federal Department of Justice was contemplating a new piece 
of legislation to fiII a void and respond to an issue in the common law regarding the 
production and disclosure of a complainant's therapeutic records, a specific fact dnven 
issue arose relating to the disclosure of certain records. As the British Columbia Coun of 
Appeal attempted to balance competing interests between the accused's right to make fùll 
answer in defence and the rights of the fernale complainant, the Court structured a 
procedural scheme in an attempt to resolve such issues in a fair manner. The case of R v. 
O 'Connor was eventually appealed to the Supreme Coun of Canada. Here fùrther 
refinements to the process were fonnulated, and perhaps more importantly, the competing 
interests of the participants were baland  in favour of the accused's right to make full 
answer and defence. The Court wncluded the prioritized harm should be focused on the 
danger of a wrongfitl conviction. Kt was argued that this effectively created a hierarchy of 
Brmdcmting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 83 5, per Lamer C. J. for the majority, at 875; Barm 
v. Canada. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416; nillsv. C a d  (Attomy GeneraI). [1998] 1 S.C.R 
513 at 558. 
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rights, with the rights of the male accused k i n g  "balanceci" above the competing rights of 
the female complainant. Then the Federal Department of Justice, as sanctioned by the 
democratic process, drafied and passed specific legislation t o  deal with the issue. Bill C- 
46 was draAed wit h significant consultation and the advantage of  having wntemplated 
both the majonty and the minority' s perspectives on the issues in R v. O *Colutor. 
In an attempt to  balance ofien diametricaily opposed interests and rights, Bill C 4 6  was 
created. That o f  course, did not end the debate, as the next wave of sexual offence 
prosecutions brought with them a number of constitutional challenges to the legislation. It 
was through an examination of the language used by the courts that revealed a continued 
reliance by some on gender based stereotypical myths. Juxtaposed to these decisions, a 
number of  cases were examined that upheld the Bill as constitutional. Attempts were made 
to compare the differences in the positions based on the respective courts' considerations 
and reliances upon both the individual harm suffered by the complainants as well as the 
overdl societal harm connected to  the under-reporting and the community's access to 
criminal justice. Now, as a nation, w e  await a second assessment of sirnilar issues by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Mills. Given the evolution of section 15 equality 
interests post O *Connor, particularly as contemplated in the Law Case, one might predict 
the Court will enunciate additionai views on the equality rights component of the 
competing interests in issue. 
Support for this prediction can also be found in the case of L.L.A. v. Behorriell. In this 
13 1 
case the majority of the Courr did not elaborate on the pros and cons of a class of privilege 
and merely endorsed their eadier p r o d u r a l  position as enunciated in the O 'Comr Case. 
L'Heureux-Dubé J. concurred with the majority's reliance on the procedure set out in the 
O 'Connor Case, however she also elaborated on a number of policy considerations. These 
considerations included the contextualkation of the potential h m  and impact on equality 
that the disclosure of a sexud assault complainant's records has on fernale viaùns' access 
to justice. Still, in the end, the rninority of the Court preferred a balancing process as 
compared to a class of privilege for the notes and records in question. Through the 
Canadian civil law cornparison we saw the same C ~ u r t " ~  address the sune issues yet with 
a different perspective. In the case of M. (A.) v. Ryan, the entue Court considered the 
female plaintiff s equality rights as guaranteed by the Charter, or at a minimum equality 
interests within the realm of Charter values. The application of the law and its impact on 
women, particularly as litigants, was considered. The Court disagreed on a number of 
issues that were examined, but in the end, agreed on the superior value of allowing a trial 
judge to balance the competing and irreconcilabie interests of the parties over the creation 
of a class or category or privileged documents. 
Thus, through the example of the disclosure of sexual assault complainant's counselling 
records we are able to observe the varying degrees with which the Canadian courts have 
either neglected entirely a "contextudized approach" to assessing the balancing of the 
"6~amer CC. J.C. and Gonthier J. who sat on the O 'Connor panel did not partake in the 
civil hearing. 
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female complainants' interests and their C k t e r  guaranteed rights, or when contextudized 
factors like individuai o r  societal harm were assesseci, the female parties' interests were 
more often than not balanced below the rights of  the male accused Party. This result was 
consistently rationalized through the findamental tenet of our criminal justice system - 
that an innocent person must not be convicted. My point here is that while this notion is 
supremely important, the courts must not abandon a female cornplaùiant's right tu be 
treated fairly with dignity and equality in the courts search for the tnith. These concepts 
must be addressed within a contextual tiamework, particularly focused on the dif5erent 
components of h m  that flow fiom the opening, reviewing and disclosing of these most 
private documents. These issues must be caretùlly contemplated as the trial courts embark 
on their assessrnent of determining the factors set out in Bill C- 46 at both stages of the 
disciosure process, assuming the legislation survives its challenge in the Mi& case. If it 
does not, it is hoped the drafters of the replacement legislation appreciate the complexity 
and consequences of the issues in addition to the need balance dignity, respect and trial 
fairness fiom al1 perspectives. To do otherwise is effectively reducing femde 
complainant's and the comrnunity's access to  real justice. 
CHAPTER THREE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
(-4) INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the problem of domestic violence. Sociologists, 
anthropologists, psychologists. politicians, criminologists as well as lawyers and legal 
theorists have al1 added volumes to our understandings about this form of violent 
behaviour and the law's reaction to it. It is not the aim of this chapter to review al1 of this 
data. as that in and of itself has been the dedication o f  entire journals.' The social 
phenomena of wife battering is an extremely complicated matter with much debate going 
on within each of the disciplines outlined above regarding its many layers of intricacy and 
possible solutions. The aim of this chapter is to examine two different responses of the 
criminal justice system to domestic violence, recently instituted in Ontario. The 
frarnework within which these two models will be discussed is the depth in which they 
have considered the broad context of domestic violence. It is argued here that while 
significantly better than the criminal justice system's conventionai approach to domestic 
violence. both of these models have failed to completely assess the many different and 
sometimes conflicting aspects of the problem. Because of this, the solutions proposed fall 
short of the mark of providing the victirns of domestic violence not only equal access to 
justice but, more importantly, the protection on which their lives often depends. 
'See the Journal of Interpersonal Violence (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Periodicals Press). 
This journal is concerned with the study and treatrnent of victims and perpetrators of 
physical and sexual violence. 
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This chapter first describes the criminal justice system's conventional approach to dealing 
with the offence of assault within a domestic relationship. The shortcomings of this 
approach are set out and then highlighted by some of the theories that attempt to isolate 
the cause or causes of the violent behaviour. Once these theories are briefly presented the 
two responses, the K Court and the Plea and Conditional Discharge Court, are outlined. 
Foliowing this descriptive process, the chapter attempts to analyze these two responses 
first from a practical perspective and then from a theoretical view point. In short, it is 
argued that both models have oversimplified the problem (causes and consequences) and. 
as a result, have provided the community with an incomplete solution. Finaily, some 
judicial interpretations of the issue of the admission of hearsay evidence for the tmth of 
its content \vil1 be examined to evaluate the effectiveness of the K Court initiative. This is 
done, in part, to fiuther accentuate women's unequal access to criminal justice in this 
regard. 
(B) THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH 
In Canada, prior to the 1 980°s, the criminal justice system's treatment of domestic assault 
charges was much like any other assault offence. The police, as investigative agents of the 
state. responded to a complaint in a attempt to keep the public peace and protect citizens 
from being injured. They intervened, took statements. observed and noted injuries and 
when they exercised their discretion to do so made arrests.' Once these charges were 
processed and a court date was set, a crown attorney was assigned the responsibility of 
having to prosecute these offences. On the day of triai the crown attorney would meet 
with the femaie complainant, assuming she responded to the subpoena, and attempt to 
prepare her for trial. If she failed to attend the proceedings, and she was an essential 
witness to the matter, the prosecution had a number of choices. The crown could request 
an adjournrnent and put the matter over to a fiiture date in the hope that she would attend 
at that time. The crown could request a material witness warrant under the Criminal Code 
that would authorize the police to locate, arrest and hold the femaie complainant - 
potentially in custody - until the matter could be brought back before the courts.' Or the 
'C. Burris and P. Jaffe "Wife Abuse As a Crime: The Impact of Laying Charges" (1983) 
35 Canadian Journal of Criminology 309. This article seeks to explore the reasons why 
the police were not more willing to lay assault charges. They found that in London 
Ontario in the year 1979 police laid charges in oniy 3% in al1 family violence cases. even 
though the police advised the victims of the violence to seek medical attention in 20% of 
the cases. The implications of this situation were exarnined. including increased feelings 
of helplessness for the victim, condoning the maie batterer's behaviour and the loss of an 
opportunity to interrupt the cycle of violence that also increases the future risks of abuse 
for the victim. See also an updated version of this study by P. Jaffe. E Hastings, D. 
Reitzel and G. Austin, "The Impact of Police Laying Charges" in N. Hilton, ed., Legal 
Responses to W f e  Assaulr: Currenr Trendr and Evaluarion (Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications, 1993). 
'Criminal Code section 705 provides that ''where a person who has been served with a 
subpoena to give evidence in a proceeding does not attend or remain in attendance. the 
court. judge, justice or provincial court judge before whom that person was required to 
attend may, if it is established (a) that the subpoena has been served in accordance with 
this Part part XXII - Procuring Attendance], and (b) that the person is likely to give 
material evidence, issue or cause to be issued a warrant in Fonn 17 for the arrest of that 
person." Sections 706 and 707 provide for the procedure to be followed when a witness 
has been arrested under such a warrant. The failure, without lawful excuse, to appear and 
give evidence when required to do so by law is punishable as contempt of court under 
section 708. 
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crovm could withdraw the charges as unviable without the cooperation of the material 
witness, namely the complainant. 
If the witness did attend, but was either unwilling to testi@ completely as to the events as 
she had described to the police soon after the incident, or was reluctant to test@ 
truthfùlly and to the full extent as her memory would allow, then the crown then aiso had 
a number of choices that could be made. The prosecutor c o d d  possibly withdraw the 
charges again because they were unprovable. Or the prosecutor could require the 
rejuctant. and now recanting witness, to testiQ in court regardless of ber wishes. Once 
called as a witness where she began to testiQ in a manner inconsistent with her original 
description of events as set out in her witness statement, the crown could then make an 
application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence AC? to obtain leave from the court 
to cross examine his or her own witness regarding the originally prepared statement. This 
would allow the crown to argue for a ruling made by the court to have the complainant 
deciared as adverse.' Through this process a witness, when faced with contrddictory 
recolIections, the possibility existed that she could feel sufficientiy pressured to provide 
the court with evidence that would be consistent with her oath. Practically however, 
unIess the prosecution had additional evidence to cal1 to support the allegations of abuse 
"Canada Evidence Act R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
For the meaning of adverse see Wuwanesa lblu~ual nsurance Co. v. Hanes [ 1 9631 1 
S.C.C. 321 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cassibo (I982), 70 C.C.C. (2d) 498 (Ont. C.A.). It includes a 
hostility of mind as well as opposed in interest or unfavourable in position to the party 
calling the witness. Note that "adverse" has been held to mean hostile and not simply 
unfavourable; see R. v. Mclnfyre (1963), 2 C.C.C. 380 (N.S.C.A.). 
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as set out in the charges beyond the evidence of the complainant, there would be very 
Iittle point in having the sole crown witness declared as adverse. The prosecution would 
simply be lefi with a "hostile" complainant and no additional evidence to cal1 to prove the 
charges beyond a reasonable d ~ u b t . ~  
Therefore, such a situation left the prosecution no m e r  ahead than it was before the 
charges were laid. Perhaps even worse off, if the accused having observed the system fail 
now believes that he is able to manipulate his partner and the criminal justice system. In 
this scenario there is arguably a reinforcement of the abusive behaviour for both the 
specific individuai as well as for cther like-minded individuds already involved the 
implementation of physical violence within a relationship. Moreover, for the cornplainant 
there is an inability for the criminal justice system to provide any immediate help, 
protection or access to justice. 
It is argued here that the failure of the approach described above is grounded in an 
unresponsiveness by the criminal justice system to an appreciation of the 
contextualization of the cycle of violence at the very heart of the domestic assault 
problem. Meaninghl and effective solutions require that the causes and consequences of 
domestic violence must be taken into account by those entnisted to improve the situation. 
The following section reviews some of the most prominent theories of domestic violence. 
6For the procedw to be followed in a S. 9(2) application see R. v. Milgaard (1971), 2 
C.C.C. (2d) 206 (Sask. C.A.), leave to appeal rehsed (1971), 4 C.C.C. (2d) 566n 
(S.C.C.). 
(C)THEORIES OF DOMESTIC ASSAULT 
1. The Cycle of Violence 
Lenore Walker is the psychologist who pioneered the work in the field of battered women 
as victims trapped in a cycle of deceit.' She reiied on the cycle of violence and the theory 
of learned helplessness to describe and explain the three distinct stages of the cycle of 
violence that occurs in many abusive domestic relationships. The first is the building of 
tension. This phase is followed by a severe battering incident that typically involves 
uncontrollable rage. Finally an act of contrition follows the outburst of violence. The 
violence creates fear and anxiety for the female party during the first two phases. The 
effect of this is to extend her fear beyond the immediate incidents of violence so that 
terror begins to seize the entire relationship. As the behaviour repeats itself in a cyclical 
fashion the female party may realize that the abusive behaviour is unlikety to change, but 
she is unable to terminate the relationship primarily because of her learned helplessness. 
It is the woman's learned helplessness that explains why she stays in the dangerous 
reIationship and maintains the unreasonable position that the abusive male wilt improve 
and stop the violence.' 
'L. Walker. The Bartered Wornen (New York: Harper and Row, 1979). 
8 D. Downs, More Than Victirns; Battered Women, The Syndrome Socieîy and the Law, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1996). See "The Key Tenets of the BWS" at 
81. 
Although the specific cause linked to the cyclical nature of a physically abusive 
relationship has not been recognized by the Canadian courts, they have accepted into fact 
its existence. For example, in a commission of inquiry into the deaths of Rhonda and Roy 
Lavoie. Mr Justice Schulman, commissioner, identified a cycle of violence as being 
intricately involved in many abusive relationships? He described the first of three distinct 
phases as a duration of tension building. During this phase the male party grows 
increasingly angry, hstrated or out of control, fiequentty due to experiences outside of 
his relationship. The male Party, unable to express or connect his feelings to these outside 
factors, attempts to legitimize his feelings by blaming h e m  on matters, real or perceived, 
associated with his female partner. The male party releases increasing anger and 
frustration by "minor abusive incidents such as pushing, shoving or calling the woman 
narne~."'~ These incidents become increashgly intense over time. Concurrent to this, the 
male party becomes increasingly jealous of his female partner and he exerts more control 
over her life. The female partner fails to understand her male partner's anger and 
frustration. As the male party's behaviour becomes increasingly less rational, the female 
party begins to believe the abuse is legitimately focused at her. She then adapts by being 
9 Report of the Honourable Mr. Justice P. Schulman, Commission of lnguiry into the 
Deafhs of Rhonda Lavoie and Roy Lavoie, A Study of Domestic Violence and the Justice 
Sysfern in Manitoba, (Winnipeg: Manitoba Government Publications, 1 997). On January 
2Oth, 1995 Roy Lavoie murdered his wife Rhonda Lavoie. He then committed suicide. 
They had been dating since Monda was 14 years old. They resided together for 7 years 
and had three children together. Monda was 22 years old when she was murdered &d 
Roy was 30 years old when he took his own life. This Commission of  Inquiry sought to 
discover the reasons behind this temble tragic end, not to assign blarne, but to find 
lessons that hope fully would serve others. 
conciliatory or avoiding her male partner to prevent any fkther abuse. However, the male 
partner's tension continues to build until control is lost and a violent incident occurs. Mr. 
Justice Schulrnan described the nature of these violent outbursts: 
The first explosive incident which occurs may be relatively minor, such as 
the man pushing the woman or calling her hurtfùl and abusive names. 
Subsequent abusive incidents become more and more significant, and may 
ultimately involve serious violence including punching, choking, rape, and 
the use of weapons or objects. If sexual assault is involved, particularly 
when objects are used during the assault, the likelihood increases that even 
greater acts of violence against the women will follow." 
Following this outburst phase both parties experience various forms of shock, disbelief 
and denial. The male party blames his partner's behaviour as the triggering event. The 
fernale minimizes the extent of her injuries or persuades herself that the behaviour was in 
some way justified. At this point she feels depressed and helpless. 
This stage of the cycle is followed by a "honeymoon" phase. During this segment of the 
cycle the male party becomes apologetic and exhibits channing and loving behaviour. He 
requests forgiveness and makes promises to change the external factors that the female 
party believes contributed to the violence, such as alcohol abuse or stress related to 
employment. This honeyrnoon phase reinforces the female partner's sense of hope and 
power. particularly to cause her partner to get help for his assaultive behaviour. At the 
sarne time the female party desires to salvage her relationship and isolates herself fiom 
fiends and farnily that were a source of her male partner's jealousy. As a result, both 
parties become more and more dependent on each other, and persuade themselves they 
can overcome their problems together. Tt is at this stage that the women who have 
contacted the police tiequently urge the prosecutors to &op or withdraw the outstanding 
charges. 
This pattern of behaviour repeats itself over and over again. Regarding the cyclical nature 
of the violence Mr. Justice Schulrnan concluded: 
it often grows shorter over tirne, and the severity of the explosive incident 
generally increases with each cycle. Each cycle a woman passes through 
tends to Iower her self-esteem and impair her judgement. It becomes more 
difficult for her to leave the relationship, or to recognize that she is not 
responsible for the violence in her relationship." 
The criminal courts have also recognized the cycle of violence theory. Recently, the 
Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to review the battered woman syndrome as 
a component of self defence. In Malot v. The Queen" a female accused was charged with 
the murder of her husband and the anempted murder of his girlfiiend. She was convicted 
at trial. She appealed first to the Ontario Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court 
Canada, where in both instances her appeals against conviction were dismissed. At triai 
Dr. P. Jaffe was qualified and gave expert opinion evidence regarding the psychological 
effects of being a battered woman. Major J., writing for the majority, outlined the uses 
that could be made of such evidence by a jury. He held that it was permissible to use 
"lbid. at 16. 
"(1 W8), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 456 (S.C.C.). 
expert testimony to hetp explain: 
1. Why an abused woman might remain in an abusive relationship. 
3. The nature and extent of the violence that rnay exist in a battering relationship. 
3.  The accused's ability to perceive danger fiom her abuser. 
4. Whether the accused believed on reasonable grounds that she could not 
otherwise preserve herself from death or grievous bodily h m . ' "  
2. Complea Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Captivity 
Psychiatrist Judith Herman theorizes the effects of sustained domestic abuse within the 
realm post-traumatic stress disorder. Her focus is on the component of control and the 
mental processes that the victim undergoes after having been subjected to violence in the 
domestic setting. Herrnan suggests that: 
Some battered women speak of entering a kind of exclusive, aimost 
delusionai world, embracing the grandiose belief system of their mates and 
voluntarily suppressing their own doubts as proof of loyalty and 
submission ... Prolonged captivity also produces profound alterations in the 
victim's identity. Al1 the psychological structures of the self - the image of 
the body. the internaiized images of others, and the values and ideais that 
lend a person a sense of coherence and purpose - have been invaded and 
systematicaIly broken down. l 5  
This notion is connected to DSM - IV's description of the "acute distress disorder" that 
"llbid. at 464. See also R. v. Lavallee (1990), 55 C.C.C (3d) 97; and C. Boyle. "A 
Feminist Approach to Criminal Defences" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Peîspectives on 
Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1 99 1 ) that advances the 
theory of contextualizing uniquely female experiences within criminal defences. See also 
A. Tomkins et al., "Self Defence Jury Instructions in Trials of Battered Women Who Ki11 
Their Partner" in N. Hilton. ed.. Legal Responses to W f e  Assauft: Current Trends and 
Evnlzra~ion, (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993). 
"J. Heman, Trauma and Recovery: The Ajrermarh of Violence - From Domestic Abuse ro 
Political Terror ( New York: Basic Books, 1992) at 92; as cited by D. Downs supra note 
7 at 85. 
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describes the trawnatic consequences of experiencing incidents "that involved actual or 
threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the integnty of self or others." and the 
victim's responses includïng intense fear, helplessness, or horror.16 
3. Battered Women as Survivors 
Others, such as E. Gondolf, believe that the women in abusive relationslips are active 
participants in the interaction of the relationship and in the creation of their own self 
identity. He supports the notion that they are not responsible for the abuse and the 
violence but, that as the violence escalates, they recognize that self blame is inappropriate 
and as result they seek outside help as the relationship becomes less caring and 
increasingly dangerous. This perspective concentrates on a system failure rather than a 
failure of any son at the feet of the battered woman. The concept of learned helplessness 
is not completeiy abandoned as it explains the resulting behaviour of the abused woman 
who attempts to get help outside of the relationship, such as in shelter, the police or 
perhaps the criminal justice system. but fails to get the help and support she needs. D. 
Downs summarizes E. Gondolf's interpretation of learned helplessness as: 
If these efforts fail, learned helplessness might set in and women might 
lose a sense of the "observing self," which is an attribute of reflective 
judgement and autonomy. With the appropriate shelter or related help, 
however, a new definition of selfcan arise. phoenix-like: the transition 
I6Diagnostic and Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorders : DSM - IV, 4th ed., 
(Washington DC.: Amencan Psychiatrie Association, 1994), section 308.3. 
from helpless viclim to sunivor. [emphasis his]" 
4. Masochism 
Some theonsts believe that the women in abuse relationships are sometimes complicit in 
their own victimization. l a  Freudian theorists suggest that women are predestined to be 
rnasochistic as a result of psychodynamic factors unique to women's psychological 
development. in response to this position, feminist theorists argue i f  women are 
masochistic in this manner they are made that way by experience. They reject the idea of 
a gender predetermination and provide a political and social explanation, grounded in a 
woman's disempowered position in a world dominated by men.lg Still others point to a 
number of reasons that abused women remain in violent relationships, such as their own 
exposure to domestic violence as children, psychological factors involving self 
destructive behaviour, psychological dependency and the lack of access to both the social 
and the economic resowces to leave the relationship. For example, Dutton and Painter 
17 D. Downs, supra note 7 at 86, summarizing E. Gondolf. Battered Wornen as Survivors: 
An A [ternative ta Treating Learned Helplessness (Lexington, Mass. I Lexington Books, 
1 98 8). See also M. Whalen, Counseling to End Violence Against Women: A Subversive 
Mode!, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996) at 27. 
18 See J. Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problern of 
Domination (New York: Pantheon, 1985). 
I9See M. Masse, ln the Narne of Love: Wornen Masochism. and the Gothie (Ithaca NY: 
Corne11 University Press, 1992). She discusses how the powerless and oppressed seek 
power and esteem through subversive acts which are products of their situations. See also 
R. Lenton, "Power Versus Feminist Theories of Wife Abuse" (1995) 37 Canadian Journal 
of Criminology 305. 
contemplate a 'bumatic bonding" theory wherein they describe a cycle of counter 
dependency that starts with the male party ' s assaultive behaviour and significant 
dependency needs. They support the notion that the male is responsible for the destructive 
components of the relationship, particularly the abuse. On the other hand, to avoid the 
violence, the woman starts to modifL her life around the demands of her abusive partner 
and thereby isolates herself fiom extemal support. In turn, her compliance to his 
controlling demands legitimizes his power. Her compliance makes her counter-dependent 
upon her male partner which, in tum, contributes to her inability to terminate the 
relationship. This counter-dependency also causes anxiety and distress for the woman as 
she feus losing her partner that she has become psychologicaily, and perhaps 
economically dependent upon." 
5. Other Theories 
A detailed description of al1 of the different theories that have attempted to explain the 
causes of domestic abuse is beyond the scope of this work." Still, given the complicated 
nature of this troublesome social phenomena, some of these theories should at least be 
noted. Within the realm of determinants that have been directed at the male abuser, 
'OD. Dutton and S. Painter, "Traumatic Bonding: The Development of Emotional 
Attachments in Battered Women and Other Relationships of Intermittent Abuse" ( 1983) 
6 Victimology 139 at 145. 
"For an excellent review of the theories related to the causes of domestic violence can be 
found in The National Research Council, N. Crowell and A. Burgess eds., 
Understanding Violence Againsî Women (Washington: National Academy Press, 1 996). 
explanations to account for the violence that occurs within a domestic relationship have 
included; evolution," physiology and neurophysiology," alcohol abuse," 
psychopathology and personality  trait^,^ attitudes and gender scherna~,'~ sex and power 
motives," as well as social leanllng theories." Other theonsts have focused on the dyadic 
"V. Quincey and M. Lalumiere, "Evolutionary Perspectives on Sexual Offending," 
(1 995) 7(4) Sexual Abuse at 301 to 3 15; as cited by The National Research Council, 
supra note 2 1 They suggest that sexual violence may be explained by evolutionary 
theories modified by specific attitudes toward females combined with an erotic interest in 
violent sexual behaviour. 
%ee J. Archer, "The Iduence  of Testosterone on Human Aggression" (1 991), 82 British 
Journal of Psychology 1; as cited by The National Research Council, supra at note 21, for 
a comprehensive review of the literature on the topic. 
" See G. Kantor, "Refining the Bnishstrokes in Portraits on Alcohol and Wife Assaults" 
in A Zco ho1 and Interpersonal Violence: Fostering Multidisciplinary Perspectives NI AAA 
Monograph 24, NIH Publication No. 93-3496 (Rockville Md.: National Institute on 
Alcohol and Alcoholism, National Institutes of Health, US. Department of Health and 
Hurnan Services, 1993); as cited The National Research Council, supra note 2 1. In this 
study it is reported that men's drinking habits, particularly binge drinking. are related to 
domestic violence across al1 ethnic groups and social classes. 
"S. Hart, D. Dutton, and T. Newlove "The Prevalence of Personality Disorder Among 
Wife Assaulters" (1993), Journal of Personality Disorders 7(4) 328; as cited in The 
National Research Council. supra note 21. This study found a high incidence of 
psychopathology and personality disorders among men that physically abuse their female 
partners. 
'6  For exarnple men, in general, have been found to be more accepting of men abusing 
women and the more culturally traditional those men appear to be the more accepting 
they are of the abuse. C. Greenblat "Don't Hit your Wife ... Unless: Preliminary Findings 
on Normative Support For the Use of Physical Force by Husbands" (1 985), 10 
Victimology 22 1 ; as cited in The National Research Council, supra note 2 1. 
"A. Browne and D. Dutton, "Escape fiom Violence: Risks and Alternatives for Abused 
Women - What do we Currently Know?" at 65 in R. Roesch, D. Dutton, and V. Sacco, 
eds .. Family Violence: Perspectives on Trea fment, Research, and Policy (Barnaby B .C . : 
British Columbia Institute on Farnily Violence, 2 990). This article reports that power and 
control fiequently underlie intimate relationship violence, although the purpose of the 
contexts or features unique to the relationships wherein this type of behaviour has been 
doc~rnented.'~ Some have looked to societal influences such as sexual scripts and cultural 
mores to account for the abusivene~s.~~ As well, institutional influences such as family, 
educational settings, religions, and media have been studied to determine their respective 
impacts on domestic violence." While still others have searched for multi factor models 
violence may be Iinked to the male party's own feelings of powerlessness and inability to 
accept rejection. 
" Social Learning theonsts suggest that human behaviour is learned by observing others, 
forming ideas about the acceptability of those behaviours and then trying and continuing 
those behaviours that are reinforced. See K. O'Leary "Physical Aggression Between 
Spouses: A Social Leamhg Theory Perspective" in V. Van Hasselt, R. Momson, and M. 
Hersen, eds., Handbook of Family Violence (New York: Plenum, 1988). 
' 9 ~ o r  example see J. Giles-Sims, Wge Battering: A System Theory Approach (NewYork: 
The Guilford Press, 1983), who studied the state of an emotional bond between the 
parties and the timing of the male's controlling behaviour. This study found some 
evidence to suggest that women were willing to accept the first act of violence as an 
anomaly and therefore forgive the behaviour. but that this response may actually reinforce 
the violent act. 
'OE?cpectations about dating and intimate relationships are thought to be taught by 
culturally transmitted scripts. Scripts support violence when they promote males to feel 
superior and are entitled to be sexually aggressive as compared to female scripts that 
perceive females as being responsible for controlling the level of sexual involvement. See 
J. White and M. Koss "Adolescent Sexual Aggression within Heterosexual Relationships: 
Prevalence, Characteristics, and Causes" at 182 in H. Barbaree, W. MarshaIl and D. Laws 
eds.. The Juvenile Sex Offender (New York: Guilford Press, 1993). Also, anthropologists 
have studied cultural differences in both the amount and acceptability of domestic 
violence within different societies. See D. Counts, J. Brown and J. Campbell, eds., 
Suncr ions and Sancruary: Cultural Perspectives on rhe Beating of Wives (Boulder Colo. : 
Westview Press, 1992). 
'' Family influences have been examined by D. Farrington "Childhood Aggression and 
Adult Violence: Early Precursors and Later-life Outcornes" at 5 in D. Pepler and K. 
Rubin, eds., The Development and Trearment of Childhood Aggression (Hillsdale N. J .  : 
Erlbaum, 199 1). Religion effects have been studied by V. Whipple "Counseling Battered 
Women Frorn Fundamentaiist Churches" (1987), 13 Journal of Marital and Family 
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explanations, such as the biopsychosociai mode1 that examines the reiative contributions 
of three main predictors of violence, narnely the physical, the social and certain 
psyc hiatnc symptoms." 
Thus. having outlined these various theories that have al1 attempted to explain the causes 
behind the controlling and abusive behaviours of male person directed at theù female 
partners, one is able to see the many complexities comected to the issue. This 
information is an important part of the analysis section of the chapter as the effectiveness 
of two recent criminal justice's response is scrutinized. 
(D) THE K COURT MODEL 
Ln 1995. a nurnber of Crowns in the Metropolitan Toronto area were becoming 
increasingly fmstrated by the reality that far too many criminal assault charges alleging 
incidents of physicd intra familial abuse were being withdrawn at the trial stage of the 
criminal justice system. The bulk of these charges were being withdrawn and not 
proceeded with primarily because the female compiainants were unwilling to CO-operate 
with the process. Basically, these type of charges were being investigated by the police as 
Therapy 25 1. A. Dworkin in Pornography: Men Possessing Wornen (New York: NAL/ 
Dutton, 199 1 ) has suggested that pomography encourages the objectification of women 
and condones sexual aggression by men towards women. 
3'P. McKenry, T. Julian, and S. Gavazzi "Toward a Biopsychosocial Mode1 of Domestic 
Violence" (1 993, 57 (May) Journal of Marriage and Family 307; as cited in the National 
Research Council, supra note 2 1 . 
1 49 
most other fiont line investigations - without an appreciation for the nature and dynamics 
of the cycle of farnily violence. The officers would attend at the scene and attempt to 
gather information fiom the witnesses in attendance about what had transpired. Perhaps 
some additional background information was obtained, medical assistance provided and 
the victim services sector were contacted about either immediate of funire shelter and 
assistance. 
At approsimately the same time that these shortcomings of the criminal justice system 
were being contemplated investigative reporters from the Toronto Star including Jane 
.Armstrong. Caroline Mallon and Rita Daly were collecting data fiom al1 of the domestic 
assault charges laid and processed through the bail release progam. They recorded al1 of 
the domestic assault charges processed by the Toronto Provincial Court for the week of 
July 30" 19%. They then monitored those charges through the cnminal justice system for 
the nest 18 months to determine how well the system performed. Their frndings were 
shocking. 
On March 9h. 1996 Jane Armstrong reported: "The Star study found a justice system 
failing at every step with judges, crown attorneys, defence lawyers and police pointing the 
finger of blame el~ewhere."~~ In particular, their study discovered that by March 9Ih- ,  
1996. only 60 percent of the 133 cases processed resulted in a conviction and that most of 
the charges were completed by way of a guilty plea to a lesser and included offence. The 
"J. Armstrong et al., The Toronto Star (9 March 1996) Al .  
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reporters also discovered that 37 percent of the cases "fell apart because the victim either 
failed to show up in court or changed her story on the stand."" 
During this tirne penod the conventional approach to the prosecution of domestic assault 
was in place in the jurisdiction. As a result, a Crown proposai was implemented to 
improve the response. A specidly designated spousal abuse court was established. This 
-'K Court M~del,"'~ entitled because of the court room in which it was assigned, was 
based on a CO-ordinated effort that included a multi-professionai cornmitment to 
reforming their individual interactions with the female complainants of dornestic assault 
charges. 
On the policing fiont, the investigative agencies were educated about some of the realities 
connected with patterns attached to the cyclical nature of domestic violence. They were 
trained to seek corroborating evidence at the scene, including such things as 9 1 1 
ernergency tapes, neighbours' statements, scene and injury photographs and. perhaps 
most importantly, the video taped statement of the cornplainant (with her consent) as soon 
j51t was fashioned on an Arnerican criminal justice response to domestic violence. 
operating in San Diego, California. It was reported that the American expenment, 
dedicated to a cooperative effort from al1 professional agencies involved in the 
investigation, prosecution and deterrence of this violent behaviour, recommended a zero 
tolerance policy towards domestic violence. In 1995 the program boasted a 95 percent 
guilty plea rate for the 2942 charges that were laid. As for the 58 matters that went to 
trial, the prosecution registered an 86 percent conviction rate. J. Armstrong et al., "Hitting 
Back in San Diego" The Toronto Star (March 16 1996) C 1. 
after the incident transpired as possible. 
This was done so that a prosecutor could marshal an application before the trial court to 
allow the Crown to enter the videotaped statement to prove the tmth of the contents of the 
statement made by the complainant. This "past recollection recorded" is an exception to 
the rule against the admissibility of hearsay e~idence.'~ Therefore, if a complainant cornes 
to court and testifies in a rnanner that is inconsistent with her onginal version of the 
events surrounding the allegations of domestic violence, that pnor statement, if proved to 
have been made (hence the videotaping and search for corroborating evidence) could then 
be declared by the court to have some probative value." The courts have consistently 
looked to a nurnber of factors to assess the reliability of the previous statements. Some of 
these factors include a detemination of whether the statement was made under oath or 
solemn affirmation following a warning that to mislead investigators is a serious matter. 
whether the entire statement is videotaped, and whether it was made at a time when the 
subject matter was sufficiently fresh in the mind of the complainant so as to ensure 
accuracy.j8 Also, while compiling the information to be attached to the bail briefs. the 
police made efforts to include prior occurrences summaries connected with police 
j6For the general pnnciples behind the exception see R. v. B. (KG) (1 993), 79 CCC (3d) 
257 (S.C.C.); R. v. U.(F.J.) (1995), 101 CCC (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
j7R. y. Beriault (1997), 6 C.R. (5h) 382 at 386 (Que.C.A.) R. v. Eisenhauer (1998) 14 
C.R. (5<h) 35 (N.S.C.A.). 
"See R. v. B.(KG) supra note 36 and R v. Eisenhauer supra note 37. These issues are 
more fùlly developed later in this chapter. 
responses that did not result in criminal charges. This was done to get as complete a 
picture as possible p ior  to the trial date for the charges. This not only required a 
cornmitment of time and expertise fiom the police but d s o  a cornmitment of financial 
resources as well. 
On the probation senices side of the equation, education and training was aiso 
implemented to assist in the reduction of specific recidivism. A treatment program based 
on education and counselling provided by accredited domestic violence professionals and 
accessed through probation services was established. Yet, these facilities could only be 
accessed once a detennination of guilt was made by the court. 
As well, the prosecutors charged with the responsibility of fairly presenting the evidence 
eathered, were also assigned to the specialized K Court to ensure that they had a clear 
C 
understanding and appreciation of the rules and options available to the crown when 
confionted on the day of trial with a reluctant female complainant. This included an 
appreciation of recent developments in the Law of evidence, particularly those related to 
hearsay and similar fact d e s .  This was particularly important given the fundamental 
changes to the principled approach taken by the Supreme Court in cases such as R. v. 
Khan. R. v. KGBJ9 that allowed a prosecutor to advance the case involving a recanting 
witness beyond a declaration of adversity by the court and tender the evidence as 
j9R. v. Khan (1990), 59 CCC (3d) 92 (S.C.C.); R. v. B. (KG.) (1993), 79 CCC (3d) 257 
(S.C.C.). These cases are described in M e r  detail later in this chapter. 
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provided by the complainant soon afier the incident as the truth of what in fact actually 
transpired. 
The other response to the initiative included the establishment of a special court to 
process the charges. As the accused persons' bail hearings were completed, the cases 
were vetted by an assistant crown attorney to ensure that al1 domestic incident charges 
laid were earmarked for the K Couri to be tried. These charges included not only 
aliegations of domestic violence but also other criminal charges directly c o ~ e c t e d  to a 
domestic setting, such as stalking, death threats, and break and enter charges. To be 
directed to the K Court the nature of the relationship between the parties had to include 
either a curent or p s t  marriage, cormnon law relationship or a union that resulted in and 
s hared a c hild. Both heterosexud and homosexual relationships were included. 
Aithough the Ontario government is currently in the process of gathering statistical data 
to determine the effectiveness of the new K Court, one can certainly argue that the 
changes irnpiemented have attempted to respond to the realities of the denial, fear and 
heIplessness experienced by a woman trapped in the cycle of violence. As well, there are 
some early indications that this response is having some impact on the guilty plea rate for 
domestic offenders as the numbers have increased fiom 40 percent to 50 percent. This 
increase was marked within the first 6 rnonths of the court's ~peration.~' This is 
''M. Herman, Assistant Crown Attorney, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario and 
member of the domestic violence work team, telephone interview Wednesday April28 
1999. See also J. Armstrong et al., " Guilty Pleas Up" n e  Toronto Slar ( 1  1 December 
significant for at l e s t  two reasons: one, a guilty plea prevents a victim fiom going 
through the ordeal of having to testi@ against her partner; and two, it saves the system 
resources that could be reinvested elsewhere. It has also been reported that within the 
same period of time, the conviction rate after trial for the K Court increased from 10 to 14 
percent." 
(E) THE PLEA AND CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE COURT MODEL 
A different response to the same fnistrations comected with the prosecution of domestic 
violence cases emerged elsewhere in Ontario. The main concept behind this approach was 
to treat the male party's violent and abusive behaviour through a counselling and 
treatrnent program. The focus in this mode1 is shifted away fiom the changes in the legal 
system that might be implernented to help ensure convictions and stressed an 
environment of CO-operation between both the partners of a domestic relationship and the 
criminai justice system. Rather than being faced with the unco-operative recanting female 
witness at the time of the trial, assurning that she even showed up. an option would be 
provided to the first time accused male person involved in a matter alleging "minor" 
incidents of violence. In exchange for his admission of guilt and the completion of a court 
recognized treatment prograrn, the male party would receive a conditional discharge fiom 
the court. To be accompanied with this counselling and education program for the male 
1997) A l .  
4 I Jane Armstrong, supra note 40. 
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Party, support and assistance would be offered to the female partner and their children. 
The aim of this mode1 is the reduction of the behaviour that leads to domestic violence 
and thereby promote increased safety for the victims of domestic violence. 
The first step in the program is to have a crown review the charges and the allegations 
supporting those charges. In determining eligibility, a number of factors are considered 
including: 
1 .  The charge must be the accused's first for domestic violence. 
3 -. That no significant harm has been suffered by the cornplainant by the 
accused's actions. 
3 The accused's willingness to admit their assaultive behaviour towards the 
complainant. 
3. The complainant's willingness to participate in the project. 
5 .  The accused consents to allowing partner contact." 
If eligible under these conditions, the matter is then directed to Victim Services staffwho 
contact the female complainant to explain to her the goals and parameters of the program 
and then attempt to obtain her input into the process. If the accused is agreeable? he is 
advised of this option and he is processed through the special domestic assault plea court 
established to deal with the charges. Once the accused accepts these provisions he pleads 
guilty to the charges before a provincial court judge and his sentencing hearing is 
adjoumed for 20 weeks. He then enten a counselling program" that consists of an initial 
1' -Notice to the profession, Re: Domestic Assault Project, Ontario Court, Provincial 
Division, Brampton Ontario. 
'"lbid. The three service providers for the Brampton Provincial Court are the Catholic 
Family Services of Peel Dufferin, Man to Man Program; The Salvation Arrny Domestic 
Violence Prevention Program and the Family Services of Peel. To be enrolled in the 
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assessment meeting, followed by 16 weekly group counselling sessions. In addition to 
these sessions focussed on the male batterer's behaviow, the agencies involved also 
contact the victim to determine her unique needs for safety and protection. Referrals may 
also be made for the female partner during this contact. If the accused successfùlly 
cornpletes the intervention and counselling prograrn then the crown's position on 
sentencing is a conditional discharge and probation with ternis, including additional 
treatment if it is deemed appr~priate.~ 
(F) Analysis of These Two Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Vioience 
Gcnerally speaking, both of these models support the position that the criminal justice 
system has responded more positively to the crisis in our society related to domestic 
violence than it h a  to the issues connected to the disclosure of female sexual assault 
complainant's counselling records. The most significant factor behind this distinction is 
the system's attempt to not only understand the contextual background behind the abuse, 
including causes and consequences, but it has also moved forward at improving some of 
the inequities related to the conventional response to interpersonal violence. However, the 
two responses set out above, when examined carefully depict an oversimplified approach 
to the advancement of equal access to justice for the female victims of domestic violence. 
counselling sessions the accused is expected to make a monetary contribution of up to 
$350 to help defiay the costs of the program. 
"41bid. See also section 736 of the Criminal Code relating to the provisions of a discharge. 
1. Practical Issues 
One potential problem that may a ise  fiom the Plea Court mode1 is where the male party 
initially agrees to the conditions of the plea, but afier attending for the initial assessrnent 
and perhaps a number of the treatment or counselling sessions decides that he will not 
complete the program. When this occurs does the plea get stntck because of a claimed 
fundamental disagreement as to the nature of the proceeding? The law grants to a trial 
judge the discretion to allow a change of plea fiom guilty to not guilty at any time before 
the conviction is entered and the sentence is passed." However, this discretion should 
only be exercised when the accused has established that the plea was invalid because it 
was entered in error or under an improper inducement or threat.46 Due to the fact that the 
guilty plea is entered in open court it is presurned to have been made voluntarily and 
thcrefore the onus is on the accused to establish that his plea is ~ r o n g . ' ~  This onus 
becornes even more difficult to overcome if the accused has had the assistance of Iegal 
counsel during the course of the guilty plea? It has also been held that a change of plea 
wiil not be granted if it is established by the court that the accused understood the 
"R. v. Bamsey, [1960] S.C.R. 294, 125 C.C.C. 329; R. v. Kavanagh ( 1  953 ,  1 14 C.C.C. 
378 (Ont. C.A.). 
46R. V. Rajaeefard (1996), 104 C.C.C (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.). 
'7R. V. Morris (1994), 87 W.A.C. 296 (B.C.C.A.). 
48R. V. Clermont (1 996). 1 50 N.S.R. 264 (N.S.C.A.). 
consequences of his ~lea. '~ As a result, a guilty plea should not be struck even in a 
situation where the plea was motivated by an accused person's desire to receive a reduced 
sentence, such as a conditional discharge that is otherwise  nav va il able.^^ 
Thus. the jurisprudence supports the position that if an accused was represented by 
couisel and understood the consequences of his plea, then the trial court judge shouid not 
allow the plea to be struck. I f  the plea is not struck then the treatment option that the 
accused removed himself fiom, no longer exists and the court is left to the conventionai 
sentencing tools, such as deterrence through punishment, whether it be monetary fines, 
incarceration or community service work. The violent behaviour goes untreated. 
Yet even in the face of this legai jurisprudence, a trial judge does allow the plea to be 
stmck down - and without a K Court prosecution mode1 to fa11 back on - then the 
cornplainant and the comrnunity are h e l l e d  back into an unsatisfactory conventional 
approach to the prosecution of the charges. There is no CO-ordinated effort to ensure the 
unique issues of dornestic assault offences, such as the recanting witness caught in the 
cycle of violence, are dealt with in their proper contextual nature. There are no responses 
to assist a female victim of abuse that wrongly believes that violence will corne to an end 
without intervention. Therefore, assuming that this is the best that the criminal justice 
system has to offer, it is suggested here that the plea court mode1 cannot exist without the 
49R. v. Atlay (1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 553 (B.C.C.A.). 
V. Btrrden (1 996). 90 O.A.C. 169 (Ont.C.A.). 
availability or option of a muiti component K Court model." 
2. Theoretical Issues 
(i) Contextual Shorteomings 
Regarding the K Court model, it is suggested here that an option for counselling, 
treatment and or education, coupled with a lenient sentence position such as a conditional 
discharge. in r e m  for an early indicated guilty plea - within the sarne parameters of the 
plea court model - would aiso assist some female complainants access to justice. The 
complainants that such an option would assist are those that truly desire to continue the 
relationship, have only been exposed to a minimal amount of physicai abuse and whose 
safety is not in is~ue.~ '  
iMore importantly, it stressed that "some"complainants may benefit fiom such an option. 
Many would not. This is the most significant component of this chapter's criticism of the 
responses set out above, specifically that both of these responses have oversirnplified the 
"See the discussion related to the unified hybrid domestic assault court option discussed 
in the Reforms Chapter of the thesis. 
"See H. Johnson, "Seriousness, Type and Frequency of Violence" in Wife Assault and the 
Criminal Justice Systern, M. Valverde, L. MacLeod and K. Johnson eds., (Toronto: 
University of Toronto, 1995). This article reviews the 1993 Statistics Canada national 
survey on male violence against women. At page 136 she notes that this survey provides 
empirical evidence of an escalation in the severity of assaults over time. 
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causes and the consequences in their attempt to understand the complexities of domestic 
assault within its broader contextual societai framework. This position can be supported 
through a number of contentions. 
First. neither the women whose safety is at risk given their exposure to more serious 
injury, nor those complainants who do not wish to reconcile the relationship would seem 
to benefit from such an approach." Studies have shown that women are at the most 
S ~ ~ O U S  risk of significant harm irnmediately after attempting to terminate an abusive 
relationship. Still, other potential partners and children of an abusive mate may reap some 
benefits from a shifi, or hopefilly a cessation of violent behaviour, and therefore it is 
suggested here that any treatment is perhaps better than none at d l ,  and that some 
attempts should be made to treat the underlying causes of the abusive behaviow. This 
treatment cm. of course. take place without some of the other risks associated with this 
plea approach. The nature of the risks Vary with the nature of the violent behaviour as 
well as to the number of individuals that are in harms way, but include hrther assaultive 
behaviow taking place in the home while the matters are still before the court. 
Secondly, any improvements must take into consideration the needs and wishes of the 
cornplainant directly involved. This concept is complicated because the two 
considerations of "needs" and "wishes" are ofien mutually exclusive of each other. For 
''ibid. at 136. Separated spouses tended to inflict more serious violence compared to 
abusive men in current relationships. 
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exarnple. the theones reviewed above, including the cycle of violence that would predict 
that some women who request to have their abusive male partner's charges withdrawn do 
so because they are trapped in a state of learned helplessness, or at a minimum some forrn 
of unhealthy mental state of being if they are unable to safely extricate themselves and 
their children fiom a dangerously violent situation. These women may not appreciate 
their tme long-term needs are inconsistent with their imrnediately perceived wishes. Tfiis 
is complicated by the fact that al1 women have a section 15 Charter nght to be treated 
equally and fairly by the law. Therefore, serious efforts must be made to get the input 
from the specific cornplainant involved. However, it is argued that given the extremely 
high threat of harm, and the almost countless different theories related to the causes of 
domestic assault, that one telephone cal1 fiom a minimally trained victim services worker 
is far from suficient. There needs to be a detailed appreciation of the history behind the 
incident, including previous assaults, the number of children involved, prior treatrnent or 
counselling, any potential culturai variables, in addition to the gathering of a 
complainant's position on wishing to have M e r  contact with her abusive partner. To 
gather such types of information would require not only a specially trained and skilled 
case worker, but also time so that a trusting relationship of some level could be created. 
Thirdly, and directly related to the input of the cornplainant, it must be stressed that an 
"one size fits all" approach is wholly inappropriate in the circumstances of domestic 
assault. Some women may have actually only been abused on one single occasion and as 
a result wish for a conventional criminal justice response to an unprovoked assault on 
their person. If this is the case, some assurances must be made that unwittingly an 
unequal lower tier of justice is not king created by these criminai justice responses. For 
example, S. Merry studied the legal consciousness of working class Amencans and their 
experiences with both court and mediation processes in eastem Massachusetts in the early 
1980'~.~'  She found that the group that used the courts, both criminal and civil. was 
Iargely but not entirely women. Through her studies she discovered an interesting paradox 
comected to ail users but especiaiiy women: 
It empowers plaintiffs with relation to neighbors and relatives, but at the 
same time it subjects them to the control of the court. People who take 
their personal problems to court become more dependent on the state to 
manage their private lives ... After submitting their problems to the courts 
for help. plaintiffs must then struggle to keep control of their problems as 
the courts reformulate and reinterpret these problems' meaning and 
c o n ~ e ~ u e n c e s . ~ ~  
She found that the courts are accessed as a fonn of conflict resolution when ail other 
means have failed. The court of last resort, if you d l .  Those seeking justice through the 
courts are othenvise powerless to resolve the conflict. Then when they attempt to exercise 
rheir rights before the law they discover that their voices are muted by the courts. Her 
studies found that while the plaintiffs were encouraged into the court they were denied a 
legal forum to assert their rights. On the issue of a separate tier of justice S. Merry wrote: 
Thus, as these working-class court users seek to assert their sense of 
entitlement to legal relief for these problems, they find that it is denied by 
the courts. The court does not reject their requests out of hand but subjects 
"S. Merry. Getting J ~ i c e  and Getfing Even (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1 990). 
"lbid. at 2 .  See also comments at 178 regarding women's particular response to the 
courts invitation for "personai" problem resolutions. 
them to periods of monitoring, to probationary supervision, to social 
services. The problems are denied as legal cases but receive continuing 
supervision and management as moral or therapeutic problems. The 
plaintiffs do not find their rights protected, but they do receive lectures, 
advice about how to organize their lives, encouragement to corne back for 
mediation, and promises that something will be done to the plaintiff if the 
problem recurs: the cornplaint will be issued, the problem will go back to 
court, perhaps the defendant will be fmed or irnpris~ned.'~ 
She described this as a form of "cultural domination" as the courts exert their legal 
authority to frame the problems in other discourses, which thereby denies access to a 
justice system created to provide protection. Such diversions offer nonlegal, nonrights 
based solutions instead. 
Some of these nodegai solutions are examined more closely in Chapter Four that deals 
with ~otential rrfonns. Still, it is important here to note that if the criminal justice system 
is to provide access to justice for the victims of domestic assault, then the provision of 
that service will require a clear determination of what the complainant's wishes are. It 
would be a further miscarriage of justice if a woman taking the position of a survivor, as 
described above, desiring that her rights and safety be protected by the courts through the 
prosecution of the criminal charges discovers, afier the fact. that her partner's charges 
have been rechannelled into a conditional discharge Stream of consciousness. How one 
goes about discovering the wishes of the complainant may start with a phone call, but 
may very well require a much more contextual appreciation of the circumstances that 
bnngs those parties before the courts. 
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Moreover, this situation, as troublesome as it appears, is not as contentious as the possible 
scenario where a crown is required to protect the safety of the cornplainant as a member 
of the public, regardless of her clearly articulated wishes. This is described here as the 
ascertaining of the complainant's needs. How does one distinguish between the individual 
comp!ainant trapped in a dangerous spiral of escalating violence fiom the woman who 
was hit once, immediately desired protection fiom her abusive partner, has since rnoved 
on and is no longer in any danger and no longer wishes to be involved in the prosecution 
of the matter? This is a complicated distinction that may need to be made fiom time to 
time that has no easy answers. It is postulated here that due to the very real potential for 
tragic consequences to transpire, it is better to err on the side of caution. As the statistics 
outlined in the first chapter indicate this is such a significant problem that once a 
thorough effort has been made by a skilled professionai to ascertain the wishes and needs 
of both the cornplainant and the community, as well as the context of the allegations, 
someone must be allowed to exercise their discretion to ensure that the violence cornes to 
an end. 
(ii) The Consequences of Domestic Violence 
An essential part of trying to decrease the arnount of domestic violence in our community 
is understanding domestic violence within a contextual fiamework. As already pointed 
out these types of criminal offences are dramatically under reported. Therefore, it is 
postulated that a contextual understanding of the problem includes an appreciation not 
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only of the potential causes of the violent behaviour, but also the consequences of the 
abuse for both the direct victim as well as the community in which the victim lives. This 
information is required to properly assess the deterrence value of the modelled solutions 
described above. Without this broad appreciation any proposed solution is destined to fail 
if not in the short term, certainly in the long term. 
The most obvious consequence to the direct victim is the physical injury. Depending on 
the severity of injury, physicai pain and suffering may follow physical abuse. One study 
conducted a review of an urban American city's emergency room medical injuries 
records. They found that 50 percent of al1 of the injuries to women seen in the emergency 
room and 21 percent of the injuries that required emergency surgery were attributed 
incidents of domestic ~iolence.~' 
Also, most would anticipate the victim of physical abuse would additionally suffer 
psychological h m  fiom the violent behaviour. Conditions such as depression, suicida1 
tendencies, low self esteem, shame, anxiety, alcohol and drug dependency problems, and 
post traumatic stress disorder have al1 been associated to the victims of both sexual 
assaults and domestic ~iolence.~' Still, while the notion of battered woman's syndrome is 
"E. Stark, A. Flitcrafl, D. Zuckerman, A. Grey, J. Robinson, and W. Frazier, Wijie Abuse 
in the Medical Setring: An Introduction for Heaiih Personnel ( 1  98 l), Domestic Violence 
Monograph Series, No. 7 (Rockville, Md.: National Clearinghouse on Domestic 
Violence, 198 1) as cited by the Nationai Research Council, supra note 2 1 .  
58 For an excellent review of the research and studies that have docurnented the 
psychological consequences of domestic violence see Understanding Violence Againsr 
an accepted notion within legal proceedings it is not a recognized psychiatrie syndrome. 
Rather, the term is linked to the consequences of having been abused. The use of the term 
has been the subject of much debate, primarily because it makes the consequences of 
domestic violence a pathology and disregards the many differences that exist between 
women's responses to being physically abused.19 
One level removed fiom the direct impact is for the children being raised in violent 
households. Many studies have been conducted on these subjects which have documented 
a broad range of effects. including being at a greater risk of physical injury than those 
children not subjected to the behavio~,~ '  the exhibiting of high levels of aggressive. 
antisocial. fearful and inhibited behavioursp' and the role modelling that young boys are 
involved in as they observe their fathers abuse their mothers. 
Wornen. supra note 2 1 at 79 to 84. 
'9See M. Dutton, "Undentanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A 
Redefinition of the Battered Wife Syndrome " (1 993), 2 1 Hofstra Law Review 1 19 1. This 
article provides a conceptual fiamework for examining the diversity of women's 
responses to violence within the context of the Amencan criminal justice system 
60 M. Straus and R. Gelles, "How Violent Are Arnerican Families? Estimates fiom the 
National Family Violenve Resurvey and Other Studies" in M. Straus and R. Gelles eds., 
Physical Violence in Arnerican Families: Risk Factors and Adaptations to Violence in 
8,145 Families (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990) as cited by the 
National Research Council, supra note 2 1 .  
6'P. Jaffe. D. Wolf, S. Wilson, and L. Zak, "Similatities in Behaviour and Social 
MaIadjustrnent Arnong Child Victims and Child Witnesses to Family Violence" (1986). 
56 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 142, as cited by the National Research Council, 
srrpru note 2 1. 
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Further impact is absorbed by community. Society on the whole must also deal with 
ramifications of domestic violence. For example, the fear of crime and of being 
victimized by crime eRects people on the macro level, and because women fear crime 
more than their male counter parts, they are disproportionately afEected? Also, there are 
financial costs of violence. H. Meyer has estimated that medical costs and lost work 
productivity attributable to incidents of domestic violence in the United States is in the 
range of $5 to $10 billion per a n n ~ r n . ~ ~  This estimation has been supported by the 
Arnerican Bureau of National Affairs, whose findings are that the annual costs of 
domestic violence to employers for health care and lost productivity are between $3 and 
$5 billion per year.' There are also the costs of medical care (immediate and long term), 
the maintenance of homeless shelters and of course the costs to the cnminal justice 
system, including the investigation, processing, prosecution and perhaps even 
incarceration costs. 
Lastly, there are atso less direct costs, such as changes in the quality of life for the 
battered partner and children that may be involved. One can only contemplate the costs 
associated with a battered womenTs reality of isolation, fear and lost opportunities to 
"M. Gorden and S. Riger The Fernale Fear (New York: The Free Press, 1989); 1. Gomme 
"Fear of Crime Among Canadians: A Multivariate Analysis" (1986), 14 Journal of 
Criminal Justice 249, as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 21 at 87. 
(j3H. Meyer, "The Billion - Dollar Epidemic" (1992), American Medical News. January 6, 
as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 21 at 87. 
HThe Bureau of National Affairs (1 WO), as cited by the National Research Council supra 
note 2 1 at 87. 
ennch their own lives, forgone because of the controliing effects of violent physical 
abuse. An indication of these indirect costs can be found in a study conducted in New 
York that found that 56 percent of employed women who had been physicaily abused had 
lost their employment as a direct result of the abuse and 75 percent had been harassed by 
their male partner while in the work place.6s 
(iii) Treatment as a Solution 
Having considered this broad range of consequences attributable to domestic violence. 
one can begin to analyse the solution component - education. treatment and counselling - 
of the recent Ontario responses to domestic violence. The first thing that comes to mind is 
that, in their efforts to improve and overcome the shortcomings of the conventional 
treatment of incidents of female partner assaults, criminal justice policy makers have 
rnissed the issue of complesity and diversity in causes and consequences. Obviously not 
al1 women who have been physically assaulted by their male partners fa11 into identical 
backgrounds and histones of abuse. The causes Vary and the costs to her. her family and 
society on the whole are al1 potentially very different. Also, if a goal of the criminal 
justice system is to prevent this specific male party from re-offending his treatment 
program will need to be modified for his panicular needs. 
"L. Friedman and S. Couper, The Costs of Domestic Violence: A Preliminary 
Investigation of the Financial C m  of Domestic Violence ( New York: Victim Services, 
1987). 
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As one contemplates the value of the models one must consider whether either have had 
an impact at reducing domestic violence in the jurisdictions where they have been set up. 
The government of Ontario is currentiy in the process of collecting data to assess the 
impact of the programs, although unfortunately these results are not yet available. In 
addition to the input fiom both the victims and the offenders the state must be interested 
in the effect that such initiatives have on individual recidivism as well as the lowering of 
the prevalence of the behaviour throughout society. Moreover, there should be some 
consideration of how the models treat the broad social disabilities comected with 
domestic assaults. Since the results of the data gathered to date is unavailable one must 
consider some of the literature in the field that has assessed similar responses to domestic 
violence established in other jurisdictions. In doing this one may be able to predict the 
programs' effectiveness. 
In a iiterature review conducted by Hamberger and Hastings, they concluded that court 
ordered treatment for wife batterers was an important positive step towards reducing 
domestic violence. On the concept generally they wrote: 
When wife assault is called a crime, several forces corne to bear. First the criminal 
justice system responds, as society's representative, to hold the wife assaulter 
unequivocally responsible for the violence. By mandating treatment for the 
offender, the criminal justice system and the treatment comrnunity are 
simultaneously giving him an oppominity to change and telling him that he is 
responsible for stopping his violence. Hence, there is good reason to coordinate 
criminal justice, social services, and treatment components to respond to partner 
66 L. Harnberger and J. Hastings, "Court Mandated Treatment of Men Who Assault Their 
Partner; Issues, Controversies, and Outcornes" in N. Hilton, ed., Legal Responses to Wife 
They went on to examine the two pnmary types of court mandated treatment sessions for 
wife batterers. The first type is described as a pre-triai diversion or deferred prosecution 
plan wherein the male party has his arrest record cleared o r  the charge reduced in some 
fashion once he has successfuIly completed a court mandated treatment program. The 
second type is court ordered participation as part of a sentence imposed foI1owing a 
convict ionm6' The Arnerican studies that examined both of these formats were reviewed. 
To assess their impact twro main areas of research have been conducted. The first involves 
the effectiveness of treatrnent sessions on the reduction of recidivism. The second is in 
the dissection of attrition rates and how well the criminal courts hold the abusers 
accountable when they drop out of the program they were ordered to attend in the first 
instance. 
Another study completed by Hamberger and Hastings four years earlier discovered that 
the manner in which a male party was directed to the battering counseIling had an effect 
on their program completion rate. They found that about two-thirds of the court mandated 
completed the sessions, as compared to two-fifths of the men whose treatment was not 
Assadt, Czcrrent Trends and Evahation (Ntwbury Park: Sage Publications, Inc., 1993) at 
188. 
67~bid. at 190. A third type of court mandated treatment is also described that involves a 
municipal court order for minor ordinance violations that d o  not amount to a 
misdemeanour offence. 
coun ordered? Others have studied the effect that the abuser's persona1 variables have 
had on the attrition rates connected to the treatment sessions. For example, it has been 
reported that younger, less educated and lower income level factors have al1 been linked 
to higher program drop out rates." 
On the issue of recidivism, M. Steinman compared the number of domestic assault cases 
that occurred pnor to the creation of coordinated community response with the cases that 
occurred post. This study found that without the coordinated effort the arrests actually 
increased the repeat violence. Yet the study also found that police arrests coupled with 
other criminal justice initiatives, including "an energetic prosecution of offenders and 
other interventions delivered by a coalition of public and private agencies," deterred 
additional violence.70 Similarly, M. Syers and J. Edleson collected domestic assault data 
in Minneapolis over a 13 month period. Included in their research was direct input from 
the victims themselves. At the 12 month period they discovered the least amount of 
repeat violence for the men who were arrested and ordered to attend for treatment. At the 
other extreme. they found that the highest repeat violence occurred among men who were 
6 11 L. Hamberger and J. Hastings, "Counseling Male Spouse Abusers: Characteristics of 
Treatrnent Completers and Dropouts" (1989) 4 Violence and Victims 323, as cited by the 
National Research Council, supra note 2 1 at 122. 
(j9R. Gruznski and T. Carillo, "Who Completes Batterer Treatment Groups? An Empirical 
Investigation" (1988), 3 Journal of Farnily Violence 141. 
"M. Steinman. "Lowering Recidivism Among Men Who Batter Women" (1990), 17 
Journal of Police Science and Administration 124 at 124, as cited by the National 
Research Council, supra note 2 1. 
not arrested. 
However, such studies are fiequently cnticized. In their literature review, Hamberger and 
Hasting point out serious methodological flaws in most of the studies inducted in the 
field. At the completion of their work they conclude: 
After reviewing much of  the research literature, what do we 'know' about the 
short- [sic] and long terrn effects of treatment on wife assault? The answer, 
unfortunately, is 'Not much.' ... We cannot confidently Say whether 'Treatment 
works.' We should be well beyond that question, asking instead, ' What treatrnent 
works best on which types of client, and under what conditions?"' 
Therefore. while the initiatives to treat and educate the abusive male partner are a 
progressive step in the right direction towards putting an end to domestic violence, it is 
far fiom certain as to whether what is currently being done is enough. It is suggested here 
that given the large nurnber of variables that are linked to the causes and consequences of 
domestic assault more information is needed so that treatment can be geared to category 
types. Solutions to this complicated problem will require a significant contextual 
appreciation of the factors at the root of each case. Yet, this is not to suggest that each 
individual instance of domestic assault will require an independent exhaustive inquiry; 
rather, it is suggested that certain categories of offenders need to be recognized so that 
optimal treatment prograrns can be made be available to best take advantage of the 
opportunity to implement a lasting cure. 
7 1 Supra note 66 at 220. A discussion as to treatment types is set out in chapter four, that 
specifically deals with reforms. 
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3. Recent Canadian Judicial Interpretaîions Related to the Prosecutions of Domestic 
Assault Cases 
The next step of this section is to examine the courts' response to this new initiative in 
prosecuting domestic assault cases. A recent search for cases that have dealt with the 
issue of a recanting domestic assault complainant's original statement admission into 
evidence for the truth of their contents has tumed up very few cases. One case directly on 
point is reviewed below. This case provides us with a predictable issue that needs to be 
carefully examined. In this case the complainant provides the police and a number of 
third parties with an explanation about how she received her injuries. By the time the trial 
is commenced she recants this original version of events and provides the court with a 
second and inconsistent recollection of the incident. It is argued that it is an injustice for a 
court to merely assess that since there are now two inconsistent stories before the trier of 
fact. there is a reasonable doubt and an acquitta1 must be entered. To avoid this result. it is 
outlined in this section that the context of domestic violence must be considered by the 
courts. There must be fair determination of the facts from the evidence, including the two 
different version of events as provided by the complainant. It  is argued that part of this 
consideration should be the assessrnent of al1 circumstances of reliability, including the 
complainant's original statements to the third parties. To fûlly appreciate the principles 
discussed, a brief review of the leading cases on hearsay has been included. Also, given 
the limited number of cases that deal with the issue, an effort has been made to discuss 
some of the Iegal principles that are evolving in the generai area o f  hearsay evidence and 
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its admission into court under the exceptions of necessity and reliability. Also, one theme 
that is highlighted in this section is the distinctive rules that apply to an accused person as 
compared to the prosecution when it cornes to the admission of hearsay evidence. 
Specifically, we see that the courts have focused on the possibiiity of a miscarriage of 
justice that would flow fiom an innocent person being wrongly convicted rather than on 
the rniscarriages of justice that may flow fiom a distraction by the courts fkorn their search 
for the truth. This residual discretion connects back into the theme of conflicted interests, 
fairness and equaiity as developed in the Second Chapter, specifically the disclosure of a 
sexual assault complainant's therapeutic records. 
(i) The Trilogy Plus One 
In 1990 the Supreme Court of Canada took a bold step in the direction of hearsay reform. 
In R. v. Hian" the accused, a physician, was charged with sexually assaulting a three and 
half year old child. Once the examination of the child was completed he was retumed to 
his mother. At this time she noted a wet spot on his clothing that was analyzed and found 
to be a mixture of semen and saliva. Approximately 15 minutes afier leaving the medical 
office the mother asked the child what he and the physician had spoken about. The child 
responded "He asked me if 1 wanted candy. 1 said yes ... He said 'open your mouth,' and 
"(1991), 59 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. L.T. W. (1995), 13 1 Sask. Reports 47 
(Sask. C.A.) at 49. 
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you know what? He put his birdie in my mouth, shook it and peed in my mouth."" The 
boy was four and a half at the time of trial. At trial, an issue arose regarding the child's 
ability to give unswom testimony. The trial judge allowed the hearsay statement of the 
child that was made to his mother as described above under a strained "spontaneous 
statements"" exception. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Khan appeal 
regardless of the declared error by creating a principled exception to the exclusionary nile 
related to hearsay. McLachlin J., writing for the Court held: 
The hearsay rule has been traditionally regarded as an absolute d e ,  subject to 
various categories of exceptions, such as admissions, dying declarations, 
declarations against interest and spontaneous declarations. While this approach 
has provided a degree of certainty to the law on hearsay, it has fiequently proved 
unduly inflexible in dealing with new situations and new needs in the law. This 
has resulted in courts in recent years on occasion adopting a more flexible 
approach, rooted in the prïnciple and the policy underlying the hearsay mle rather 
than the strictures of traditional exceptions.'' 
The Court went on to anchor the new approach in two generai requirements: necessity 
and reliability. For interpretive purposes, necessity was broadly descnbed as "reasonably 
ne~essa ry ' '~~  Examples of circumstances that would meet this requirement threshold 
included the inadrnissibility of a child's evidence or perhaps the trauma that would be 
caused to a child if required to testifi in court. Regarding reliability, McLachlin J. 
provided a number of considerations that could be relevant, but clearly designated the 
trial judge as the person to best frame the factors." 
In R. v. Smith" the Supreme Court of Canada had an opportunity to re-examine the 
principled approach to the hearsay issue. In this case the accused was charged with 
second degree murder. The Crown wished to tender the statements of the deceased to 
support it's theory that the accused had initially tried to persuade the deceased to smuggle 
drugs into Canada from the United States. When she rehsed he lefi her in a hotel in the 
United States. The deceased then made series of phone calls to her mother; one indicating 
that she had been abandoned by the accused and that she required a ride home. a second 
indicating that he had still not returned, a third indicating that the accused had returned to 
the hotel and that she would no longer require a ride, and a fourth call indicating that she 
was on her way home. The main issue on appeal was the admissibility of the statements 
made by the deceased to her mother over the phone. The Court held the first two calis 
should be admitted but excluded the third due to it's lack of reliability. The fourth call 
was not in issue. Lamer C.J.C., on behalf the Court, supported the refonns established in 
Khan, stating that: 
However, Khan should not be understood as turning on its particular facts, but, 
instead must be seen as a particular expression of the fundamental principles that 
underline the hearsay rule and the exceptions to it. What is important, in my view, 
is the departure signalled in Khan fiom a view of hearsay characterized by a 
general prohibition on the reception of such evidence, subject to a limited number 
of defined categoncal exceptions, and a movement towards an approach governed 
by the principles which undedie the rule and its exceptions alike. The movement 
-- 
771bid. at 105. 
'"1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.). 
towards a flexible approach was motivated by the realization that, as a general 
rule, reliable evidence ought not to be excluded simply because it cannot be tested 
by cross-exa~nination.~~ 
In R. v. B. (K. G.) this principled approach was expanded to admit into evidence a p io r  
inconsistent out of court videotaped statement for the tmth of its content. In this case a 
yowig offender was charged and tned in the youth court for second degree murder. The 
incident arose when the accused and three other young men became involved in a 
physical altercation in which the deceased was stabbed and killed. Two weeks afier the 
killing the three other young men were interviewed separately by the police. During these 
interviews each had present with them a parent and legal counsel. With their consent the 
interviews were videotaped. In statements each of them indicated that the accused had 
admitted to them that he believed that he had stabbed the deceased. During the trial each 
of the three cornpanions refûsed to adopt their earlier videotaped statements. Under 
section 9 of the Canada Evidence Act, each was cross-exarnined and admitted that they 
made the statements but also gave evidence that they had lied to the police. The trial 
judge held that the earlier videotaped statements could only be used to assess their overall 
credibiiity. The accused was acquitted. The Supreme Court of Canada overturned the 
lower court ruling on this issue and ordered a new trial. 
Lamer C.J.C., again writing for the majority, rejected the technical rule of exclusion and 
- - -  
791bid. at 270. 
"(1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.). 
found that where there was a sufficient guarantee of reliability attached to a statement, 
then the pnor inconsistent statement should be admissible for its tmth. On the issue of 
reliability he held: 
The reliability of prior inconsistent statements is clearly a key concern for Law 
refonners and courts which have reforrned the orthodox d e ,  and, as 1 have 
outlined, this concem is centred on the hearsay dangers: the absence of an oath, 
presence, and contemporaneous cross-examination. The reliability concern is 
sharpened in the case of prior inconsistent statements because the trier of fact is 
asked to chose between two statements fiom the same witness, as opposed to 
other f o m s  of hearsay in which only one account of the declarant is tendered. In 
other words, the focus of the inquiry in the case of prior inconsistent statements is 
on the comparative reliability of the pnor statement and the testimony at trial, and 
so additional indicia and guarantees of reliability to those outlined in Khan and 
Smith must be secured in order to bring the pnor statement to a comparable 
standard of reliability before such statements are admitted as substantive 
evidence.*' 
This notion of a threshold reliability was addressed in R. v. C/.(F.J.).8' This case involved 
a recanting child witness. The accused was charged with five counts of incest and the 
sesual touching his daughter. The young complainant was interviewed by the police and 
provided them with a statement detailing the sexual attacks. The sexual acts were 
described in some detail and with a recollection regarding fkequency. Following this the 
accused was interviewed by the police. During this interview the accused provided the 
police with an admission regarding the manner and ffequency of the offences. The 
accused's statement was mled admissible at trial. When called to testifi the complainant 
recanted the allegations, indicating that she had lied to the police. The trial judge directed 
''Ibid. at 287. See also R. v. Finfa (1994), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 41 7 (S.C.C.) at 526 for a 
discussion regarding reliability as established by a combination of several factors. 
"(1996), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
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the jury that they could examine the complainant's prior statements and compare it to the 
accused's confession as the similarity in details could be considered in their deliberations. 
The accused was found guilty. A number of issues, including the burden of proof and the 
proper use that could be made of the pnor inconsistent out of court statements were 
examined by the Supreme Court. 
Reçarding the procedural issue of burden of proof, Lamer C J.C. held that: 
the trial judge need only be convinced on a balance of probabilities that the 
statement is Iikely to be reliable, as this is the normal burden of proof resting upon 
a party seeking to admit evidence." 
Related to the statements use issue, once again the Court relied on a flexible and 
principled approach to "ensure that the new developments in the evidential treatment of 
hearsay would reflect those te net^"^ as was articulated in the cases Khan and Smith. Here 
the Court held that this was a proper case that the orthodox rule, that a prior inconsistent 
statsment cannot be admitted for its truth, should not be applied. Larner C.J.C. w-riting for 
the majority. considered the similarity between the statements of the cornplainant and her 
father to support the requisite reiiability. He noted that: 
In order to eliminate. or at least substantially reduce, the likelihood of a similarity 
'%id at 1 1 9. See also D. Paciocco and L. Stuesser, The Luw of Evidence (Concord, Ont. : 
Invin Law. 1996) at 13; "the general rule is that the party seeking to have a rule of 
evidence applied must establish its factual prerequisites on a balance of probabilities. 
This means that while a rule of exclusion or a special rule of admissibility provides a list 
of preconditions, the judge must determine that each is met before the rule can operate." 
between two statements arising through coincidence, the similar factual assertion 
must be so striking that it is highly unlikely two people would have independently 
fabricated it. ... In some cases, the necessary degree of similarity will result fiom 
the unique nature of particular factual assertions in both statements. In other 
situations, while there may not be any points of similarity that are sufficiently 
striking to render coincidence unlikely when viewed standing alone, it may be that 
the cumulative combination of sirnilar points renders the overall similarity 
between the two statements sufficiently distinctive to reject coincidence as a likely 
explanati~n.'~ 
Having compieted this brief review of the Supreme Court's reformed position on the 
principles of hearsay, we can now turn our attention to its actual and potential impact on 
the prosecution of domestic assault cases. 
(ii) Domestic Assault Cases 
In R. v. iklohamecf6 the Crown applied to have the complainant's pnor inconsistent 
staternent adrnitted into evidence for the tmth of its contents. In this case the complainant 
and the accused were mamed in 1989. On September 14, 1996 the accused assaulted the 
complainant following an argument. Afterwards the accused lefi the apartment to 
purchase some cigarettes. While he was gone fiom the apartment the complainant locked 
the apartrnent door. When her husband returned he becarne upset and kicked the door 
open and entered the apartment. He found the complainant in the kitchen preparing a 
''1bid. at 1 17. Similarities between the statements is considered in addition to the factors 
set out in R. v. B.(K.G.), including the availability of the witness to be cross-exarnined at 
trial, the use of an oath given at the time the out of court statement was made, and 
whether or not the statement was videotaped. 
86[1 9971 O. J No. 1287 (Ont. Prov. Div.). 
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meal for their children. At this time there were two pots on the stove, one a boiling pot of 
macaroni and the other a boiling pot of tomato sauce. The accused, angry at being locked 
out of the apartrnent, picked up the boiling pot of macaroni and poured it on the 
complainant's head. She ran fiom the kitchen and the accused followed her with the 
boiling pot of tomato sauce. The accused then intentionally poured the mohen liquid over 
the complainant's head. This caused senous second degree bums to her back and chest. 
She eventually ran out of the apartment where she was assisted by neighbours. An 
emergency " 91 I call" was made and she was transported and admitted into a local bum 
unit for treatment. 
Within the two hours following the attack the complainant spoke to the neighbours who 
assisted her, the 91 1 operator, the ambulance attendants? a police oficer present in the 
emergency ward at the hospital and to the plastic surgeon who took the information fiom 
her about her injuries. The compfainant told each of these parties a similar account of the 
assaults as set out above. Three days later, Detective Gerry attended at the bum unit to 
take a statement fiom the complainant. The interview was audio taped. At that time she 
also advised the detective that the injuries that she had sufTered had been caused by her 
husband in the manner set out above. Further, she advised the detective that she had been 
physically assaulted by her husband in 1993 when he punched and choked her with an 
unknown type of cord. 
The next contact that transpired between the detective and the complainant was on 
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November 13, 1996. At that time the detective became aware that the complainant was 
now recanting her earlier version of events. From that point in time fonvard she indicated 
her wish not to have anything else to do with either the police or the prosecutor's office. 
She even refùsed to answer the door to receive her subpoena to attend court. Months later 
at the trial she was cailed by the Crown to test@ on the matter. At that time she 
indicated, under oath, that & had assadted him earlier in the day and that she poured the 
boiling macaroni pot on him. She also testified that the boiling pot of tomato sauce was 
spilled on her accidentally. 
In a conventionai manner the prosecutor made a section 9(2) Canada Evidence Act 
application to determine the issue of adversity so that the witness could be cross 
examined. During her cross examination the complainant failed to adopt any of her 
previous statements as tme, maintaining that she had falsely accused her husband of the 
violence. In an unconventional manner the Crown then applied to have the comptainant's 
previous statement admitted for the tmth as to what had happened on September 14, 
1996. The Court granted the appIication and allowed the prior statements to be admitted 
into evidence for the truth of their contents. 
MacDomeli Prov. J., reviewed the pnnciples set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the decisions discussed a b ~ v e . ~ ~  Given the recantation of the complainant the component 
87R. V. B.(K.G.) (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 257; R. V. LI.(F.J) (1995), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 97; R. 
v. Khan [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531,  59 C.C.C. 92, and R. v. Smith [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, 75 
C.C.C. (3d) 257. 
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of necessity was conceded? As a result, the judge's reasoning focussed on the reliability 
requirements of the issue, He noted the three main concems at the root of the traditional 
distrust of pnor inconsistent statements included: 
1 ) the absence of an oath or solemn affirmation; 2) the inability to assess the 
demeanour of the declarant at the time the staternent was made; 3) the lack of 
opportunity for the party against whom the statement is offered to cross-examine 
the declarant at the time the statement was 
The court went on to consider a nurnber of safeguards that could be flexibly considered 
when assessing the reliability of the statements in issue, including the videotaping of the 
  rate ment.^^ Still, probably the most interesting feature of these types of cases is what the 
courts do when the statements are not videotaped following an oath or affirmation 
accompanied by a warning about the consequences of intentionally misleading the police. 
In the Moharned case, MacDonnell Prov. J .  relied on other circumstantial guarantees of 
reliability that consider the fiailties of reliability in hearsay evidence. For example, the 
availability of the witness for cross examination by the opposing party was held to be a 
"Sec also R. v. Conway and Husband (l998), 12 1 C.C.C. (3d) 397 (0nt.C.A.) at 406; R. 
v. U.(EJ.) (1995), 101 C.C.C (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) at 119. The criteria for necessity is met 
whenever a witness recants. For a broader review of necessity see R. Pomerance, 
"Confionting the Hearsay Dangers: The Principles of Necessity and Reliability " 
[unreported] a paper presented at the National Crirninal Law Program, Dalhousie 
University. Halifax Nova Scotia July 1997. But see R. v. Charles (1997), 152 Sask. 
Reports 65 (Sask. C.A.) at 75. 
89R. V .  Moharned, supra note 86 at 3. 
90 Still, it should be clarified that an oath, a caution as to the significance of providing 
false information and the videotaping of the statement are not preconditions to the 
admissibility of a prior statement. R. v. Cr.(F.J.). supra note 82. 
substantial means to ensuring reliability.g' 
Furthemore, the Court determined the option of relying on other alternative guarantees of 
trustworthiness. MacDonnell Prov. J. considered the principles articulated in the case of 
U ( F J )  and held: 
1 regard U.(F. J.) as a case that turned very much on its own facts, but in any event 
it is note worthy that in that case the Supreme Court found a circumstantial 
guarantee of reliability not in the fact that the accused's statement tended to 
confirm the prior statement of the cornplainant but rather in the fact that the 
accounts were strikingly ~imilar.~' 
The Provincial Court stressed the difference between threshold reliability and ultirnate 
reliability. It was pointed out that the judicial inquiry regarding the element of reliability 
needs to be focussed on the circumstances in which the statement was made.93 It was 
reasoned that if the circumstances in which the statement are made eliminate the 
possibility that the person making the statement was either untniffil or mistaken then 
evidence c m  be assessed as reliable. Although it is not specifically articulated in  the 
decision, it is then assurned that other factors, beyond the those circumstances of the 
making of the statement, are relied upon to determine ultimate reliability. So for example, 
in the case of Mohamed the photographs and medical expert descriptions of the burn 
injuries could only be considered in the determination of ultimate reliability and not in the 
9 1 ~ .  v. B.(K.G.) supra note 87 at 116. 
"R. V. Mohamed, supra note 86 at S. 
"Sec also R. v. Hawkins and Morin (1996)' 1 1 1 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) at 129 and R. v. 
Smith, supra note 87 at 270. 
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assessrnent process that concludes whether or not the hearsay statements, specifically 
about how the injuries occurred, are in and of themselves reliable. It is argued here that 
this is perhaps a false distinction yet one that the courts adhere to. Having spent eight 
years in the criminal justice system's trial courts (the trenches so to speak) it is suggested 
that to rely exclusively on the sanctity of an oath and to neglect other circumstantial 
pieces of evidence, such as the testimony of other unbiased third parties, to detennine the 
reliability of a p ior  out of court statement is naively ridiculous." 
MacDonnel Prov. J. applied the facts of this case to the three contentious reliability issues 
as established in R. v. B. (KG.). First with regards to the absence of an oath at the time 
the statements were made to the detective in the hospital, the Court considered the serious 
nature of the manner in which the interview took place in the bum unit. The fact that the 
detective spoke with the cornplainant about the accused's bail conditions and the 
possibility for the increasing of security at the hospitai. the fact that the detective "had 
with him a large attache case containing tape recording equipment" and the fact that "he 
pimed a microphone to her clothing and to himself ail satisfied the issue of the absence 
of the ~ a t h . " ~ ~  
QJ See L. Stuesser, "Admitting Prior Inconsistent Statements where 'Adverse'- Section 24, 
Evidence Act (Ont.)" (1962), 40 Can. Bar. Rev. 96; and D. Dugdale, "Against Oath 
Taking" [1985] N.Z.L.J. 404, both as cited by Lamer C.J.C. in R. v. B. (K. G.). These 
articles suggest that in a modem society the power of an oath should be discounted as a 
means of guaranteeing witness reliability. 
9 5 ~ .  v. hlohamed. supra note 86 at 6. 
Second, on the issue of the statement not k i n g  videotaped, the trial judge relied 
significantiy on the circumstances surround the audio taping of the statement. This 
combined with the Court's opportunity to observe the witness take the stand during the 
voir dire conducted at the trial compensated for the inability of the trial judge to be 
present during the time that the statement was made in the bwn unit. 
Third. the tàct that the complainant remained available for cross examination for the 
remainder of the trial, if the previous statement was adrnitted for the truth of i ts  contents. 
overcame the lack of contemporaneous cross examination when the statement was made 
cit the burn unit.96 
The Court concluded that the Crown had established the requisite threshold reliability of 
the complainant9s statement made to the detective in the bum unit. As such, the statement 
was admitted for the truth of its contents, namely that her husband had intentionally 
poured boiling hot Iiquids ont0 her body. 
Given the realities of the special dynamics between an accused and a complainant in 
cases involving domestic assault cases, it is suggested that most would agree with the 
result of allowing the Court to consider the statement that the victim made to the 
detective while in the b u m  unit for the tmth of its contents - that the accused intentionally 
96R. V. B. (KG.) supra note 87, where it was held that the opportunity to cross examine the 
party making the statement at trial could be an important substitute for the inability of the 
defence to cross examine the witness at the time that statement was made. 
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poured the boiling hot liquids on his wife. Still, what about the other evidence gathered 
by the police from the neighbour, the 91 1 tape, the ambulance attendants, the police at the 
emergency ward, and the plastic surgeon? They al1 spoke with the complainant and al1 
were advised that the accused had intentionally burned her with the boiling liquids afier 
having had an argument. 1s this type of information not also relevant in creating the 
context in which the statement was made? Does it not add reliability to the complainant's 
statement made to the police while in the hospital? It is suggested that the answer to both 
of these questions is obviously yes. However, given the developing hearsay jurisprudence. 
the Court could not look to these factors to suppon the threshold reliability of the 
truthfulness or accuracy of the audio taped hearsay statement. Unfortunately, the Court's 
eventual determination was not reported, so we are unable to determine whether this 
information could be, or was, relied upon in the final determination of ultimate reliability. 
Al1 that we do know is that it was idormation that was excluded fiom the statement's 
initial threshold reliabiiity determinati~n.~' 
Another troubling feature about this case are the questions that arises in the hypotheticai: 
what if the complainant had never made the statement to the police while in the hospital? 
" ~ t  is noted that the distinction between "threshold" reliability and "ultimate" reliability 
may require further clarification. It has been assurned for the purposes of this work that 
threshold reliabiiity relates to the question of satiseing a minimum standard of 
trustworthiness such that the evidence can be considered by a trier of fact. Once the 
evidence is admitted for such a purpose the trier of fact must then assess the same 
evidence for a final determination of  cogency. D. Paciocco and L. Stuesser in The Law of 
Evidence (Concord, Ont.: Irwjn Law, 1996) examines a similar distinction between 
primary materiality and secondary materiality. These issues are discussed more fdly  over 
the next few pages of this chapter. 
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What if she had died in a time frame beyond the scope of a dying declaration exception9' 
or was consistently unco-operative with the police? Could the statements that she made to 
the neighbours and other third parties be admitted into evidence for the truth of their 
content? From the Court's determination of the issue we are given some guidance about 
the use that can be made of the complainant's initial audio taped statement that she gave 
to the police in the hospital. The case also examines the use that can be made of the 
complainantos statements to the third parties that she had contact with shortly after the 
incident, particularly as they relate to the issue of reliability regarding the complainant's 
statement to the police. It is argued that while MacDonnell Prov. J.'s decision in 
ltloharned was perhaps correct in law (as is reviewed below) his reasoning would not 
assist a court presented with this hypothetical situation. Therefore, it is postulated that the 
statements made by the cornplainant to the other third parties, assuming they c m  
overcome the preliminary issue of ttireshold reliability, established on a balance of 
probabilities, they should also be ruled as admissible in the fact finding mission of a trial. 
This position is supported by both the reasons articulated by the Supreme Court of 
Canada related to the flexibility and the need for a principled approach to assessing the 
admission of hearsay evidence for the tnith of its contents, as well as some of the basic 
rules of evidence. Because the Court's rulings have already been examined, the next 
98D. Watt. Watt S Manuel of Criminal Evidence (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1999) at 
273; "a statement made by a deceased declarant under a settled hopeless expectation of 
death concerning the circumstances of the impending death, including its cause and the 
identity of its perpetrator, is admissible to prove the truth of the facts contained in the 
statement." See also R. v. Woods (1 8W), 2 C.C.C. 159 (B.C.C.A.). 
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component of this chapter, reviews some basic first principles of the rules of evidence. 
The basic rule of evidence is that ail relevant and materiai evidence is admissible. 
Generally speaking an item of evidence is relevant if it makes a matter in issue more 
likely than not. D. Paciocco and L. Struesser note that evidence has been recognized as 
relevant if it "has some tendency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the 
proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would appear to be 
in the absence of the that e~idence ."~~ The determination of whether or not an item of 
evidence is material is somewhat more complicated, because there are two related 
groupings of materiality. To assess materiality one must start with the development of an 
issue. Primary materiality is detennined by the pleadings, indictment or information of a 
case. the substantive law and by procedural rules. Secondary materiality is determined by 
a court charged with the responsibility of resolving questions about the admissibility of 
evidence and witnesses' testimony. This involves an assessrnent of whether, and to what 
level. the information that has been presented to the court is accurate or honest. This 
process is described as the determination of credibility and weight. On the issue D. 
Paciocco and L. Steusser write: 
In order to decide the value of the evidence offered in a case, the fact finder may 
profit, therefore, fiom information that is not directly about the facts in issue but 
rather about the witness or the evidence that is being presented. For example, 
proof that a witness received a bribe from a party is important in assessing the 
testimony of that witness. Evidence offered to demonstrate the value of other 
9YD. Paciocco and L. Steusser The Law of Evidcnce (Concord, Ont.: Invin Law, 1996) at 
1 9. Compare this explanation with Lamer C.J.C.'s position regarding threshold and 
ultimate reliability in R. v. C/. (F.J.), supra note 82 at 1 19. 
evidence can be material, even though it is not about one of the primary issues 
r e q u i ~ g  resolution. It is secondarily material, since it assists only indirectîy in 
resolving the pnmarily matenai issues that the court m u t  decide.Iw 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has established a policy of a flexible and principled 
approach for trial courts to deal with the admission of hearsay evidence. Basic evidence 
rules suggest that the statements made by the complainant in the Moharned Case are 
relevant because they make the accused's guilt, or at least the manner in which the 
injuries occurred, more likely than not. The evidence of what the complainant told her 
neighbour and the other third parties about the incident are obviously matenal, but 
excluded by the traditional rule against admission of hearsay evidence for the tmth of its 
content. However a flexible and principled exception exists to include this evidence in the 
fact finding mission as long as the evidence can meet the requirements of necessity and 
reliability. The necessity is obvious assuming the complainant refuses to test@. The 
reliability of the statements must then be examined by a court. It is suggested that in 
addition to circumstances under which the statement was taken, these other items of 
evidence should also be considered as secondarily material that could be used by the court 
to assess the value of the complainant's statement. 
Having estabIished this position we can now review some of the jurisprudence in the area 
IO determine whether or not this position might be supported. As indicated earlier the 
rationale articulated in Moharned is consistent with the conventional jurisprudence. For 
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example, in R v. Comvay and  Husband, 'O' the Ontario Court of Appeal assessed the issue, 
although outside of the realm of domestic assault. In this case the two accused were 
charged with second degree murder. They admitted to manslaughter but not to the charge 
as laid. The Crown's entire case for second degree murder was based on a statement that 
a witness, Marc Jardine, made to the police during the course of their investigation. At the 
time of the triai the witness was unable to recall the statement nor could he recall even 
making the statement to the police during the investigation. The Court \vas not satisfied 
that the previous statement was reliable for a number of reasons including, the lack of an 
oath given to the witness at the time the statement was made, the statement was not 
videotaped and the cross examination of the witness at court was ineffectual because he 
claimed that he could not even recall making the statement. More interesting for our 
purposes. was the Court's mling on the Crown's argument that the Court should have the 
abiIity to look to other factors outside of the circumstances under which the statement 
was made, such as other evidence gathered by the police, that confirmed the accuracy 
and reliability of the witness's statement. 
Regarding the issue of reliability, Labrosse J.A. writing for the Court relied on Chief 
Justice Lamer's words set out in R. v. Smith. 'O' He noted that: 
The cnterion of 'reliability' - or, in Wigmore's terminology, the circwnstantial 
giiarantee of tnistworthiness - is a function of the circumstances under which the 
statement in question was made. If a statement sought to be adduced by way of 
'"(1 W8), 121 C.C.C (3d) 397 (0nt.C.A.). 
'"(1 992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.) at 270. 
hearsay evidence is made under circumstances which substantially negate the 
possibility that the declarant was untruthhil or mistaken, the hearsay evidence may 
be said to be 'reliable', Le., a circurnstantial guarantee of tmstworthiness is 
established.'03 
The Court rejected the position of the Crown that other corroborating evidence, apart 
from the circurnstances in which the statement were made, should be assessed to 
detemine the admissibility of the hearsay statement.lM Part of the Court's rationale for 
this determination was that none of the alleged confirmatory evidence referred to by the 
Crown was tendered before the trial judge during the voir dire. As a result, the trial judge 
could only consider the evidence presented in the voir dire to make a threshold 
determination of reliability of the statement in question. Related to this issue Labrosse 
J.A. contemplated the rights of an accused and noted that the "voir dire c m  have an 
impact on the way the trial unfolds, notably, on the strategy adopted by the defen~e." '~'  
Similar exclusive reliance on the circumstances surrounding the making of a statement 
' O 3  R. v. Conivay and Husband, supra 1 0 1 at 4 1 4. 
'<YIbid. at 416. To support this position the Crown relied on the rninority decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright, 1 1 O S.Ct. 3 139 (1 990). This case 
involved the statements of a child witness unavailable to testi@ in a trial involving 
allegations of sexual abuse. In this case the majority held that the circurnstances relevant 
to the admissibility of the statements only include those that surround the making of the 
statement. Labrosse J.A. noted that the majonty's view was consistent with the principles 
articulated in R- v. B.(K.G.), supra note 87. But see R. v. Big Eagle (1997), 163 Sask. 
Reports 3 (Sask. C.A.) at 17, wherein Tallis J.A. relies on the evidence of independent 
witnesses as a substitute for videotaped demeanour evidence. The Court also considered 
the similarity of content between two statements to help assess the issue of reliability. 
were pronounced in R. v. Tai and Long. In this case the accused were charged with one 
count of first degree murder and two counts of attempted murder connected with a 
shooting at a restaurant. The Crown wished to tender the identification evidence of an eye 
witness who shortly afier the incident picked out Long as one of the gunmen. When 
caI1ed at trial the witness maintained that neither accused were the shooters. At trial, the 
evidence of the police, specifically the uitness's statements related to the evidence of 
identification was admitted for the tmth of its content and both accused were convicted. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal excluded the evidence and entered acquittais for both 
accused. On the issue of reliability and the out of court statements, Doherty J.A. writing 
for the Court adopted the reasoning of Larner C.J.C. and Iacobucci J. as set out in R- v. 
Hawkins. 'O7 wherein it was held that: 
The criterion of reliability is concemed with tiireshold reliability, not ultimate 
reliability. The function of the trial judge is limited in to determining whether the 
particular hearsay staternent exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability so as to f iord  
the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for the evaluating the truth of the statement. 
More specifically, the judge m u t  identrfi the specrjic dangers raised &y the 
srarement, and rhen determine whether the facts surrounding the utterance of the 
staternent oflers suficient circumstantial guarantees oftrusîworthiness to 
compensate for those dangers. [Emphasis added b y Do herty J. A.] 'O8 
Applying this principle to the facts in issue the Court held that there were only two 
circumstances that could compensate for the inherent dangers connected to the hearsay 
evidence. These included the fact that the statement was made soon after the event 
'06(1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.). 
'07(i996), I l  1 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) at 157. 
'O-ra note 1 06 at 5 10. 
described and that the witness had no personal interest in making the identification. 
However, these circumstances failed to persuade the Court that the statement should be 
admitted for the truth of its content, particularly due to the fact that it was not videotaped 
and because the defence could not cross-examine the witness alleged to have made the 
statement. 
In R. v. i ~ c i ~ a s t e r ' ~ ~  the issue was revisited. In this case the accused was charged with 
murdering his girlfiend. The accused's position was that he was innocent m d  that a third 
p a t y  was responsible for the death. The defence wished to cal1 a witness, identified in the 
judgement only as Reilly, to testify about a conversation that this witness had with the 
deceased about her concerns that she had about the third party in question. The trial judge 
excluded the hearsay evidence because it was found to be unreliable. The Court of Appeal 
upheld the determination and commented on the issue of the consideration of evidence 
tendered outside of the admissibility voir dire. Brook J.A., writing for the majority, held 
that: 
He considered, and said so, that Reilly was not a reliable witness. I think it is clear 
that this threshold issue of reliability is to be decided on the evidence heard on the 
voir dire, without reference to any of the evidence heard on the trial outside of the 
voir dire."' 
This case is unique fkom the other cases reviewed to this point because it represents a 
defence application to admit hearsay evidence for the truth of its contents. It seems to 
'@)(1998)? 122 C.C.C. (3d) 371 (Ont. C.A.). 
' 1°lbid. at 374. See also R. v. Erven, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 926; 44 C.C.C. (3d) 257. 
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apply the same principles to this defence application that have been applied to the Crown 
utilizations already discussed. However, two other recent decisions in the field of 
exceptions to the hearsay rules would seem to suggest that an additional consideration, 
specifically a "residual discretion," may affect defence concerns about this type of 
evidence. This distinct rule may impact on triai fairness and the equality principles 
outlined above. 
R. v. Kalisa"' discussed the weighing of the probative value against its potentiai 
prejudicial effect for the accused in relation to the trial judge's determination of the 
reliability of hearsay evidence. In this case the accused was charged with a number of 
sexual offences involving a minor female comptainant. At triai she refused to testify. The 
Crown attempted to have the sister of the complainant, who received a statement from the 
complainant about the incident and also acted as an interpreter for her sister as she 
discussed the incident with the police, a doctor and a psychologist. During the voir dire 
held to determine the aâmissibility of the hearsay statements, the sister witness declared 
that she had since had M e r  discussions with her sister the complainant and that her 
sister now indicated that the accused had done nothing wrong. Furthemore, this witness 
indicated that she would not test@ about the details of the post incident discussions that 
she had with her sister. The trial judge held that the evidence of the sister witness that she 
originally provided to the investigators was not sufficiently reliable and excluded the 
evidence. The accused was acquitted and the Crown appealed. The Quebec Court of 
"'(1999)~ 130 C.C.C. (3d) 121 (Que. C.A.). 
Apped dismissed the appeal. In its support for the trial jucige's determination they held: 
The Court is of the view that in the determination of the reliability of the hearsay 
evidence, it was effectively part of the trial judge's role, apart fiom assessing 
credibility per se, to determine whether the prejudice which may be caused to the 
accused substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence, which was 
incomplete and weak, to the point of risking making the trial unfair for the 
accused, contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. ' " 
Another case that would appear to support a residual discretion for trial judges is R. v. 
Folland. "' In this case the accused was charged with sexual assault. The defence position 
was mistaken identity. The allegations suggested that after an evening of drinking the 
complainant went to bed alone. She awoke to find a man having sexual intercourse with 
her. obviously without her consent. She identified the accused as the person responsible. 
in part. because of perception that her attacker was partially bald. The accused's position 
mas that afier the sexual assault had occurred a third Party, Mr. Harris, admitted to having 
sesually assaulted the complainant. The police also tested semen found in the 
compIainant's underwear and in a pair of men's underwear found in the bed where the 
complainant was sieeping. The DNA test performed excluded the accused as a source of 
the semen. Regardless of this the accused was convicted after trial. After the trial. bodily 
samples were obtained fiom the third party and tested. DNA tests performed on these 
samples detennined that the third Party was the source of the semen located in the 
' I2lbid at 126. No indication was made in the reported decision as to which judge wrote 
the decision. The panel included Brossard, Rousseau-Houle and Delisle JJ.A. No 
reference was made to the specific section of the Charter under which the potential 
unfairness could be created. See also D. Paciocco and L. Steusser, supra note 99 at 23 for 
a review of the exclusionary discretion rule. 
'13(1999), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. C.A.). 
underwear in question. The central issue of this case was the fiesh evidence gathered and 
the results from the DNA tests. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a 
new trial. On the issue of admitting the hearsay evidence from the accused about what 
Mr. Harris had said to him about being responsible for the attack, the Court suggested 
that a residual discretion with the trial judge existed to relax the rules of evidence to 
prevent a rniscarriage of justice. Rosenberg J.A. reviewed the evidence of Mr. Harris 
given at trial. He noted: 
If Mr. Harris were to tell the sarne story to the jury as he did under cross- 
examination prior to the appeal, and if he were to be believed, it would be open to 
the jury to find that he did not attack the complainant and that he was asleep 
before the complainant made her cornplaint about the appellant. His testimony 
about having consensuai relations with the complainant the day before the attack 
would explain the presence of his semen on the white underwear. On the whole, 
Harris's evidence, if believed, would assist the Crown rather than the defence."" 
The converse to this is that the trier of fact would reject portions of Mr. Harris's 
testimony given under oath at trial and accept what he was alleged to have told others out 
of court about the incident on a previous occasion. 
Rosenberg J.A. declined to make a specific ruling about the admissibility of the hearsay 
evidence of Mr. Harris but provided the trial judge with some guidance on the matter. He 
reviewed the comments of Martin J.A. in R. v. Williams, specifically that: 
I t  seems to me that a court has a residud discretion to relax in favour of the 
accused a strict rule of evidence where it is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of 
justice and where the danger against which an exclusionary rule aims to safeguard 
does not e ~ i s t . ' ' ~  
Rosenberg J.A. went on to comment on some of the general principles related to the rules 
that exclude hearsay evidence. On the issue of defence evidence he wrote: 
In my view, while the trial judge must be satisfied that the prior out-of-court 
utterances have some reliability, the strict standards set, in the context of an 
apptication by the Crown to make substantive use of ptior inconsistent statements 
incnminating the accused, in R. v. B. (K G.) do not apply: cf R .v. Eisenhauer 
[emphasis mine, cite ~rnitted]."~ 
I t  is argued that these two passages, taken together, seems to create authority for the 
proposition that a residual discretion exists with the trial judges to allow the necessity for 
full answer and defence to t m p  the requirement for reliability. It is emphasized that this 
is the same trial and Charter right of the accused that was balanced above the rights of a 
sexual assault cornplainant to privacy and equality, as was examined in Chapter Two. 
This result would appear consistent with the decision in R. v. Chaldey. "' In this case the 
accused was charged with one count of first degree murder, ten years afier the death of 
Mr. Bartko. This charge was laid after two of the accused's farnily members came 
fonvard and advised the police that their brother, the accused, had confessed to the 
"'lbid. at 3 1. R. v. WiIZiams is cited at (1  985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 356 (Ont. C.A.). The 
passage set out in the text was approved by Cory J. in R. v. Finta (1994), 88 C.C.C. (36) 
4 17 (S.C.C.) at 527. 
' I6/bid. at 3 1. The passage also makes reference to cf: R. v. Eisenhauer (1 998), 123 
C.C.C. (3d) 37 (N.S.C.A.) at 64, application for leave to the Supreme Court of Canada 
dismissed, August 20, 1998 [126 C.C.C. (3d) vil. 
"'(1992), 72 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (B.C.C.A.). 
killing. The deceased, Mr. Bartko was known to the accused as a boy friend of his ex- 
wife. Ms. Cater. For our purposes, the key issue is the alleged statement of the deceased 
made to Ms. Cater, days before his death, about an unidentified black male who had 
threatened hirn with a knife. The trial judge excluded the evidence as inadmissible 
hearsay. At trial the accused was convicted and he appealed. The British Columbia Court 
of -4ppeal disagreed with the trial judge's ruling and ordered a new trial. Wood J.A. held 
that the statement was admissible as "original circumstantial evidence from which an 
inference could be drawn that he had a contemporaneously fearful state of mind."'" More 
importantly however. the Court went on to consider whether or not the same statement 
could be admitted for the tmth of its content, particularly that the deceased had been 
threatened by a third person with a knife, thus leaving with the jury some circumstantiai 
evidence that this unidentified person was responsible for the killing. Relying on the 
principled approach established in the Khan Case, Wood J.A. examined the issues of 
necessity and reliability. The necessity was obvious given the declarant was deceased. On 
the issue of reliability Wood J.A. stated: 
The principal concern which underlies the rule against the admission of hearsay 
evidence is the tnistworthiness of the out of court statements. .., the focus of that 
concern has always been the declarant. and nof the person through whose mouth 
the declarations are tendered. The reliability of the witness who offers the hearsay 
testimony, and who is under oath and available for cross-examination, has much 
to do with the weight to be ascertained to the evidence, but in my view it ought 
not to be a condition of its admissibility. The weight to be ascribed to the evidence 
given under oath in a trial is a question of fact for the jury. I t  is not a question of 
law. The tnistworthiness tests upon which the admissibility of hearsay evidence 
depends, on the other hand, ought to be legal tests which do not purport to invade 
the fimction of the jury [emphasis  hi^]."^ 
From this jurisprudential review, a clear reluctance by some cowts to consider 
corroborating evidence, apart fiom the circumstances in which the statements were made, 
has been established. As already set out, this rule fails to fimher the fact finding mission 
of a domestic assault. 
Given the unsatisfactory treatment by the law of this issue, our attention is now turned to 
an argument for reform. The Arnerican academic R. Parks has contemplated the issues of 
hsarsay reform. In an article that explores the reasons for excluding hearsay he 
surnrnarized the five major arguments to oppose hearsay reform in criminal cases. These 
included: 
First, the conventionai academic rational for excluding hearsay - iack of cross- 
examination of the declarant - appears frequently in the discourse of Iawyers. and 
must be counted as a major reason for the exclusion. Second. concern has 
frequently been voiced about the danger of misreport and fabrication by the in- 
court witness. Third. lawyers have often alluded to the danger of surprise at triai. 
Fourth. lawyers have been concerned that hearsay reform would leave admission 
or exclusion to the uncontrolled discretion of the trial judge. Findly. concern has 
been expressed that the relaxation of hearsay d e s  will facilitate abuse of 
governmentai power in cnminal cases. '" 
Exarnined individuaily, none of these reasons detract from the value of expanding 
'"R. Park, "A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform" (1 987-88), 86:l Michigan 
Law Review 5 1. This article explores the differences that exist between civil and criminal 
law. It is these differences that support his conc1usions that a different set of rules 
regarding hearsay exclusion shodd be implemented. 
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tlireshold reliability to include the consideration of circumstances outside of process of 
statement recording. As already discussed, the cornplainant and the source of the hearsay 
evidence is available at trial for cross-examination. So too would the recipient witnesses, 
such as a neighbour, an ambulance attendant, a hospital worker or a police officer, that 
actually received the statement from the cornplainant soon after the incident. These 
witnesses could al1 be cross-examined to test the reliability of their recollections or even 
their motives to fabricate. Also, this would satisSf the right that an accused person has to 
face his accuser in court."' The danger of being surprised at trial is d l  but elirninated by 
the rules of disclosure.'" However, if a situation did arise where certain evidence 
becomes known to an accused party or a prosecutor at trial for the first time. certainly the 
remedy of an adjoumrnent is a far more equitable and reasonable solution than an 
automatic esclusion based on an occurrence possibility. As for the uncontrolled trial 
judge discretion argument, it is suggested that the consideration of more evidence not less 
evidence would assist trial judges in making less a r b i t r q  and more consistent decisions 
rsgarding threshold reliability. Lastly. the concem about the facilitation of state abuse is 
decreased when the evidence is being tendered by unbiased civilians as descnbed above. 
Therefore it is argued that more considerations as compared to artificial boundaries to 
"'1bid. at 88, Parks examines hearsay and the confrontation clause. guaranteed under the 
sixth amendment of the U.S Constitution, that States -'In ail criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confionted with the witness against him."R. v. 
Eisenhazrer (1 998), 123 C.C.C. (3d) 37 (N.S.C.A.) provides a thorough review of rational 
for the opportunity of an accused to be afForded the opportunity to cross-examine a 
witness. 
"'R. v. Srinchcombe (I991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
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exclusion would provide a greater opportunity for the tmth to surface, particularly in 
situations such as abusive relationships where, for a number of  reasons, the tmth is often 
suppressed not only by the accused but also by the victim, who remains in continuous 
danger. 
Moreover, these cases taken together, depict the courts adherence to strict application of 
the niles as they relate to the issue of threshold reliability on Crown applications, often 
ignoring circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that exist outside of the statement 
taking process. Nonetheless, the courts are wiIling to relax these general principles on 
behalf of the accused to avoid a miscarriage of justice. But what about the rniscarriages of 
justice that would flow fiom the exclusion of hearsay evidence fiom a recanting witness 
on the grounds of threshold unreliability and where circumstantial evidence bearing on 
the issue of ultimate reliability is ignored? It is argued here that the exclusion of this 
evidence also arnounts to a miscarriage ofjustice and, as such. this position should be 
reconsidered by the courts. It must be stressed that a principled analysis should not be 
technically applied. As R. Delisle reminds us: 
B. (K. G.) was a case of an out of court statement being subjected to a principled 
analysis determining whether there were sufficient grounds of necessity and 
circumstances promoting reliability that the jury could be trusted to properly 
evaluate the worth of the statement. '" 
Certainly the principled approach established in Khan and that has since evolved in 
"'R. Delisle, "B. (KG.) and Its Progeny" (1998), 14 C.R. (5') 75.  
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Smith, B. (K. G.) and C/. (FX)  is flexible enough to take into consideration the contextual 
realities of the recanting witness trapped in a cycle of domestic violence to ensure that the 
search for the truth is not forsaken. It is contended that circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness adds reliability to the fact finding mission of a trial without negatively 
impacting trial fairness for an accused person. It does not shifi the focus of concern from 
the declarant, rather this type of evidence importantly helps create a context for an 
assessrnent of trustworthiness. It is an item of evidence within the realm of secondary 
materiality that should be used to value both the trial testirnony of the recanting witness. 
as weli as the reliability of the hearsay statement. For example, if one accepts that a 
cornplainant is trapped in a cycle of domestic violence as a result of leamed helplessness, 
the context of why she remains in the violent and dangerous relationship, unreasonably 
believing the abuse will soon corne to an end must be considered. Specifically, if in the 
'-honeymoon" phase of the cycle of violence a fernale partner may be particularly 
vulnerable to refusing extemal assistance to end the violence. I t  should be recalled that 
while in this phase the victim believes that the contrite male batterer wiIl make the 
n e c e s s q  changes in his life so that the violence will stop. Similarly, if one supports the 
theory of a complex post-traumatic stress disorder one must also accept the position that a 
victim suffering fiom such a delusional state is not in the best position to appreciate al1 of 
the consequences of reîùsing to testiQ in a truthfûl manner in a cnminal proceeding 
cornmenced against her abuser. Finally, the obvious must also be taken into account. the 
fear of retribution for her CO-operation with the state prosecution. It is argued that al1 of 
these contextual realities must be factored into the concepts of flexibility and a principled 
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approach to the courts' consideration of a recanting domestic assault witness's out of 
court statements, in addition to al1 types of the relevant and materid evidence that either 
supports or detracts fiom the issue of reliability. 
(G)  Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to provide a contextual explanation of the social phenornenon 
of domestic assault. There is very little consensus in the field as to the exact cause of this 
form of violence. In fact, it would appear that there are perhaps many different causes, 
some of which may be combined to fllrther complicate the problem. Similarly, the many 
consequences of domestic assault for the direct victims, their children and society as a 
whole are still to be unravelled. Nonetheless, most experts agree on at least one effect and 
that is the cyciical nature of the abuse. Without intervention women trapped in abusive 
domestic relationships are in serious peril. The conventional response of the criminal 
justice system has failed to respond to the problem, particularly with regards to the issue 
of the recanting witness. Also, as was pointed out in Chapter One, this type of cnminal 
offence is severely under-reported. It is suggested that the conventional criminai justice 
approach to dealing with incidents of domestic violence has only exasperated this 
contention. 
This chapter presented two recent responses to the unique problems associated with the 
crime of domestic violence. The responses to domestic violence discussed above are 
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positive steps in the correct direction of increasing women's equal access to justice. but 
they too have their shortcomings. These limitations are grounded in an oversimplified 
appreciation of the intricate nature of the dilemma. With regards to the court mandated 
treatment more needs to be done to assess the type of treatment warranted in each 
situation presented to the court. More investigation is required to detemine and isolate 
the causes unique to each male batterer so that appropriate counselling sessions and 
treatments can be provided. Also, efforts need to be reformulated to accurately assess the 
complainant's needs and wishes. When possible a spirit of CO-operation should be 
fostered. Input from complainants m u t  be respected and carefidly assessed, even if it is 
not adhered to. 
With regards to the K Court approach to the prosecution of domestic assault charges, 
advances must be made in the courts acceptance of the context in which situations of 
recantation occurs. A more expansive understanding of the principled approach to the 
mies assessing hearsay reliability needs to be accepted. This is not to postulate that the 
current considerations of threshold reliability need to be abandoned. but rather the 
considerations of external circumstances that either detract or bolster the reliability of the 
out of court statements aiso need to be added to that threshold equation. Jurispmdential 
authority for this pnnciple was articulated in R. v. W. (EL) and is in keeping with the 
principled and flexible approach enunciated in al1 of the Supreme Court's recent 
considerations of the issue. As well, the traditional reservations, as described by R. Parks 
and that have been perfunctody c o ~ e c t e d  with the reluctance to broaden the principles 
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should be re-evaiuated to support the need for m e r  refonns in the area. in this way the 
court's search for the t . t h  is improved, without affecting trial faimess for the accused. 
This is particularly true when a declarant is available for cross-examination. Both of these 
reform issues are expanded upon in Chapter Four. 
Lastly, the theme of unequal treatment characterizes the residuai discretion outlined in R. 
v. Kalisa and R. v. Folland. These cases depict a concern for the doctrine of an accused's 
right to fiil1 answer and defence unbalanced against the essentiaI requirement of 
reliability . This theme is presented as an extension to the disparity presented in Chapter 
Two, specifically the courts resolution of the conflicted interests of the male accused and 
the fernale sexual assault complainant. 
CaAPTER FOUR: REFORMS 
(A) Introduction 
Chapters Two and Three show that the criminal justice systern has failed to provide fernale 
victim's of violent crime equal treatment within our coum. The quai treatrnent warranted 
t O remedy t his situation, under section 1 5 of the C ' e r ,  is a criminal justice system tbat 
accommodates their differences and prevents the violation of their essential human dignity 
and fieedom.' As well, situations have b a n  identifieci that prevent or dissuade fernales 
from accessing the criminal justice system entirely. If femde complainants decide to 
initiate contact with the criminal justice system they oAen end up feeling powerless and 
largely ignored in the process. The consistent stumbling block to meaninfil and impartial 
access for women has corne as result of the criminal justice system's failure to 
contextualize the issues that confiont some female victims when they have been involved 
in violent crimes such as senid assaults or physical abuse within a domestic relationship. 
This recognized problem accounts for, at lest in a partial sense, why women under report 
these types of crimes and why when they do become involved as prosecution witnesses, 
they are fiequently reluctant to participate in the judicial process. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, complainants of sexual assault who have sought out 
'See Andrews v. Lmv Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) at 
1 0 and 1 3; and Law v. Minister oflitman Resourees Development File No. : 2% 74, 
judgement March 25, 1999 (S.C.C.) at 13, for thorough discussions of the meaning of 
legal equality. 
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counselling and/or therapy to assist them in their healing process are often confionted, 
during the trial process, with the dilemma of having their confidential counselling remrds 
disclosed to the court and perhaps even counsel for the accused. We have seen that when 
the C h e r  rights of these two individuais come into confikt with each other, the male 
accused's rights to fùll answer and defence have been balanced above, or given a priority 
over, the femaie complainant's rights to privacy and equality2 This chapter suggests a 
reform that may assist women in the criminal litigation process. The key to this refonn is 
the recognition of the signifiant h m  that flows to a sexual assault complainant fkom 
either the delaying of treatment or the intemption of the counselling process. The reform 
examined is judicial notice of the h m  that flows fiom the disdosure of these extremely 
sensitive materials and how this legal pnnciple should be used in conjunction with BiU C- 
463 for the determination of the issue of relevance of these records. 
With regards to rectiijing the criminal justice system's response to the prosecution and 
deterrence of men who physicaiiy abuse their femaie partners, this chapter suggests 
reforms that will account for the complexity of the many variables connected with this 
dangerous and widespread social practice. On the treatment side of the issue, it is 
postulated that the caretùl and individual contextualization of domestic assault matters is 
the key to success. Once the needs of both the complainant and the accused are properly 
'Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 8, and 1 5, Part 1 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Cana& Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1 1. 
3Criminal Code, R.S., c. C-46 [hereinafter Bill C-463. 
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and professionally assesseci, appropriate responses can be formulated. In this chapter, 
strengths of the restorative justice xheme are examined and molded to fit the 
transfomative needs of couples that wish to resurrect a heaithy domatic relationship fiom 
one t hat is dangerously dysfùnctional. 
(B) The Disclosure o f  Sexual Assauft Compfainant's Counselling Records 
1. Judicial Notice 
In this section the principle ofjudicial notice is described. Following this an argument is 
presented that judicial notice could, and should, be used in a court's assessrnent of an 
accused's application for the disclosure of  a complainant's counselling records. To 
articulate this position a review of the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts 
is undertaken. An important component of this distinction, specifically the role ofjudges 
as law makers is highlighted. Two options to incorporate this principle to the issue of 
disclosure has been presented in this materiai. The first is one based on legai precedents 
and the second is founded in principle. To fbrther this position a brief presentation of a 
case that deals with the issue of the judicial interpretive process connected to a section 1 
Charter determination has been provided. As well, a number of cases that address the 
issue of how the courts have dealt with the issues of racial prejudice, judicial notice and 
the jury selection process have been briefed. Lastly, to  support the principled rationaie, the 
relevant sections of Bill C-46 have been exsmined to help conclude the usenilnesi of this 
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reasoning to the dilemma of the disclosure of sexual assault complainant's counselling 
record. 
The law in Canada regarding judicial notice is that a fact which is generaily known and 
accepted such that it cannot be reasonably questioned need not be formally proven in 
court. It is a type of fact which is notoriously "known to intelligent persons generally4 Ife 
fact is not known and accepted it may still qualie as a fact that judicial notice can be taken 
of, if it can be verified in a source whose accuracy cannot be questioned.' 
The issue then becomes how, if at dl, can this legd principfe be applied to the hann that 
flows corn the opening and the disclosing of the contents of a sexud assault complainant's 
counselling records? At first glance, the jurisprudence in the area is not overly helpfùl. For 
example, the courts have traditionally rejected the notion of taking judiciai notice of 
previously accepted scientific knowledge and the evidence of experts given in other 
judicial pr~ceedings.~ Similarly, the courts have been retuctant to admit scientific 
5 ~ .  Sopinka, N. Lederman and A. Bryant, 7k Lmu of Evidence in CPnrrrb (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1992) at 976. For example judicial notice cm be taken of the existence of a 
provincial legal aid system; see R. v. Cobhani (1993), 92 C.C.C. (3d) 333 (S.C.C.). See 
also R. v. Ports (1 982), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 2 19 (Ont. C.A.). 
6R V. K (S.) (1 99 l), 6 C.R. (4th) 373 (Ont. C.A.); a trail judge could not take judicial 
notice of a "cultural disinclination" of a Native Canadian sexual assault cornplainant to 
relive past unpleasant experiences. R v. Dickson (1973), 5 N.S.R (2d) 240 (N.S.C.A.); a 
trial judge could not take judicial notice of the period and process of absorption of dcohol 
in the human body. 
positions, reports or literature on a particular matter that hm not been tendered into 
evidence by one of the panies before that coun.' This is partiailady tme of ''social f d '  
directly relevant to the dispute before the c o u d  Thus, relying only on the traditional 
position that the courts have taken regarding the acceptance of facts based on judicial 
notice and not on evidence tendered by one or more of the parties to the litigation, the 
likelihood of judges king  allowed to take judicial notice of a fact such as the 
psychological harm that flows fiom the opening and disclosing of therapeutic records is 
not particularly favourabie. 
However, when we examine the principle itself and how it has been expanded in other 
areas, such as the jury selection process, some exciting possibilities emerge. To begin our 
examination we should consider the American treatment ofjudicial notice. The law in the 
United States has clearly distinguished between two different types of fact; adjudicative 
facts and legislative factse9 Adjudicative faas rre those facts that relate to issues that are 
unique to the case being heard by a court. These types of faas relate to the specific parties 
'R V. Pante11 (1995), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 83 (Ont. C.A.); R v. Desatdniers (1994), 93 C.C.C. 
(3d) 371 (Que. C.A.) at 377; reference by a judge, on his own initiative and without there 
being any suggestion on behalf of the parties, to a scientific work or report which sets out 
opinions of experts, constitutes an error in law, leave to appeal to S.C.C. retiised (1994), 
95 C.C.C. (3d) vi. 
'Cronk v. Canadion General Insurance Co. (1995), 128 D.L.R. (4th) 147 (Ont. CA); the 
assumption of a motions court judge, that clerical employees were able to obtain 
employment more easily than management, was beyond the scope ofjudicial notice. 
'Sec K. Davis, " Judicial Notice" (1% 5) 55 Columbia Law Review 945. See also 29 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Evidence at paragraphs 27 to 30 for a for a review of the types of facts related to 
judicial notice. 
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and their actions that make up the subject matter of the litigation. On the other han4 
legidative facts relate to determinations on questions of law or policy. Legislative faas 
assist a court in interpreting the content of legal niles and their application to the issues 
before the court. 
This distinction has been similarly recognized by Canadian academics. For instance, D. 
Paciocco and L. Stuesser note that adjudicative facts refers to the facts that must be 
determined in a specific case. On the other hand, they describe legislative facts as: 
those that have relevance to legal reasoning and the law making policy. They are 
not directed at resolving a specific factual issue in the case before the court. 
Rather, they are resorted to when the courts are asked to make law, which is a 
matter that transcends the pmicular dispute and is of general social irnportan~e.'~ 
An example of this process is when a court is called upon to determine the constitution ai 
validity of a law under section 1 of the Charter or when it is asked to interpret legislation. 
To effectively complete this task, the courts rely upon a wide range of social science 
research and study." It has been put foward here that the courts, as they interpret Bill C- 
46, should take judicial notice of the legislative facts linked to the ramifications of the 
opening and disclosing a sexual assault complainant's private counselling records. We 
shall return to this mornentarily, but first another distinction in the types of facts should be 
'"D. Paciocco and L. Stuesser, The Law of Evidence (Concord Ont.: INiin Law, 1996) at 
246. See also S. Schiff, Evidence in the Litigution Prucess. 3 rd. ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 
1988) vol. 2 at 661 to 713. 
"fiid. at 246. See also C. L'Heureux-Dube, "Re-examining the Doctrine of Judiciai 
Notice in the Family Law Context" (1994) 26 Ottawa Law Review 55 1 at 554. 
reviewed. 
Two other American academics have taken the distinctions one step fùrther. L. Walker 
and J. Monahan, describe three related categories of facts; social authority, social fiame 
work and social facts.I2 Social authority, describes situations wherein social science is used 
to establish or interpret the law in some fashion. They compare its use by courts as le@ 
precedent because bath social science and legal precedents have ramifications for other 
members of society beyond the immediate litigants to a legal conflict. h this way social 
authority parallels the principles of legislative facts. When social science research is used 
to resolve a conflict specific to individual litigants, it is categorized as a social fact. This is 
obviously similar to adjudicative facts. The third category of facts, social fiamework, is a 
combination of the first two, and is used to describe the facts that flow fiom social science 
research that creates a background of social context to assist a coun in the determination 
of a specific dispute particular to individual litigant~.'~ This category of social framework 
could aiso apply to the issue of the hann and its impact on a specific sexual assault 
"I. Monahan and L. Walker, "Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and Establishg 
Social Science in Law" (1986) 134 U. Pa. Law Review 477. This work advances the 
thesis that "social science research, when used to create a legal nile, is more analogous to 
'Iaw' than to 'fact' and hence should be treated much as the courts treat legal precedent." 
at 478. 
"These descriptions are a summary of C. L'Heureux-Dubé's review of L. Walker and 1. 
Monahan's work, supra note 12 at 555 to 556. See also L. Walker and J. Monahan, 
"Empirical Questions without Empirical Answers" (1 99 1) Wisconsin Law Review 569. 
This article examines the problems that couris encounter when empirical questions do not 
have empincal answers and offers suggestions on how courts should proceed in the 
absence of data. 
cornplainant who has counselling records and wishes to keep the contents of those records 
private. 
Related to this, C. L' Heureux-Dubé points to the fiindamentai role that the judges must 
play in the evolution of legal principles to help clarifj. the distinction. She notes that if 
stwe decisis was applied without consideration for the evolution of context changes 
within society the law would quickly fail in its goal to maintain order through public 
respect." This is why the Canadian couris have traditionally b a n  recognlled as playing a 
policy making role in the administration of justice rat her than merely designated a passive 
role in the detennination of what the law is based exclusively on precedents. Also, since 
the courts do perform such a role, the decisions made by judges must be subject to 
appellate scrutiny. Related to these issues, she wrote: 
The way in which the role of the court is perceived can, in tum, very much affect 
the way in which the doctrine of judicial notice is conceptuaiized. The more couns 
acknowledge t heir active contribution to law making, the greater becornes both 
their duty and their need to lay bare the policy assumptions upon which their 
decisions are based. 
On the other hand, if courts deny their law making role, then they deny Our judicial 
system the ability to monitor that role. Unfortunately, however, a by-product of 
imposing strict rules on the taking of judicial notice is that such rules discourage 
courts fiom admitting that they use it. As a consequence, underlying questions of 
policy are obfLscated by a masic of "legai principles."Principles formulated on such 
a basis, in tum, may lead to illogical applications in subsequent cases. Judicial 
notice must not be a convenient means by which courts can escape examination of 
"One example that was developed in this regard was the principled approach of hearsay 
exceptions in R v. K h r  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 53 and R v. i3.fK.G.) (1993), 79 C.C.C. (36) 
257 (S.C.C.). This policy evolution was discussed in Chapter Three. 
their underlying policy assumptions.lJ 
As indicated earlier, there are also precedents fiom the Supreme Court of Canada to 
support a court's reliance on reliable information through the doctrine ofjudicial notice to 
assist in its section 1 Charter rights violation scrutiny. For example, in R v. lMvm& 
Books. La Forest J., held: 
1 do not accept that in deaiing with broad social and econornic facts such as those 
involved here the Court is necessarily bound to rely solely on those presented by 
counsel. The admonition in O a k  and other cases to present evidence in Charter 
cases does not remove fiom the courts the power, where it deems it expedient, to 
take judicial notice of broad social and econornic facts and to take the necessary 
steps to infonn itself about them.16 
Beyond Charter cases, the Courts have also examined the issue of judicial notice and the 
existence of racial prejudice in society as it is related to the legal process ofjuror selection. 
In R v. ParkslT the Ontario Court of Appeal determined that a court could take judicial 
notice of the fact that racism does exist in Our society. This type of fact determination 
would fall within either the categorization of legislative fact or of a social authority fact, 
"C. L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 1 1 at 558. See also S. SchiK Evidence in the Litigution 
Process, 3 rd ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) vol. 2 at 682 for a discussion of the role of 
the judiciary in making law. 
I6R. V. Ectwards B& di Art Ltd , [1986] 2 S.C.R. 7 13 at 804. This case dealt with the 
Charter right fieedom of religion and whether provincial legislation that required Sunday 
closings would withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Court held that the legislation was 
enacted for the secular purpose of providing a uniform holiday for retail workers. It 
examined the legislation in Iight of its contextual purpose. 
17(1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 87 C.C.C. 
(3d) vi. See also R v. Willis (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 350 (Ont. C.A.). 
described above. This case involved a black male that was chuged with second degree 
murder. It was alleged that he was also a drug dealer and that the white deceased was a 
cocaine user. The killing m r r e d  during a fight between the two parties that enapted 
during a dnig transaction. Of significance here was the tnal judge's determination as to the 
appropriateness of the accused king allowed to question potential jurors about any 
preconceived racial biases that would impact on their ability to be impartial jurors. The 
Court of Appeal held that the accused should have been allowed to question potential 
jurors if the facts of this case, specifically that the accused was black and the deceased was 
white, would affect their impartiality. It is important to note that no evidence was calleci 
by either party at trial to support the position that racial prejudice did exist in the 
community fiom which the potential jurors were selected or that any of the jurors that did 
decide the case were impartial due to racial prejudice. In coming to their conclusion the 
Court relied on a number of social science studies and references dealing with racial 
prejudice in Canada. Doherty J.A., writing for the majority noted that: 
The existence and the extent of racial bias are not issues which cari be establïsheà 
in the manner normally associated with the proof of adjudicative facts. Unlike 
claims of partiality based on pre-trial publicity, the source of the alleged racial 
prejudice cannot be identified. There are no specific media reports to examine, and 
no circulation figures to consider. There is, however, an ever growing body of 
studies and reports docurnenting the extent and intensity of racist beliefs in 
contemporary Canadian society." 
The Court al so went on to articulate a costhenefit analysis of the decision to allow 
empaneled jurors to be questioned on issues of racial prejudice that could effect their 
%id. at 366. No fewer than nine Canadian reporis or studies are cited in the decision, in 
addition to a number of American works. 
217 
impartiality. The only cost noted was a "small increase in the length of the trial."19 On the 
benefit side three advantages were noted. First, that a potential juror, who would 
discriminate against an accused because of racial prejudice, could be eliminated fiom the 
juiy. Second, al1 potential jurors are sensitized fiom the beginning of the process that 
racial biases must not be a factor in their fact finding mission. And third, that allowing 
such a question enhances the appearance of triai furness in the mind of the acc~sed .~  
The fact of racial prejudice was aiso examined in the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. 
Williams. *' This case involved allegations that resulted in an aboriginal person king 
charged with robbery. At the second trial the judge disallowed a challenge for cause 
question, based on possible racial prejudice against aboriginal persons, to be put to the 
potential jurors. The Supreme Court held that a question testing for such a bias should 
have been allowed because there existed a redistic potential of partiality. The matter was 
retumed for a new trial. McLachlin J. writing for the Court, addressed the matter of 
judicial notice. Relying on the Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant text, she held: 
The existence of racial prejudice in the conununity may be a notorious fact within 
the first branch of the rule.. . .Widespread racial prejudice, as a characteristic of the 
community, may therefore sometimes be the subject of judicial notice. Moreover, 
once a finding of fact of widespread racial prejudice in the conununity is made on 
evidence, as here, judges in subsequent cases may be able to take judicial notice of 
Iglbid at 379. Note that the Court did not rely on a costhenefit analysis in coming to its 
conclusion, stating that "faimess cannot ultimately be measured on a balance sheet." at 
379. 
"(1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.). 
the fact. "The fact that a certain fact or matter has been noted by a judge of the 
sarne court in a previous matter has p rden t i a l  value and it is, therefore, usefiil 
for counsel and the court to examine the case law when attempting to detennine 
whet her any particular fact can be noted." It is dso possible that events and 
documents of indisputable accuracy may permit judicial notice to be taken of 
widespread racism in the cornmunit. under the second branch of the nale.* 
This issue was recently revisited R v. Koh? In this case the accused Chinese men, Msiting 
Canada fiom Singapore, were charged with conspiracy to import heroin for the purposes 
of traficking and other related charges. The trid judge retùsed to allow the accused to 
question potential jurors by asking: "Would the fact that the accused are persons of 
Chinese origin and visitors fkom Singapore affect your ability to judge the evidence f&ly 
and without prejudice?' M e r  being convicted at trial the men appealed and the Ontario 
Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding that a question related to their membership in 
a visible racial minority should have been allowed. The issue ofjudicial notice regarding 
racial attitudes was specifically addressed. Finlayson J.A., held that: 
Although the trial judge was entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that there is 
a substantial population of persons of Asian origin in the comrnunity, it is my 
opinion that he was not entitled to take judicial notice of the "fact" that Chinese 
people are judged individually and are not classed as a race.*' 
The rationale for this position was that the unentitled fact did not fall within either of the 
two categories set out initially in this section, a notonous fact or one that can 
demonstrated as accurate fiorn an indisputable source. Regardless, racism against visible 
=lbid at 502. See also I. Sopinka, S. Lederman and A. Biyant, The Dnu of Evidence in 
Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) at 977. 
" (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 668 (Ont. C.A.). 
241bid at 674. 
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minorities has been held to be a ~ O ~ O ~ O U S  f a a u  Additiondly, Finlayson J.A. provided 
obiter dicta to the effect : 
My suggestion that the courts in this jurisdiction may now take judiciai notice that 
reasonable persons must be taken to be aware of the history of discrimination 
against visible minorities finds practical support in the reality that an accused wiil 
oflen face insurmountable difficulties in marshalling evidence to meet the threshold 
test with respect to individual minonties of c ~ l o u r . ~  
Thus, in this review of the current state of the law as it relates to the judicial notice of 
racism for visible minorities, a trend is revealed indicating the willingness of Canadian 
courts to rely on social science research, as well the social realities that exist, to make 
common sense policy based interpretations of legal pnnciples to increase trial faimess - at 
least for accused persons. This has been achieved through the legal principle ofjudicial 
notice. 
Applying this reasoning to promote a jurisprudential argument for the purpose of the 
expansion of judicial notice principles to include the harm that flows fiom the disclosure of 
a sexual assault complainant's counselling records and thereby increase trial fairness for 
female witnesses, one must consider the courts' discussions regarding the types of facts 
the can be included in the principle of judicial notice? For exarnple, it was held "judiciai 
''Ibid at 678. See also R v. WiIIims (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) at 502. 
261bid at 680. The Court also held that to require each visible minority to adduce evidence 
in support of an application to be dlowed to question a potential juror about racial 
prejudices would be inconsistent with section 1 l(d) of the Charter that ensure everyone's 
right to a fair and impartial tribunal. 
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notice is permissibie where previous courts have proven a m a i n  facVn Therefore, ifit 
has been established that in the case of racial prejudice, once one court has made a finding 
of fact as to its existence and the potential for injustice that could flow fiom this, and that 
subsequent courts may also be able to take judicial notice of this fact, then the argument 
can be made that once one court has made a finding of fact that a significant harm does 
flow tiom breaching the privacy of a cornplainant undertaking therapy or wunselling, then 
other courts may find as a fact that these types of intrusion could have a similar impact on 
al1 women complainants. This judicial notice would allow the triai courts, charged with the 
responsibility of detennining the disclosure of these sensitive records, to assess the issues 
in a more equal and consistent fashion. It would help provide a context to distinguish these 
types of material fiom other fonns of disclosure. Moreover, it would give significance to 
the wording of legislation that sets out the conditions and factors that must be weighed in 
the courts determination of the issue and the balancing of the competing interests of the 
male accused and the female complainant. 
From a principled perspective, it c m  be maintained the legislation created to address the 
production of complainant's counselling records must be interpreted by the courts. To do 
so, it is argued, the courts charged with the responsibility to assess these applications 
should be allowed to consider, or take judicial notice, of certain "legislative facts." In 
particular, it is suggested that when one examines Bill C-46 in its entirety (as was done in 
Chapter Two) its purpose becornes quite clear. It is an exhaustive guide for the courts that 
*'Md. at 679; R. v. Williams, supra note 25 at 502. 
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are requested to  balance the wmpeting interests and legal rights o f  the accused and the 
complainant. 
Therefore, when the courts are asked to interpret Bill C- 46, it is suggested that they 
could, and should, take judicial notice o f  the harm that flows fiom the invasion o f  a semal 
assault complainant's private cuunselling records. It should be r d l e d  that it has becn 
argued previously that this h m  has two components; the first is iinked to the individuai 
complainant whose course of treatment is intempted and her willingness t o  access justice 
in the criminal courts affecteci, and the second is connected to the chilling effect that the 
possibility of disclosure has on other women who have been victimized by sexual violence 
to corne forward with their complaints. It is argued that this form ofjudiciai notice would 
fall within the parameters of a "legislative fact" and as such the courts could rely on social 
science research and impact studies in their determination of this disclosure issue. Through 
this analysis, both the insufficient grounds set out in section 278.3 (4) and the factors to  be 
considered set out in section 278.5 (2) would then be interpreted in a context that 
recognizes the type of injuries that are caused by a sexual violation as well as the intimate 
nature of  these counselling records. 
More specifically, section 278.3(4) prohibits a court fiom making inferences of relevance 
on certain facts alone. These facts, presented in fbll in Chapter Two, include the mere fact 
that a counselling record exists, that it relates to  the incident that is the subject matter of 
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the criminal triai, or that the record may relate to the credibility of the complainant." As 
well, section 278.5(2) sets out permissible factors that must be considered by a judge 
reviewing such a disclosure application. The factors that arguably require some level of 
attentiveness to legislative facts include whether the production of the record is based on a 
discriminatory belief or bias (indistinguishable fiom racial prejudice that has been judicially 
noticed); society' s interest in encwraging the reporting of sexuai offences; society 's 
interest in encouraging the treatment of sexud assault complainants; and the impact of the 
determination of the issue on the integrity of the trial process? in shon, as the accu& 
attempts to tender sufficient evidence of reievance to persuade a court that he has 
established that the counselling record is likely relevant to an issue at trial and that the 
production of the said record is necessary in the interests o f ju s t i~e ,~  the coun mun 
consider both the individual impact on the complainant and societal impact of the request 
in making its findings. 
This wouid allow for a more contextuai appreciation of the impact that such disclosure 
orders have, not only on the female witness's opportunity to advance through the healing 
process, but also enhance the equal treatment of al1 complainants. Additionally, this 
judicial recognition and the resulting protection of a nght to privacy may also hopefblly 
increase women's wiIlingness to avail themselves of justice through the criminal trial 
"Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C46, [hereinafter Criminal Code] section 278.3(4). 
29Criminal Code, section 278.5 (2) (d), (0, (g) and (h). 
30Criminal Code, section 278.5 (1) (b) and (c). 
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process. Obviously, women complainants' treatment in the criminal justice system requires 
the preliminary step of a decision by those complainants to access justice in the criminal 
courts. 
(C) Domestic Assault 
Due to the complexities of the domestic assault problem in our society, any meaningfùl 
reform must include a CO-ordinated and collaborative effort of al1 interested stakeholders 
in the criminal justice system. These stakeholders include investigators, heaith care 
providers, prosecutors, defence counsel, judges, treatment professionals, and probation 
and parole service providers. As well, outside of the criminal justice system, the input fiom 
other individuals who are committed to preventing domestic violence, such as those 
individuals running the wornen shelters, academics and researchers, must also be 
considered. A multi system and well orchestrated approach is required to put an end to 
this oppressive form of violence. The reforms examined here should be contemplated not 
as alternatives to each other but rather as a variety of options that need to work union 
with each other if reai change is to occur and lives are to be saved. 
1. Unified Court 
As was pointed out in the lut  chapter, a significant problem that arises frequently in the 
prosecution of domestic assault charges is the complainant's unwiliingness to cooperate 
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with the process. The criminal justice system's response of  leniency coupled with 
education and counselling for the remorsefiil and contrite accused is an important and 
progressive step forward to  assisting the femaie partner caught in a cycle of violence who 
wishes to remedy the dilemma and maintain a safe relationship. 
There are two basic types of court mandated treatment programs for mafes who physically 
abuse their female partners. The first is the type that has been implemented in Brampton, 
Ontario. This model has been described by some as "pretrial diversion."" In this style of 
response, an accused can avoid a criminal conviction or perhaps have his charge and 
sentence reduced on the successhl completion of a treatment program. The second 
initiative type is requiring a male party attend a court sanctioned treatment program as 
part of a sentence imposed aller conviction. This model has been implemented in the 
Toronto K  COU^ response. Failing to complete either program presents a difficulty for 
both models although, as discussed earlier, more so for the prettial diversion response 
because of the ramifications of sarne on the eventual prosecution of the charges. Few 
studies have been completed to discover whether o r  not the form of mandating treatment 
has any impact on the completion of the prograrns and the resulting effects on recidivism. 
D. Saunders and J. Parker did find that about two-thirds of the men who undertook 
"National Research Council, N. Crowell and A. Burgess 4s.. Uderstanding Violence 
Agairwt Women (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996) at  122. This terrn is 
perhaps inappropnate because the passing of  rn tence  still takes place within the aiMd 
courts and as such the accused is not diverted out of the criminal justice system, as is the 
case for other crimes such as shoplifting. Restorative justice principles urge that, in some 
cases, true prettiai diversion prograrns should be given an opportunity t o  s u c d  where 
traditional criminal justice responses have failed. 
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treatment because of coun orders completed the program, compared to two-fifths of the 
men who started treatment that was not COUR ordered?' These findings suggest that more 
research is needed to determine the cause and effect relationship between how one is 
channeled into a program and its impact on completion rates. 
Regardless of the relationship, it is important to note that a significant number of men do 
fail to complete treatment programs and it is suggested that a response must be planneci 
for the accused who is unwilling to complete a treatrnent prograrn. To rely on the 
conventional approach of prosecution for this type of offence is unwise, primariiy due to 
the issues connected with a recanting witness. Therefore, in addition to pretrial diversion 
rnodel, what is also needed is a diligent prosecution model, such as the K Court initiative. 
In this way the criminal justice system can, in the appropriate circumstances (for example 
where minimal levels of violence are alleged) ailow an accused to admit responsibility and 
then be treated for the violent behaviour in an environment of CO-operation. However, 
when an accused is given the opportunity to modie his behaviour and fails to complete his 
counselling, an option of diligent prosecution must also exist. As well, a collaborative 
effort is required by investigators, prosecutors and probation and parole service providers 
to ensure violent offenders are brought to justice and deterreci fiom recidivism. 
'*D. Saunders and J. Parker, "Legal Sanctions and Treatment Follow-through Among Men 
Who Batter: A Multivariate Analysis" (1989) September, Sociai Work Research and 
Abstracts, 2 1. 
2. Restorative Justice / Transformative Justice 
i. Language 
In this section the concepts C O M ~ C ~ ~  with the broader philosophy of restorative justice 
are exarnined. Once this is completed these ideas are analyzed to determine whether or not 
they have a role in reforming the dificulties associated with the prosenition of domestic 
assault cases, described in chapter three. However, ôefore this can be cornmenced it 
should be re-emphasized that, as it was set out in chapter one, the language used to 
describe an issue brings with it certain notions and connotations for both the reader 
assimilating the information as well for the author describing the features of the particular 
issue. The common understanding of the word "restore" implies a return to  an earlier held 
position or status. It should not be the goal of any criminai justice response to restore, or 
return a female victim back into, a relationship and environment where violence of any 
kind is used by one partner to control another. In short, the restoration of a violent 
relationship is obviously a non-starter. The word "transfomative" is far more acceptable 
as it connotes, at least to this author, a positively changed or irnproved relationship 
uninhibited by violence. It suggests a non-violent rmnciliation. Yet, it is also a specific 
term that D. Moore and J. McDonald have applied a specific meaning to." 
33This term has been adopted by a movement CO-founded by David Moore and John 
McDonald in 1 995. Transformative Justice Australia has as its primary emp hasis, 
collective engagement, emotional transformation and social support, rather than on shame, 
reintegrat ive or ot herwise. See online: Transformat ive Justice Australia 
<http://www.tja.corn.au/menu.htm> (date accessed: 15 June 1999). 
Phitosophically, they have described "transformative justice" as a: 
practical philosophy that sees crime as a violation of people and the relationships 
between them. It V ~ W S  the conflict resulting fiom crime as an opportunity to 
achieve transformative healing for al1 those affécted. Transformative justice sees 
problems beginning not only with the crime but also with the causes of crimes. It 
employs processes that treat the incident as a transformative relational and 
educational opponunity for victims, offenders, and ali other members of the 
affected community. Transformative processes must therefore employ mechanisrns 
for building and repairing human relation~hips.~ 
Transformative justice advocates believe that the mechanisms used to impose social 
regdation should be based on an understanding of human motivation on both the 
"intrapersonal and interpersonal" level. Therefore, it's primary focus for reform is 
understanding the emotional basis of a confiict and its transformation into something 
inherently better. Thus, although the term itself may have a more appeasing tone to it, it 
also has connected to it a specific process and airn different fiom restorative justice 
paradigms and should not be conflsed. Still, the criticisms of restorative justice pnnciples, 
as they apply to repairing violent domestic relationships, may apply equally to these 
principles, that urge a community based response to domestic violence. Regardless, the 
purpose here is to outline the appropriateness of the nomenclature so that when references 
are made to restorative justice concepts it should be inferrecl that the aim of the reforms 
discussed here are reconciliatory or transformative in nature rather than restorative. 
%lbid. at TJA Philosophy (date accessed: 15 June 1999). 
ii. The Restorativt Justice Philosophy 
An effective way to appreciate the philosophy of restorative justice is to juxtapose its 
principle next to  the conventional criminal justice response to  crime, o r  what Kent Roach 
described as a "punitive model."" He explained the distinctions around the role that the 
victims of  crime piayed in each paradigm: 
A punitive model of victims' rights promoted the power of the traditional agents of 
crime control - legislatures, police and prosecutors - while not necessarily 
empowering crime victims and potential victims." 
A non-punitive model o f  victims' rights based on crime prevention and restorative 
justice presented a far more radical challenge to the criminal justice system than 
due process or punitive forms of victims' rights." 
This distinction is a focus for the Nova Scotia Restorative Justice ~rograrn.* It described 
the conventional approach as an "adversariai system" that defines crime as a violation of 
rules that btings about harm to the state. In this system the victim does not play a p n m q  
role in resolution and the offender, if convicted, is blamed, stigrnatized and punished. 
Contrary to this, a restorative justice model presents victims as central to the criminal 
justice system's process of both defining harm and how it might be repaired. In a forum 
"K. Roac h, Lhe Proces and Victims ' Rights: 7he N~ov Luw and Politics of Crimiml 
Jm~ice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 999). This work is primarily concerned 
with how the system's stakeholders, including legislators, judges, interest groups, and the 
media have defined certain criminal justice issues and its ideologies. 
'%lova Scotia Department of Justice, A Progron for Nova Sçotia: Resîoratzve Justice 
(Halifax: Department of Justice, 1998). 
that encourages repentance and forgiveness, restorative justice relies on community 
involvernent to hold the offender accountable and to provide that offender with the 
opportunity to make amends. Critically, the victim is given the chance to play an active 
role in determining a resolution to the offen~e.'~ In this fùndamentai shiA both the primary 
goals (the reduction of recidivism and increased victim satisfaction) as well as the 
secondary goals (strengthened cornrnunity suppon and increased public confidence in the 
criminal justice system) are emphasi~ed.~ 
However, it is significant to note that Nova Scotia's Restorative Justice Program has 
recognized the ongoing debate taking place in Canada regarding the appropriateness for 
domestic violence and sexual assault offences being included within the reaim of this 
justice system. The primary focus for this concern is the "possible power imbalance 
between the victim and the offender in a restorative forum."" As a result, these types of 
offences will oniy be considered as appropnate for post-conviction, pre-sentence and post- 
sentence restorative justice "entry point" considerations. 
'Wova Scotia Depart ment of Justice, A Program for Nova Scotia: Restorative Justice 
(Halifax: Department of Justice, 1998) at 2. For an extensive review of these principles see 
J. Llewellyn and R. Howse, "Restorative Justice - A Conceptual Frarnework" (Prepared 
for the Law Commission of Canada) online: < http://.lcc.gc.ca/en/papers/how~c.htd~ 
(date accessed: 15 June 1999). 
Some of these restorative justice issues were recently examineci by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R v. Glcldue." This case involved an aboriginal femde accuseci, who pled 
guilty to one count of rnanslaughter after she stabbed her cornmon law spouse twice, once 
in the chest and once in the m. She was sentenceci to three years of imprisonment. Both 
the British CoIumbia Court of Appeal and the Suprerne Court of Canada dismisseci her 
appeal related to the fitness of her sentence. Ofsignificance here is the  Courts discussion 
of sentencing principles, particularly those related to restorative justice. Cory and 
Iacobucci JJ. writing for the Court, considered the parameters of S. 718.2(e) of the 
Criminal Code" and its application to the facts before the Court. Section 718.2 sets out 
the princi ples of sentencing, including: 
(e) al1 available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the 
circumstances should be considered for al1 offenders, with particular attention to 
the circumstances of aboriginal offenders?' 
The Court recognized the concept and pnnciples of restorative justice as a form of 
community-based sanctionhg and that these notions would develop over time in the 
jurispmdence. The Court, in recognition of the concept wrote: 
In general terms, restorative justice may be described as an approach to  remedying 
crime in which it is understood that al1 things are interrelated and that crime 
disnipts the harmony which existed prior to  its occurrence, or at l e s t  which it is 
felt should exist. The appropriateness of a particular sanction is largely determined 
by the needs of the victim, the comrnunity, as well as the offender." 
*'[1999] S.C.J. No. 19. 
' 3 ~ . ~ . ~ . ,  1985. c. C-46, Part XXIII [repl. 1995, c. 22, s.61, s.718 (2). 
%id 
*'R v. Gludie. st~pra note 42 at paragraph 7 1. 
Thus it cm be said that the restorative justice is a philosophical tiamework or a new 
method of looking at criminal behaviour and conflia. It extends the concept of crime from 
a personal viewpoint to that of a collective societal perspective. It places much of the 
responsibility of confîict resolution back within the comrnunity." 
iii. Application to Domestic Assaults 
It is important to note that, for the most part, the pnnciples discussed to this point have 
not been exclusively directed at domestic violence. They have been examined fiom a non- 
specific criminal conduct perspective. The issue now debated is whether or not they have 
an applicability to domestic assault offences. To answer this question we must retum to 
the concept of context. It is contended that there may be a place for these kinds of 
initiatives in a limited type of domestic violence, but there are some significant hurdles that 
must be overcome once it can be ascertained that they are an effective means of reducing 
domestic violence occurrences. 
Applying these broad restorative justice principles to the social dilemma of domestic 
assadt one must contemplate how well this victim based approach contextualizes the 
position and needs of an abused female partner, as well as the possible causes and 
consequences of her part ner's awessive conduct. If she wishes to have her legal rights 
46Nova Scotia Department of Justice, supra note 38 at 2 and 1 1. 
protected and personal safety ensured through the prosecution of an offence then those 
wishes must be at a minimum be assessed - ifnot adhered to. If a cornplainant desires that 
her abuser should face conventional criminal sanctions, such as detemence through 
conviction, incarceration or some less severe fom of punishrnent, then her best interests 
must not be presumed and her situation delegated to a perceived second class tier of 
criminal j~sticc.~' 
Assuming that this component of the victims needs are correctly assessed, some academics 
believe that because the philosophy of restorative justice is focused on "restoration and 
prevention" and provides for "healing, empowerment, forgiveness, and an identity that is 
richer for not being circumscribed by victimization" it is well suited to reducing incidents 
of domestic violence.4* The oppomnity to place the domestic assault victim at the centre 
of the process is key, as K. Roach explains: 
Unlike in the punitive victims' rights, crime-control, or due process models, the 
victim's decision not to invoke the criminal process deserves respect unless it can 
be show that it only reflects coercion or the inadequacies of the present 
system ... .An important step here is to define victims as the best judges of their own 
interests and not to see their actions as a product of learned helplessness." 
Two other academics share this perspective. J. Braithwaite and K. Daly have developed a 
47 See S. Merry, Gerting Justice and Getting Even (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1990). The issue of the potential for cultural domination of women's legal rights is 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
"K. Roach, supra note 3 5 at 37. 
'%. Roach, supra note 3 5 at 33. 
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comrnunity-based response to domestic violence- They propose a "comrnunity confèrence7'> 
in which the sanctioning principle of shaming is stnictured ïnto a process that requires the 
victim and her supporters to be included. The aim of  reintegration of the offender is 
accomplished through the participation of his farnily and fiiends. This conference is then 
placed at the bottom mng of a hierarchy of  a series of increasingly severe and punitive 
initiatives (ultimately including incarceration) to combat domestic violence." 
To analyse these positions we must return to ow central theme of context. Here context is 
focused on what considerations are made for the specifk causes and consequences of the 
violent behaviour. For example, how responsive is a psychological or an alcohol related 
aggression to the deterrent of shame? Where is the particular victim to be located on the 
escalating s a l e  of severity with regards to the violence and what type of nsk to ftrther 
h m  is she currently facing if forced to be a central figure in a deterring process? What if 
the victim is trapped in a cycle of violence that has affected her judgement such that she 
believes their own couple-based solution is a tenable cure? One author and researcher who 
is skeptical about the potential of restorative justice as a panacea for domestic violence is 
J. Stubbs. 
'7. Braithwaite and K. Daly, "Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian Controi" in T. 
Newburn and E. Stanko eds., Just Boys Doing Busines: Men, Mascuinis, and Crime 
(London: Routledge, 1994) as cited by J. Stubbs, "'Communitarian' Coderencing and 
Violence Against Women: A Cautionary Note" in M. Valverde et ai., eds., Wije AsrcltlIr 
and the Crimirmi Justice System: Issues and Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 
1995). 
She inte~ewed 88 f e d e  victims of domestic violence about the outcomes of their 
efforts to obtain a protection order fiom before the Australian courts. From these 
intewiews she found that it was very difficult to classifi or rneasure the success of their 
efforts. She summarized that for some women, once the order was in place the violence 
stopped. For others their requests for extemal intervention helped them to negotiate 
components of the termination of the relationship, such as child access and support. Still 
others found that their decision to involve the state had mixed benefits and costs. At the 
other extreme, some wmplainants' efforts to involve the state only worsened their abusive 
situations. Overall she found that the majority of women interviewed felt that their efforts 
had assisted them in some fashion. On the issue of diversity among the women she 
inte~ewed she noted: 
In the context of what has oflen been a lengthy relationship within which the 
violent exercise of power and control is an established pattern of behaviour, it is 
hardly surprising if the resort to law does not produce a simple and unarnbiguous 
response. We need to listen closely to women's experiences before imposing 
outcome measures which deny that expenence, and we need to recognise [sic] the 
limitations of simple quantitative measures, what ever their appeal in terms of 
simplifjing the outcome measures used in the analysis." 
Therefore, when contemplating community-based responses it must be recalled that 
assaultive behaviour within a domestic relationship is commonly a very highly charged 
emotional matter with a complicated background. For instance, researchers suspect 
culture may play a significant role in promoting violent behaviour within a domestic 
"J. Stubbs, '"Cornmunitarian' Conferencing and Violence Against Women: A Cautioniiry 
Note" in M. Valverde et al., eds., Wve Assmit and the Criminui Justice System: Isnres 
and Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1 995) at 265. 
relati~nship.~' The restorative justice mode1 w u m e s  that the behaviour is universaiiy 
detested. This may not be an accurate assumption. If culture is playing a role, the 
effectiveness of using an accused's farnily and fiiends t a  provide support and to act as a 
deterrence one wonders what d l  be reinforced beyond the actual supervised group 
counselling sessions. Or even if it can be assumed that the support group selected 
acknowfedges the use of  violence as  abhorrent behaviour, what guarantees exist that this 
support network will be able to positively impact the relationship and its parties on an 
extended basis? This may be particularly difficult $part of the behaviour pattern of an 
abusive male is to isolate the relationship fiom outside influences. 
J. Stubbs also pondered the effectiveness of a cornrnunity-bas4 shaming strategy on the 
ability to modi@ behaviour when it is anchored in a context of power and control 
implemented by men and which is sustained by a number of different variables. She 
explains "vioience against females partners is widely practiced, is sustained by broader 
cultural practices, and needs to be understood in broad social and political tem."" The 
depth with which the proposed responses of a cornmunity- based restorative justice 
solution, regarding the problems systemic oppression towards women, is still not very weii 
understood. 
5 2 ~ e e  D. Counts, J. Brown and J. Campbell, eds., Soncrion dSanctuury: Culrural 
Per~pectives on the Beizti~rg of Wives (Boulder Colo. : Wesîview Press, 1992) as cited by 
the National Research Council, N. Crowell and A Burgess, eds., Understanding Violence 
Againsr Women (Washington: National Academy Press, 1996) at 67. 
"J. Stubbs, stcpru note 5 1 at 278. 
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Consider for a moment that a woman is trapped within a cycle of domestic violence. How 
realistic is it that a woman, isolated fiom her fiiends and f d y  and subjected to repeated 
incidents of violent abuse, could gather support fiom either person's family? Some 
research indicates that women look to the criminal justice systern for heip because they 
were unable to find support and assistance from those in their private lives." Women d m  
worry t hat they wiii not be beiieved because these family members will not know her 
partner to be violent." J. Stubbs found that in her study group women sought court 
orders, in part, because they felt more able to discuss the matter with someone who was 
neutral and removed from the imrnediate relationship." 
LastIy, improved access to criminal justice, as opposed to either "transformativeyy or 
"restorative" justice, must take into account the strong possibility that, regardless of the 
specific cause, the abused woman may be caught in a cycle of violence. Those charged 
with the responsibility of formulating a response to the violence must determine that, due 
to the controlling influences of her unremorsefiil abusive partner, she is not merely a pawn 
being manipulated so that state controlled sanctioning is avoided. J. Stubbs sumrnarizes 
some of the feminist criticisms of community-based mediations in this way: 
%lbid. at 280. See also H. Astor, 7ik Weighi of Silence: Talkïng About Violence in 
Family Mediution, in M. Thomton, ed., Fragile Frontiers: Ferninisi Debares Armnd 
Public and Private (Oxford : Odord University Press, 1 995) as ated by J. Stubbs, supra 
note 5 1. 
Feminist critiques of mediation have drawn attention to the dangers of assuming 
that a woman who has been the target of violence is able to assert her own needs, 
and promote her own interests in the presence of the person who has perpetrated 
that violence. It is the violent partner who is well practiced in meeting their own 
interests through violence, control and manipulation. It is also the case that 
requiring a woman to  come together with her violent partner o r  ex-partner risks 
providing the occasion for more violence and abuse, especially where the parties 
are separated. 
Therefore, because of the complicated background and many unanswered questions that 
exist about the numerous causes and consequences of domestic violence, it is suggested 
that much more research is requireâ to properly assess the role that restorative justice 
principles might play in reducing this costly and potentially tragic behaviour. It is stressed 
that two important issues that must be carefilly determined before such solutions can be 
tested, are the safety of the victims and their children, if any, and the that a power 
imbalance premised on physical domination could have on the resolution of the conflicts 
linked to the violence. 
3. Co-ordinatc Cornmittee Approach to Cnrting and Intcrpnting Studics 
Through the examination of the theories of domestic assault, significant gaps in our 
understanding of the causes, consequences and therefore the most efficient treatments of 
"lbid. at 28 1. See also M. Mahoney, "Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the 
Issue of Separation" (1990-1991) 90 Mich. Law Rev. 1. in this article Mahoney talces the 
position that assaultive behaviour, within a domestic relationship, is about domination and 
the male partner's efforts to  control his spouse through violence. To advance this position 
she examines the stmggle for control that takes place when a woman separates or 
attempts to separate fiom her abusive partner. 
the problem have k e n  revealed. At a minimum, it is suggested that the "one ske  fits ail" 
approach to refonn is an insufficient response to bring about meaninghil access to justice 
and protection for women involved in abusive domestic relationships. This issue was 
contemplated by D. Saunders when he wrote: 
These cases illustrate the great diversity m o n g  husbands who assault: diversity in 
violence severity, alcohol use, social class, childhwd expenences, and other 
factors. Some men are aggressive ody  at home, whereas o t h a s  are aggressive in 
many settings and have a long criminal record. The violence may range fiom a few 
slaps and shoves to life threatening beatings and use of weapons. The backgrounds 
and hence the psychological traits of these men are also diverse. Although the 
patnarchal noms  and stnicture of our society lay a strong foundation for mm's 
violence against intimate partners, the expressions of their aggressive domination 
takes many complex f ~ n n s . ~ '  
It i s  suggested here that there must be a concerted effort, by trained professionals, to 
assess the specific needs of the cornplainant in addition to the treatment needs of the 
accused. Also, special care would be required for those determinhg the appropnateness of 
this form of counselling for couples expressing a desire to continue in a relationship, 
particularty if children are involved. This is so for at least three reasons. First, there is a 
recognized reality that this fonn of  violence usually escalates in its severity. s9 Second, it 
has been s h o w  that children of abusive homes are at greater risk of physical h m  than 
'*D. Saunders, "Husbands Who Assault: Multiple Profiles Requiring Multiple Responses" 
in N. Hilr on, ed ., Leguf R e p n s e s  to Wue AsrcnZt: Current Trends and EvaIuation ( 
Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993) at 10. 
'W. Johnson, "Seriousness, Type and Frequency of  Violence Against Wives" in M. 
Valverde et al. eds., Wve A S S Q U ~  cn>d tlie Crintinaf Justice System: Iscues und Poficies 
(Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1995) at 136. 
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other ~hildren.~ And third, evidence has k e n  gathered that suggests this form of violent 
behavior may be learneû through cxposure to it!'
Once the immediate d e t y  needs of the cornplainant and her children are assessed, a 
suitable prograrn for the accused can be considered. This is not to suggest that every male 
offender should have access to individually stnictured counseîiing. However, a review of 
the literature into the theories of causes and consequence strongly urges that difEerent 
factors need to emphasized during the course of counselling. For example, if a pattern of 
violence seems to be related to the abuse of alcohol then a wmponent of the treatment 
for the offender should include a focus on the recognition of the connection and the nature 
of long term commitments to the treatment of al~oholisrn.~ If on the other hand, a 
60M. Straus and R. Gelles, "How Violent Are Amencan Families? Estimates from the 
National Family Violence Resurvey and Other Studies" in M. Straus and R. Gelies, eds., 
Physicui Violertce in American Families: Risk Factors and A&ptatiom to Violence in 
8.145 Families (New Brunswick, N.J. : Transaction Publishers, 1990) at 95 to 1 12, as 
cited by the National Research Council, supra note 3 1 .  
O'Leary, "Physicd Aggression Between Spouses: A Social Learning Theory 
Perspective" in V. Van Hasselt et al.. eds., Haradbook of Famiiy Violence (New York: 
Plenum, 1 988), describes social leaming theory as a cognitive theory placed in a social 
context. 
62Male drinking patterns, particularly binge drinking, have beai associated to domestic 
violence across al1 ethnic groups and social classes. See G. Kantor, "Redefining the 
Brushstrokes in Portraits on Alcohol and Wife Assaults" in Alcobl cmdlnterperso~~l 
Violence: Fostering Multidisciplitamy Perspectives NIAAA Monograph 24, NM 
Publication No. 93-3496 (Rockville Md.: National Institute on Alwhol Abuse and 
Alcoholism, National Institutes of Health, U. S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1993) as cited by The National Research Council, in N. Crowell and A Burgess, 
eds., Understanding Vïolence Against Wome~ (Washington D.C. :National Academy 
Press, 1 996) at 55.  
cultural myth about violence and gender roles is at the epicmtre of  the violence, then 
those constructs must be identified and responded to through education." 
As well, if children are involved it is suggested that founselling may also repuirecl for 
those indirectly subjected to domestic violence. This is not to suggest that any degree of 
fault should Lx leveled at these young victims of circumstancc, rather this is a pragmatic 
reform suggestion directed at the undoing o f  any misguided learned behaviour. These 
young persons should be educated about why such behaviour is harmfùl and wrong and 
perhaps how communication skills can be developed between partners t o  avoid the control 
and oppression of one life partner by another through the use of violence. Moremer, givm 
the dramatic estirnates as to the degree of under reporting in the incidents of violence, as 
were set out in Chapter One, we can assume that the number of cases currently before the 
criminal justice system represents only the very tip of  the iceberg. I fwe  as a society are 
truly cornmitted to the reduction or perhaps even the elirnination of physical domestic 
abuse, then the education of young people as to these issues should not be exclusively 
reserved for the children of violent offenders brought to  the attention of the state. Schools 
should be required to include as part of their curriculums, education about these matters. 
Boys and girls should be taught about the signs o f  violence, the harms that flow 6om such 
debilitating behaviour and the socially acceptable ways in which aggressive feeling must be 
dealt with. If children are institutionally instructed on issues of street proofing, h d t h  care 
QD. Adams, "Treatment Models Of Men Who Batter: A Proferninist Analysis" in K. Yllo 
and M. Bograd, eds., Ferninisi Perspectives on Wve Abuse (Newbury Park, Cal. : Sage 
Publications, 1988), as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 3 1. 
24 1 
and the responsibilities of srnial intimacy, as if their lives may depended on it, why not 
educate about domestic violence where we know for certain someone's üfe is dependent 
on it?a 
Having considered these treatment issues, the notion of counselling complainants mua be 
addressed. Certainly the most controversiai counselling issue is the concept of "souples 
therapy" for individuals involved in an abusive relationship. Some experts believe that by 
initiating such a process, a woman's d e t y  may be jeopardki." Others suggest that a 
couples dynamic perspective may create, at least by inference, joint responsibility for the 
violent behaviour and therefore present the offender with an opportunity to deny 
responsibility for his aas  of violence." There are very few studies on the effectiveness of 
such treatment approaches, although one was conducted by K. O'Leary. It w m p d  
single-sex group therapies with couples counselling and found significant decreases in the 
number of violent incidents following both types of treatment, one year after the 
individuals had completed the treatments. Still, it is imponant to note that the individuals 
"The National Research Council, stcpra note 3 1 at 101. See statistics on intra familial 
homicide rates discussed in Chapter One. 
65R.E. Dobash and R. Dobash, Wornen. Violence und Social Change (New York: 
Routledge, 1 Wî), as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 3 1 at 13 3. At 
page 244 of the text they note that "a fiindamental principle is to make men responsible for 
their violence. Consequently, couple or farnily counselling is rejected as ineffective, even 
dangerous." 
&M. Bograd, "Family Systems Approaches to Wife Battering: A Feminist Critique" (1984) 
54 Arnerican Journal of Orthopsychiatry 5 58, as cited by the National Research Council, 
supra note 3 1 at 133. 
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in both counselling groups were directed there fiom non-severe violent situations and that 
al1 of the participants in both paradigms wished to remain together." Given the potanid 
for fûriher abuse, it is suggested here that before any fom of couples counsdling is 
introdud into the criminal justice system far more long tenn a comparative studies are 
required. In support of this position it has been reported that rnost experts in the field 
agree that couple fwnselling is inappropriate for coun mandated counselling sessions and 
cases that involve more violent offendersa 
4. A National Research Centre 
This work has attempted to reveal the dramatic complexities associated with the 
phenornena of domestic violence. Numerous studies have been cornpleted by American 
67 K .  O'Leary et al., "An Empirical Comparison of Physical Aggression Couples Treatment 
vs. Gender-specific Treatment, [unreported] paper presented at the 4th International 
Family Violence Research Conference, Durham, New Hampshire, July 21 - 24, 1995, 
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook; as cited by the 
National Research Council, srrÿra note 3 1 at 134. 
68EE. Gondolf, "Batterer Intervention: What We Need to Know" [unreported] paper 
prepared for the Violence Against Women Strategic Planning Meeting, National Institute 
of Justice, Washington D.C., March 3 1, 1995. Mid-Atlantic Addiction Training Institute, 
Indiana University of Pennsylvania; as cited by The National Resuvch Council, mpru note 
3 1 at 1 34. See also E. Gondolf and E. Fisher, Battered Women as Suntivors 
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1988) at 73: "severe police action is likely to be the 
most effective with the sporadic and chronic batterers who have linle previous contact 
wit h the police."See dso M. Whalen, Cmnseling tu End Violence Againrr Wornen: A 
Subversive Mode1 (Thousand Oaks Cal.: Sage Publications, 1996) at 64, where she 
rejects wuples counselling because physically abused women csn never be fra fiom their 
partner's intimidation. As a result fernale Mctims cannot participate h l y ,  equaily and 
without fear of reprisal. 
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and Canadian researchers to identitjl andlor elirninate both causes and consequences of 
this behaviour. Similady, as new solutions and treatment initiatives are proposecl, their 
effectiveness at reducing the violence is k i n g  tested. What is required to CO-ordinate and 
disseminate this new information is a national research centre. To avoid the necessity of 
recreating the wheel at each new tum, researchers should be made aware of past and 
current work being done in the field. This could be done through a central a jpcy  
delegated to keep abreast of the studies and to co-ordinate new research. Such a centre 
could also monitor the types of work being done so that more longitudinal studies can be 
completed. In short, the center could promote the collaboration between researchers and 
practitioners so that study results could be integrated into new criminal justice initiatives." 
This is an imporuint piece of the puzzle that is currently missing in our societyy s 
cornmitment to increase Our understanding of the problem. 
Another difficulty in the field is a lack of terrninologicd wnsistency. H. Johnson and V. 
Sacco, in their anaiysis of Statistics Canada's national survey on violence against women, 
note that: 
Definitions of violence against women in the research literature Vary widely. Some 
include psychological and emotional abuse, financid abuse, and sexual coercion, as 
well as physical and senial assault as legally defined." 
@National Research Council, N. Crowell and k Burgess, eds., (Inderstlanding fioieme 
Againsf Women (Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1996) at 153. They suggest 
the development of three or four Arnerican regionai centers to improve research capacity 
and strengthening researchers and service providers collaôoration. 
'%. Johnson and V. Sacco, "Researching Violence Against Women: Statistics Canada's 
National Survey" (1 995) 37 Canadian Journal of Criminology 28 1 at 289. 
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In addition to the types of behaviour researched, others have studied incidents of 
assaultive behaviour between intimates dong side other foms  of abuse that may dso 
occur in familial settings, such as child and elder abuse. A national research center could 
be of some assistance to those gathering data in the field in the recognition of these 
variables and perhaps support the use of a cornmon measure of violence. For example, M. 
Straus developed a sale  of nine escdating physical violence items called the Cotiflict 
Tactic Scale.'l The use of such a standardized mode1 could allow for more concise 
comparisons between findings and measuring the impact of different criminal justice 
response. 
Similarly, there must be some general guides regarding the measurement of success for 
different initiatives. Currently, how success is measured varies widely. 1s recidivism the 
key, or should the yardstick measure overall incidents reported to the police? Are 
conviction rates an indication of success? If culture does play a role should these statistics 
be monitored so that resources and efforts can be channeled where they may be needed 
most? Or perhaps a primary goal should be the completion of a treatment program. If so, 
then efforts to modiQ programs to specific needs must be measured in some consistent 
fashion. Again, it is suggested here that the use of a national research centre could assist in 
setting national standards for the measurement and assessrnent of the impact that digerent 
"M. Straus, "Measunng Family Violence. The C o d i a  Tactic Scale" (1979) 41 Journal of 
Marriage and the Family 75, as cited by the National Research Council, supra note 3 1. 
See also W. DeKeseredy and B. MacLean, "Researching Women Abuse in Canada: A 
Realist Critique of The Conflia Scale" (1 990) 25 Canadian Review of Social Policy 19. 
initiatives have on a comparative basis. 
To advance the position that there is a significant need for a national research cmtre, three 
different societal responses to domestic violence are considered. In Manitoba, the 
Winnipeg Family Violence Court (FVC) began its operations on September 17, 1990.~ 
The goal of the program was to provide a better environment in which to process " f d y  
violence" cases? The desired effêcts were to include a more expeditious proassing of 
cases through the use of speciaily trained court judges and prosecutors. Their training 
incorporated their experiences to help increase their contextual understanding of funily 
violence cases. After the first year, results were analyzed and it was found that, "the 
performance of the FVC in the first year was outstanding in its achievement of expeditious 
processing, high conviction rates and consistent and appropriate sentencing."" 
In the province of Saskatchewan, the Victims of Domestic Yiolence Act7' was proclaimed 
'=E. Ursel, Win~~ipeg Fmily VïoIence Court Evahation. Reswch, Statistics and 
Evaluation Directorate, WD l995-2e (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1995) at ix. 
731bid The farnily violence cases evaluated included spousd assaults, child abuse and elder 
abuse cases. 
716~d at ix. This report focuscd on the second year of the FVC's operation. First, it 
examined to what extent the FVC could maintain its momentum in light of the inaease in 
the number of cases that it dealt with. Second, it studied the relationship between the W C  
and the other nonspecialized criminal courts in the province in an attempt to cornparatively 
measure its success and efficiency. 
'' S.S. 1994, v-6 .O2 [hereinafter YDVA]. 
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on February 1, 1995. In an effort to  improve on the unresponsiveness of the criminai 
justice system to  the needs of  abused women, additional options were legislatively created. 
These options included "assisting women promptly &er an offence is reporteci; providing 
immediate assistance on property matters; removing an abuser fiom the f d y  home; and 
seeking alternatives for victims who do not report abuse to m y  agaicy."" The legislation 
created three basic types of remedies t b t  were designed to  enfiance the provisions of the 
Criminal Code and related provincial statutes, to help the victims of domestic violence. 
These remedies involved emergency intervention orders, victim assistance orders and 
warrants of entry." An undertaking was initiated to  assess the implementation phase of  
this new response, regarding its impact on assisting the victims of domestic violence and 
the degree to which the objectives of the Act have been met. Data was coilected through 
file reviews, the analysis o f  administrative data and personal i n t e ~ e w s  of both victirns 
and a number of key individuals involved in the criminal justice system, including justices 
of the peace, judges, lawyers, police and victim services personnel. ïhrough this process it 
was detennined that more education and training was required for the persons responsible 
for the implementation of the legislation." Also, it w u  revealed that a consistent method 
of identifjing the orders used across police services and courts was needed, in addition to 
the production of monthly police statistical reports. 
"Prairie Research Associates Inc., Review of the Saskatchewan Victims of Domestic 
Violence Act, WD 1996-6e (Ottawa: Department of  Justice Canada, 1996) at 1. 
"lbid at 1. See also the VDVA, supra note 75, sections 3, 7 and 1 1. 
The mandatory charging policy in the Yukon was dso recently reviewed. This polis, 
evolved fiom a public statement issued by the Minister of Justice and the Solicitor General 
in December of 1983. The purpose of the staternent was to  initiate a directive that would 
remove fiom the victims of domestic assault the responsibility for initiating criminal 
charges and to ensure that both the police and the prosecutors would prioritize domestic 
assault cases. Over a 12 month period, ending in December 1995, a study was conducted 
to examine the "effectiveness and impact of criminal juslice interventions in spousai assault 
cases, and the potentiai limitation of mandatory charge 1 pro-arrest policies" of a directive 
initiated 1 1 yean earlier? The study involved a number of interviews with criminal 
justice, social service and First Nations respondents, victims of domestic assaults and 
domestic assault offenders. A primary concern for the organizers of the study was that it 
should reflect a strong cornrnunity base. As a result, T. Roberts, the author of the report, 
explained that the format of the study was: 
not based on a quantitative analysis of al1 spousal assault cases over an extendecl 
period of time, nor a tracking methodology, but rather on the subjective and 
experience based responses of groups an individuals that have been involved with 
the issues of spousal assaults in the Y u k ~ n . ~  
With regards to the criminalization of domestic violence, al1 respondents supported the 
concept of mandatory charging, based on the notions that there should be a clear message 
sent to society that such behaviour is unacceptable and that victims of family violence need 
'PT. Roberts, S p ~ s a I  Asundt and M d t o r y  Chatpitg in the Y h n :  -riences. 
Perspectives and Alternatives, WD1996-3e, Research, Statistics and Evaluation 
Directorate (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 19%) at Wi. 
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protection fiom their abusive partners. Yet, there was "considerable division" in those 
polled over whether mandatory charges should necessarily lead t o  the mandatory 
prosecution of those charges." Victims in particular, wanted the criminai justice system to  
"validate their perceptions, d u c e  their isolation, and hear their needs? It was the 
perception of many of those that responded that these goals muld be accomplished 
without a criminal trial and state sanctioning. Also, the study found that the mandatory 
charging policy did very little to encourage the reporting of incidents. T. Roberts wrote: 
Roughly 70 percent of community respondents feel the policy has been consistently 
applied, although there is certainly evidence that discretion and inconsistency still 
exist. Nonetheless, there is a strong consensus that the actual incidence o f  spousal 
assault remains considerably higher than the incidence of report, and two-thirds of 
victims did not report earlier a ~ s a u l t s . ~  
In the end, the report concludes that the e f f i  of mandatory charging may in fact be 
counter productive to the prirnary aims of  the 11 year old directive, specitically the 
removal of the responsibility tiom the victims of domestic violence for the initiation of 
criminal charges. 
Therefore, it is argued here that while al1 three of these studies are important, each of them 
%id. at 1 1 1. The conclusions of  this study were based on the feedback fiom victims, 
offenders, and community respondents interview4 fiom the time of an alleged incident 
through the reporting, processing, enforcement up until the final outcome stages of state 
response. 
"Ibid. at 1 1 2. Note that the study dso addresses cultural issues (the differences between 
First Nations and non-Fint Nations Respondents) and the disparity of resourçn, between 
the larger and smaller communities. 
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is very different fiom the others. Their methodologies, that set out t o  increase society's 
understanding of the domestic w o u l t  problem and to hopefully improve the manner in 
which the criminal justice system responds to  this type of criminai offence, are as varied as 
the initiatives they examined. To increase the studies value to  the eradication of  the 
societal problem on a broader national level, a central specialized and highly skilled 
resource centre could be used to both di- and superimpose individual findings of these 
types of studies on some of the common themes discussed in chapter three, such as the 
causes and consequences of domestic violence. This would make a more efficient use of 
the time and monies spent on researching domestic violence by individuai comrnunities by 
avoiding duplication, building on the consistent findings and promot ing funher and longer 
term studies on the inconsistent o r  contrary findings? 
(D) Conclusions 
Two inequalities of the criminal justice system have been presented in this thesis. First, the 
courts have failed female complainants of sexuai assault by balancing their Charter 
" A n  article written by L. MacLeod reviews some of the issues exrunined at a one-day 
workshop on wife assault and the criminal justice system. It was held it Toronto on 
November 25, 1994. Her article summarizes some of the findings fiom a number of recent 
criminal justice responses, including the Winnipeg Farnily Violence Court and the 
Saskatchewan Victims of Violence Act. See L. MacLed, "Expanding the Dialogue: 
Report of a Workshop to Explore the Criminal Justice System Response to  Violence 
Against Women" in M. Valverde, L. MacLeod and K. Johnson eds., Wge AssmIt and the 
Crimird Jt~stice System: Iswes and Policies (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1995) 13 
at 20 to 24. 
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guaranteed right to equality before the law and their right to privacy below the right's of 
an accused to full answer and defence. The reforms wggested here would have the effkct 
of rebalancing these cornpethg interests by the reliance upon the doctrine of judicial notice 
of the legislative fact of significant h m  that flows fiom the opening of a complainant's 
counselling records. Such a legal principle would not absolutely exclude the availabiiity of 
a complainant's counsdling or therapeutic records in al1 ciraimstances. This reform would 
work to avoid the h m  that would flow, to the accuseci, fiom a miscarriage of justice 
created by the possibili ty of relevant evidence being absolutely banned fiom access. Yet it 
would, in effect, firmly place on an accused person the responsibility of presenting 
evidence to establish that the record is likely relevant to an issue at trial and that the 
production of the record is necessary in the interest ofjustice before such records are 
opened and a women's right to privacy are trampled needlessly. The hop is that such 
reform would also open access to justice for women who have been sexually assautteci by 
guaranteeing that their most private mental health files and records are not opened by an 
accused on a violative fishing expedition. 
Second, it has been argued that physically abused women have been denied real access to 
a criminal justice by a system that has failed to appreciate the numerous causes and 
consequences to domestic assault. In the reforms suggested for domestic assault, it has 
been stressed that the key to making significant progress is a collaborative effort fiom al1 
interested parties. The eradication of the problem will not come fiom one single reform 
but rather fiom a series of initiatives that assess the real needs of abused wornen and the 
25 1 
complex causes and consequences of the violent behaviour of their male partners. It has 
been stressed that this type of assessrnent requires a contextualization of the violence 
within the individual relationship as well as the accompanying broader societal issues. The 
restorative justice principles may very well play a role in the solution to this social 
dilernma, but more research is needed before an abused woman's d e t y  is placeci at risk. 
The significance of this nsk presented itself twice during the preparation of this chapter. 
On June 1 1, 1999, Ms. Samson was shot to death at a sheltet for abused women in 
Quebec. Her estranged paner, Marcel Samson, set fire to the couple's home that they 
shared for 20 years, then forced his way into the shelter, found Ms- Samson and shot her 
seven times with a hunting rifle, as ten other women and children "cowered nearby." 1. 
Peritz, a writer for the Globe and Mail, reported that, "only hours before her deaîh, she 
tolc! staffers that she would not return home because she faireci for her life."" On June 
25, 1999, Rhonda Nickerson was shot and killed, by her estranged husband, in her parents 
home on Cape Sable Island, Nova Scotia. Barry Nickerson had been released fiom 
custody, pending the resolution of a number of domestic assault and uttering death threat 
charges, laid in April of 1999 and alleged to have taken place back as far as 1983. At the 
time he shot and killed his wife, he was enrolled in a male batterers counselIing program. 
M e r  killing Ms. Nickerson, he tumed the gun on himself and took his own life? These 
"1. Peritz, The Globe and Mail, "Quebec Woman Shot to Death at Shelter for Battered 
Women," 11 June 1999, A 2  
86B. Medel, The Mail-S tar, "Murder-Suicide gun already in house," 28 June 1 999, Al. 
The article indicates that Mr. Nickerson was attending the "Men at Peace" volunteer-nin 
program, in Yarmouth Nova, Scotia. 
horrific stories not only depict the gravity of the potential consequemes of domestic 
assault, but also emphasize the immediate ne& for workable solutions to this shocking, 
shameftl and sometimes deadly behaviour- To expedite these reforms, it has also been 
urged that a national research centre should be created so that solutions can be identifid 
and efficiently implemented. As we have seen, human lives depend on effective initiatives 
and answers. 
CELAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of "equai" treatment that has been presented in this thesis has been adopted 
fiom the Canadian jurisprudence. This theory of equality rejects the notion of the same 
treatment for dl means equal treatment for everyone. It champions the realizations of 
McIntrye J. t hat "identical treatment may fiquently produce serious inequalitf" and that 
the essence of true equality is the ac«>rnmodations of differen~es.~ The key to deterrnining 
what these differences are requires an analysis that is purposive and contextuai.' The 
answer to assessing context is the identification of the interrelationships between social 
variables and how these variables are linked to one another within the realm of law. 
The disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic or counselling records and 
two recent criminal justice responses to the crime of domestic violence demonstrate the 
complexities associated with the gender inequalities that exist in the Canadian criminal 
justice system. The unequal treatment of these female complainants and witnesses has 
been anchored in the criminal justice system's failure to appreciate the issues ~ ~ ~ e c t e d  to 
these dilemmas within their proper context. In other words, the criminal justice system has 
failed to properly contextualize these gender specific issues. 
'Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) at 10. 
3Law v. Millister of Htman Resources Developmen?, File No. : 25374, judgement March 
25, 1999 (S.C.C.). 
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A number of  choices were made in this thesis about the terms used to discuss these topics. 
It was admitted that the terms eventually selected were far fiom ideal and were iduenced 
by the author's own gender and experiences, including those as a legal practitioner and 
prosecutor. The t e m s  used to discuss these issues and, most importanly, the process of 
contextualizing them is a critical component of the exercise. Since these issues d'iectiy 
impact women and because these women often fwl marginalized and ignored by the 
criminal process, it is concluded that they should be given a voice in the debates regarding 
these serious problems, their potentiai tragic wnsequences and their solutions. 
The complexities of  women's lives, specifically as complainants whose lives have been 
af5ected by criminal violence, was highlighted throughout this work. The inequality of 
women's treatment within the cnminal justice system was presented through the contlias 
that arise between their interests, needs and rights and the rights of  an accused person to 
full answer and defence. To help understand these conflicts and the potential for refomu 
to  these problems, the procedural nature of a criminal trial was outlined. The concepts of 
the litigation parties and due process were also explored. 
The scope of the problern was discussed fiom the perspectives of  tiequency and the 
signifiant strife of  female victims' under-reporting incidents of violence. It has been 
estimated that approximately one third (29%) of Canadian women who have ever been 
married o r  lived in a cornmon law relationship have been physicaily o r  sexually assaultd 
by their partner at some point during the term of that relationship.' According to the 
Homicide Surwey. in 1991, 270 women in Canada were murdered.' Investigative agencies 
reported that of this number, 225 were classified as solved. From this category it was 
determined that 2 10 of these murdered women were killed by men and 12 1 of these 
victims were killed by their intimate partners. During the time it took this author to edit 
and revise one chapter of this thesis, two more female victims were killed by their spouses 
afier they tried to unsuccessfùlly end the violence in their homes that controiled their 
lives! For these women the tenn " s u ~ v o r "  Mgs hollow. We as a society can no longer 
debate policy. The number of lives that are affêcted by this type of dangerous and 
potentially fatal conduct heightens the desperate need for changes. The under-reporting 
exasperates this issue and presents a platform for denied access to justice is yet another 
consequence of this form of gender inequality. The law must react quickly before more 
lives are lost and destroyed. It is urged that the key to meaningfùl improvements is 
contextualism as the standard of judicial analysis and protection through the equaiity rights 
'Family Violence Initiative Program and Health Canada and Statistics Canada, as cited in 
the Fimi  Report. F m  Rhetoric to Reaiïty E d i n g  Domestic Violence in Nova Scotia, 
Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, February 1995. See also K. Rodgers, "Wife 
Assault: The Findings of the National Survey" Juristat, March 1994, Vol. 14, No. 9, Cat. 
85-002. 
'Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics n>e Homicide Surwy, f 991 (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada, 1993). 
61. Peritz, The Globe and Mail, "Quebec Women Shot to Death at Shelter for Battered 
Women," 1 1 June 1999, A2; B. Medel, The Mail Star, "Murder-Suicide gun already in 
house," 28 June 1999, Al. 
guaranteed under section 15 of the Charter. ' 
The law's current response to the issue of the disclosure of a sexual assauIt complainant's 
therapeutic or counselling records was presented in a chronological manner. The courts' 
response to the procedural and evidential issues was analyzed through a detailed review of 
the O 'Connor case' and the legislation, Bill C46,' that followed t hat decision. The cases, 
particularly R v. Mills.1° that tested the constitutionality of the Bill C-46 were also 
reviewed. The central theme in this component of this thesis was the courts' balancing of 
the competing interests of the male accused and the female complainant. More specifically, 
the recognition and treatment of the accused's Charter guaranteed right to f û U  answer and 
defence was compared to the complainant 's right to privacy and equality before the law. It 
is concluded that the effect of the courts' efforts to balance these competing interests 
resulted in a hierarchy of rights, with those of women complainants balanceci below the 
rights' of the male accused. Based on this, it is suggested that the reasons reiied on by the 
courts to assess these conflicting interests often neglect the tme context of these records. 
The courts have failed to recognize and weigh the impact that the opening and disclosing 
these records, particularly to an accused person, had on a complainant. As well, the courts 
'Canadian Charier of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Consiiution Act, 1982, king 
Schedule B to the CCIIMdu Act, 1982 (U.K.), c. 1 1 [hereinafter " C h t e r " ] .  
'R. V .  O'Connor (1994), 89 C.C.C. (36) 109 (B.C.C.A.); (1996)' 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 
(S.C.C.); R v. O'Corrnor (No. 2) (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (B.C.C.A). 
'Criminal Code R.S., c. C-46 [hereinafter Criminal Code]. 
''(1997)' 205 A.R. 321; 207 A.R. 161 (Q.B.), on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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have failed to assess the consequences associated with such a breach of these extremely 
private materials rnigiit have on other victirns' willingness to access justice in the criminal 
courts. One additional issue presented in this work was the lever of recognition by the 
courts of the complainant's rights. The evolution of these rights to Charter statu, 
particularly an equality right, was achieved t hrough an examination of the Supreme 
Court's assessrnent of similar issues within the civil law context. As well, the Supreme 
Court's deliberation of a class privilege for these types of records was looked at in the 
case of L.L.A. v. BeharrieII." This assisted in the presentation of an argument that 
supported that need for the courts to acknowledge victirns' rights as equally guaranteed by 
the Charfer as t hose of the accused. 
In an effort to analyze some of its shortcornings, the crirninal justice system's foilure to 
contextualize women's lives afler having been exposed to male violent behaviour was 
revealed. At the core of these problerns is an unsuccessfùl appreciation of the context of 
the issues, including the causes and consequences of this deplorabte criminal behaviour. 
To begin to unravel these issues the theories of domestic assault were summarizeâ. Two 
recent criminal justice responses to domestic violence were andyzed. The first initiative 
was the "K Court" model commenced in Toronto. This program has been created, in part, 
to improve the effectiveness of the criminal courts fact finding mission of a trial. It is 
premised on a multi-professional cornmitment to the reformed treatment of domestic 
assault charges. Police as investigators, Crown Attorney's as prosecutors and judges as 
11(1 999, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 92 (S.C.C.). 
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trien of both facts and law were trsined to msure an appreciation of the complexities 
connected with an assaultive domestic reiationship, including the phenornenon of a 
recanting mmplainant. This is acknowledged as a positive aep towards a contextu al 
appreciation of the issues linked to domestic violence, but it is stressed that it has failed to 
go far enough to truly impact the varied causes and consequences of domestic violence. 
This response was compared to the plea and conditional discharge coun model, 
implemented in a number of different juridictions throughout Ontario. This initiative 
inchdes the court ordered treatment of accused persons through court mandated 
counselli ng sessions for t heir abusiveness. Once completed the criminal justice system then 
rewards the accused's acknowledgement of guilt and cornmitment to change with a 
conditional discharge and perhaps some additional f o m  of deterrence. 
Related to the prosecution of domestic assault charges, a number of the cases that 
addressed the treatment of a recanting complainant's evidence were examined. This 
required an examination of the Supreme Court's creation and adaptation of a principled 
approach to the admission of hearsay evidence for the truth ofits content. The leading 
cases of R. v. R v. B.(K.G.),13 R v. Smith," and R v. L~.(F.J.)'~ were briefed and 
"[1990] 2 S.C.R. 53 1; 59 C.C.C. 92 (S.C.C.). 
'3(1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
14[1992] 2 S.C.R. 915; 75 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.). 
lS(1995), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
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their principles were applied to the issues oRen co~ected to  the prosecution of domestic 
assault charges. One case directly on point that was also scrutinized was R v. Mchmed l6 
Ot her recent cases that addressed the issue of the admission of hearsay evidence in a 
criminal trial were also presented. Of significance in these cases was the courts' 
consideration of a statement's reliability and extemal guarantees of trustworthiness. It is 
reasoned that a truly principled approach to hearsay refonn, combined with certain 
fundamental evidence concepts and the context of domestic violence itseK require the 
courts to consider al1 possible factors that support or detract fiom the reliability of a 
recanting witness's original statement of cornplaint. 
Moreover, in the analysis of these recent hearsay cases one other gender issue is revded. 
SpecificaIly regarding equality, it would appear that a residual discretion exists with trial 
judges to allow the necessity for f i I l  answer and defence to trump the requirement for 
reliability. It is emphasized that this right is the identical premise that is relied upon to 
allow the rights of a male accused to be "balanced" above the rights of a female sexud 
assault cornplainant to privacy and equality before the law. 
To refom these failures it is urged that meaninfil changes require a contextuai 
appreciation of the problems. To irnprove the equality rights of  female complainants, 
modifications to the criminai justice system are required. These modifications must 
accommodate the gender differences linked with surviving violent crime. The failure to do 
16[1 9971 O. J. NO. 1287 (Ont. Prov Div.). 
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so violates women's essential human dignity and fieedom, guaranteed to al1 citizens under 
the Charter. 
With regards to the disclosure of a sexual assault complainant's therapeutic or counselling 
records a reconstnicted approach to balancing the competing interests of a male accused 
and a female complainant is suggested. fudicial notice of the significant harm that flows 
fiom to a sexual assault complainant fiom either the delaying of treatment or the 
interruption of her counseiling process is an alternative available to  the courts to avoid the 
revictimization of a woman's integrity and human dignity. Support for this refonn can be 
found in the wording and intent of Bill C-46. This legislation establishes both an onus on 
the accused seeking the disclosure of these highly sensitive and personal records, as well 
as a number of factors that cannot be regarded as sufficient for making the case for 
disclosure. The codification also provides a Iist of permissible considerations that a judge 
must contemplate when requested to determine the appropriateness of a disclosure 
request. These provisions assist judges in resolving the conflict between the competing 
interests and the judicial notice of the h m  linked to this process. The doctrine of judicid 
notice allows the courts to consider societal impact issues, including the chilling effect 
that this type of privacy invasion may have on women's acKEs to  justice in the criminai 
courts, within the classification of legislative fact. Support for this position is also 
bolstered by academics' writing on the subject, some analogous case law deaiing with the 
issue of the h m  that flows fiom racism and /or a principled argument premised in 
context. 
26 1 
Related to the dilernma of domestic violence the reforrns tabled in this work focussed on 
the diversity of causes and consequences linked to the criminai behaviour. To start, it is 
proposed that both of the recent Ontario initiatives, a rigorous prosecution mode1 and a 
court mandated treatment based detenence approach, must exist together. A conviction 
for a physidly abusive male at the end of the day without counselling retums a troubled 
and physically dominating mais back into a repeating cycle of violence. This resu1ts in 
great risk to his female partner and perhaps their children. Similarly, a lenient treatment 
course, without the threat of other traditionai criminal punishments, including 
incarceration, fails to provide for the possibility of a less than cornmitted maûe who drops 
out of his counselling session. This male could then end up back in a home where he teels 
invincible and continues to control his female partner with Unmunit.. Given the d a t i n g  
nature of this form of violence both scenarios present unacceptable risks to an innocent 
Party- 
Regarding the contextualization of these initiatives it is concluded that because domestic 
violence may have a nurnber ofdifferent causes and consequences, then a one size fits ail 
treatment is less than an effective solution. It is emphasized that regardless of how a 
batterer finds his way into a treatment program some expert form of assessrnent is needed 
to properly channel his specific problems into a particular type of counselling. Also, other 
options such as the cornmunity based restorative justice philosophy need to be explored. 
The strengths and weaknesses of these alternatives must be assesseci with specïd attention 
paid to the context of the cyclical nature of domestic violence. More research is needed 
before women who have been manipulated by their male partners through the use of 
physical violence are placed at the centre of any process established to terminate the 
abuse. To avoid the same pitfalls associated with the conventional criminal justice system's 
treatment of dornestic violence women's equality rights must remain the focus of this 
reform. Policy advisors and politicians entrusted to protect the wlnerable in society must 
not be distracted by issues of expense and efficiency if this problern is to be successflllly 
battled. 
This imperative for additional research l a d s  to the conclusion that what is needed is a co- 
ordinated committee approach to creating and interpreting existing and fbture studies. 
This could best be achieved through a national research centre, established to pool 
information and make the most efficient use of the information that is available, planning 
future studies and avoiding costly duplications. Three different progrms initiated in three 
different parts of the country were examineci to help make this point. It is stressed that 
domestic violence is a cntical problem with many complicated layers. It is time that we as 
a society commit to ending the needless waste of precious opportunity and lives. More 
than women's equality, essential humanity dignity and freedom is at risk- 
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